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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Toward a Conceptualization of Metacognition: Background and Relevant Literature 
 
In a special issue of Educational Psychology Review focused on Metacognition (Mc), 
Self-regulation (SR) and Self-Regulated Learning (SRL), Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin 
(2008) reviewed how these related constructs have been conceptualized and measured in the 
literature. It will likely not surprise researchers in these areas that these constructs were explicitly 
defined by researchers in only 49% of the studies reviewed; this was particularly true for Mc 
(32%; 39/123 studies). In addition, when these constructs were defined, they were often 
interchangeably conceptualized (i.e., the same or similar definition given for Mc in one paper 
was given for SR in another) (Dinsmore, et al., 2008). Furthermore, variants of seven keywords 
(monitor, control, regulate, cognition, motivation, behavior, and knowledge) were reiterated in 
explicit definitions of these constructs to varying degrees across the different constructs (see 
Table 1.1). This analysis indicated differential emphases among the constructs, specifically 
between Mc and SR/SRL indicating that SR/SRL had a broader emphasis compared to Mc. This 
was evidenced by the higher proportions of the keywords “cognition,” “motivation,” and 
“behavior” in definitions of SR/SRL (when they were explicitly defined which was 57% of the 
time for SR and 69% of the time for SRL) compared to the targeted way that Mc was defined 
with minimal keywords related to “motivation” or “behavior.”  Additionally, the keyword, 
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“knowledge” was used far more frequently in reference to Mc than SR or SRL. Interestingly, the 
keywords “monitor” and “control” were only slightly more frequently used as keywords for Mc 
over SR, and SRL though these term have been used in seminal definitions of Mc from its  
inception (i.e., Flavell 1979) to Nelson and Narens’ (1990) prominent model of metamemory 
processes.  
Table 1.1. 
Percentage of SRL Studies with Keywords Appearing in Explicit Definitions 
 Metacognition (Mc) Self-regulation (SR) Self-regulated Learning (SRL) 
Monitor 51 35 39 
Control 49 39 33 
Regulate 44 * * 
Cognition * 48 43 
Motivation 03 42 50 
Behavior 05 42 39 
Knowledge 59 06 15 
Notes: Adapted from Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008, p. 400 
           * Authors did not code the nested term cognition for Mc nor regulation for SR or SRL 
 
It may be that, as Dinsmore et al. (2008) speculated, a key difference between Mc and 
SR/SRL related to monitoring and control processes is the focus on what is being monitored or 
controlled, which is often not emphasized by researchers in operationalizations or keywords; it 
may be that behavior, emotions, motivation, and/or cognition are being monitored and controlled 
for SR/SRL whereas cognition specifically is being monitored and controlled for Mc. This is an 
important distinction for researchers to make.  
The review described above suggests a substantial amount of conceptual overlap in this 
terrain. This overlap extends to the tools and the manner in which researchers measure these 
constructs (e.g., Veenman 2007; Marulis, Baker, Basilio, & Whitebread, in preparation). When 
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Dinsmore et al. (2008) analyzed the alignment between authors’ construct definitions and the 
types of measures they used, they found that more than 92% of the SRL studies had full 
alignment whereas this dropped to 71% for Mc and 63% for SR studies.  The authors concluded 
with a plea for researchers and educators to be ‘vigilant’ in the way they conceptualize and 
measure these interrelated (though distinct) constructs. This is what my dissertation studies were 
designed to address: The conceptualization and measurement of early metacognitive processes.  
Origins and Models of Metacognition 
 Metacognition, coined by John Flavell (1976), is how one monitors or thinks about one’s 
own cognition. At its essence, it is “thinking about one’s own thinking.”  In his seminal paper, 
Flavell (1976) focused broadly on several “metas” that he believed were of utmost importance to 
learning (and particularly to problem-solving). The first “meta” he mentioned (that children 
gradually acquire through information storage and retrieval) was being aware of situations in 
which intentional, conscious storage of particular information may be beneficial to future 
learning (e.g., a math fact or effective reading comprehension strategy). The second was keeping 
this information current and at the ready (e.g., monitor this information and change it with any 
new information or when it becomes clear that it is not accurate or effective and be ready to 
retrieve it when needed). The third, was when the information was not deliberately stored for 
subsequent usage (i.e., when this need was unable to be anticipated), making purposeful and 
systematic searches for any and all stored information with the potential to facilitate solving a 
problem. Flavell notes his deliberate avoidance of using the term ‘memory’ when describing 
these metaskills because he says that these processes could be internal or external (e.g., the use 
of notes previously taken or a concept map previously created).  Prior to the 1976 paper, 
however, Flavell wrote about “metamemory” and conducted research on this construct (e.g., 
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Flavell, 1971; Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975), so the distinction is not clear cut. Even 
Flavell himself indicated that memory can be viewed as “in good part just applied cognition” 
(1971, p. 273). I share this view that memory is just one (albeit key) type of cognition, though 
prefer the term metacognition to metamemory as it subsumes all other “metas” related to 
cognitive processing and has a closer connection to authentic learning contexts that rarely recruit 
only one cognitive process. Such a distinction would be important when, for example, 
investigating associations between metamemory and memory skills compared to associations 
between attention and attention skills. However, as that type of examination is not my focus, I 
will use the term metacognition (Mc) throughout this multiple-manuscript dissertation.   
Flavell’s original conception of Mc—framed within the information processing theory of 
cognitive development—was that of  Piagetian stage theory wherein, with development and 
experience, we learn to better monitor our thinking by understanding what we need to monitor 
and regulating our thinking by setting goals and initiating strategies to achieve these goals and 
assess progress. Flavell, in creating a model of cognitive monitoring (1979), parsed Mc into four 
main components as follows: metacognitive knowledge (McK1) including knowledge of one’s 
self and others’ thinking, tasks, and strategies; metacognitive experiences (McE) which include 
conscious experiences related to thinking (cognitive or affective); cognitive goals or tasks, which 
are the objectives of thinking; and cognitive actions or strategies, which are the cognitions and/or 
behaviors that are enacted to achieve the cognitive goals.  Flavell emphasized that the successful 
and efficient interaction of these four processes could lead to greater levels of learning and 
                                                            
1 Included declarative (knowledge about one’s own capabilities/abilities and factors that may influence processing 
and performance), procedural (knowledge related to how to execute procedures and strategies) and conditional 
(knowledge about when and why to apply particular actions and strategies). 
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performance (through developing and applying metacognitive skills). See Figure 1.1 (Flavell, 
1979).  
 
Figure 1.1.  Flavell’s model of cognitive monitoring (1979). 
Interestingly, though some of Flavell and colleagues’ early work would be categorized 
within a deficit model approach, he was explicit that this was not his overarching emphasis: “...it 
will naturally be very important to try to discover the early competencies that serve as building 
blocks for subsequent acquisitions rather than merely cataloging the young child’s metacognitive 
lacks and inadequacies” (1979, p. 909). 
  Though these seminal papers (Flavell, 1976; 1979) mark the official unveiling of the term 
“metacognition” in psychological and educational research, there was a long previous history of 
reference to similar concepts such as reflection or introspection, traces of which can be seen as 
far back as the musings of Plato, Aristotle and Simonides (403 B.C.).  John Locke, in 1690, 
introduced greater specification by distinguishing “reflection” as a more important and 
privileged form of thinking than other forms or “sensations” that do not tend to produce “long-
lasting ideas” or deep levels of understanding (Locke, 1690 as cited in Brown, 1987, p. 70). 
Furthermore, early educators such as John Dewey had similar ideas. In his Pedagogic Creed 
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(1897), Dewey stated his belief that the learning process would be disorganized and unsystematic 
(and thus not “educative”) when left unexamined and that by looking within one’s psychological 
processes would lead to educative leverage (Dewey, 1897). It is likely that the influence of 
behaviorism in the field of psychology in the early 20th century is related to the hiatus in 
research and theorizing about Mc (and the resurgence just after the shift from behaviorism to 
cognition with the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s). 
Around the same time that Flavell was exploring this new conceptualization, Ann Brown, 
wrote a paper entitled, “Knowing when, where, and how to remember: A problem of 
metacognition” (Brown, 1978). She focused on the importance of Mc as a distinct entity in 
studying developmental cognition and learning rather than an add-on or product of cognition. 
Brown framed Mc within efficient thinking, which she purported to be made up of several basic 
characteristics: “predicting, checking, monitoring, reality testing, and coordination and control of 
deliberate attempts to learn or solve problems” (1978, p. 78). However, she emphasized the 
significance of the addition of this new conceptualization (Mc) of what may have been viewed as 
simply good study skills or good thinking. Her justification was based on the “change of 
emphasis” inherent in this term—rather than its being simply an epiphenomenon—from 
“cognitions themselves” to “knowledge about one’s own cognitions” (Brown, 1978, p. 79). Later 
studies have provided empirical evidence supporting this claim indicating that the “meta” does 
provide distinct information (e.g., modest correlations, r=.42, between metamemory and memory 
across a wide range of learning contexts; Schneider & Bjorklund, 1988). We see an additional 
viability to the distinction of Mc from earlier similar concepts such as study skills (e.g., Brown & 
Smiley, 1977; Robinson, 1941) as it forms a deeper theory of change rather than separate 
piecemeal study skills that may be less likely to be taught in relation to cognition and how the 
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mind and brain work, which can help children make larger connections and stronger associations 
(e.g., see Carol Dweck’s intervention work using Brainology ®; e.g., Dweck, 2008). Others  have 
supported Brown’s (1978) notion of the critical nature of having a unified theory of learning and 
mechanisms of development and change, such as that of Mc, to cognitive and developmental 
psychology (including social cognition theories) as well as educational practice (Larkin, 2010).  
Later, in 1987, Brown created an extended model of Mc that distinguished between 
knowledge about cognition, and regulation of cognition.  She re-emphasized that Mc is “at the 
very roots of the learning process” (p. 66) and, though a multifaceted complex construct (and 
often a confusing and ‘fuzzy’ concept for researchers and educators), is key to targeting 
mechanisms of change and development. She clarified that cognitive strategies such as 
elaboration should not be lumped into the Mc construct and made it clear that only when one 
reflects or regulates the strategy of elaboration or knows when or how to recruit this strategy, for 
example, should it be considered a metacognitive process. Brown (1987) suggested that 
regulation of cognition (metacognitive regulation; McR) is more context-than-age-dependent; 
one may regulate their cognitive processes in one situation but not another, and a child may show 
regulatory behaviors where an adult does not (see Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2. Brown’s model of metacognition (1987) 
Furthermore, the regulatory aspects of MC are not necessarily stable or statable; knowing 
how to regulate may not be conscious or easily reported to others (Brown, 1987).   Brown (1987) 
discussed several researchers interested in Mc at that time (e.g., Henry Wellman and Lila 
Gleitman) who proposed that, to reduce the ‘mystery’ of the Mc construct, it be limited to its 
original conception (i.e., Flavell, 1976): “knowledge about cognition.” This would reduce the 
confusion with related concepts such as SR and SRL and other (related) processes such as 
“planning-ahead” or “resource allocation” could be used independently rather than subsumed 
under the unwieldy umbrella term Mc. Nearly 15 years later, SRL researchers concurred 
proposing that Mc be reserved for McK and processes related to control and regulation excluded 
from this construct (e.g., Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, 2000).  Though, even a cursory review of 
the literature would illustrate that this was not by any means universally adopted (see Table 1.1 
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for one indication), influential researchers have reaffirmed this proposal since Brown’s 1987 
paper. The authors and editors of a recent empirically-based book Trends and Prospects in 
Metacognition Research (Efklides & Misailidi, 2010) have adopted this perspective. In the 
introduction, the editors make an explicit statement to this effect: “All contributors to this book 
share the definition of metacognition as cognition of cognition”, (Ibid. p. 2). However, this 
“cognition of cognition” is often reflected in (and operationalized as) self-regulatory actions such 
as creating and enacting a plan for approaching a learning task. Thus, Mc remains a complex and 
somewhat “mysterious” construct, not to mention issues such as when it emerges and how it can 
be measured. Thus, the focus of the current dissertation studies is on the conceptualization and 
assessment of metacognitive processes in young children to target these pressing issues.  
Importance of Metacognition to Learning 
 There is considerable empirical evidence indicating a strong association between Mc and 
greater levels (and depth) of general learning and academic achievement across grade levels and 
even when controlling for other cognitive and SRL2 factors (e.g., August, Flavell & Clift, 1984; 
Borkowski, Carr, & Pressley, 1987; Bransford, Brown & Cocking, 2000; Carr, Kurtz, Schneider, 
Turner & Borkowski, 1989; Garner, 1990). Moreover, Mc is related to intelligence (Borkowski, 
et al., 1987; Sternberg, 1984, 1985) and has additionally been shown to predict academic 
achievement and learning beyond measures of intelligence (e.g., Demetriou, Gustafsson, 
Efklides, & Platsidou, 1992; Elshout, 1987; Sternberg, 1985; Veenman, & Spaans, 2005). 
                                                            
2 The positive influence of Mc is not limited to academic learning. Mc has also been shown to have important 
associations to other positive life outcomes (e.g.,  relieving depression and other disorders such as Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder, anxiety, and generally to making better life choices and decisions) (e.g., Fisher, 2009; 2011; 
Wells, 2008) but the focus of this chapter is the relation between Mc and cognitive development/academic learning. 
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Further, the predictive strength of Mc is consistent across domains (e.g., analogical reasoning: 
Brown & Kane, 1988; problem-solving: Davidson & Sternberg, 1998; Whitebread, 1999; 
inductive reasoning: Prins, Veenman, & Elshout, 2006; mathematics: Desoete, Roeyers, & 
Huylebroeck, 2006; science: Georghiades, 2004, White & Frederiksen, 1998; writing: Bereiter & 
Scardamalia, 1987, Harris, Graham, Brindle, & Sandmel, 2009; and reading comprehension: 
Palincsar & Brown, 1984; Pressley, 2002). These findings have also indicated that Mc was 
especially important for learning tasks within learners’ zones of proximal development (ZPD; 
Vygotsky, 1978); when tasks were at the boundaries of their knowledge and abilities (Prins et al.,  
2006).  As will be reviewed shortly in more detail, Mc has more recently been shown to 
influence even preschool-aged children’s cognitive ability and academic achievement (Shamir, 
Mevarech, & Gida, 2009; Whitebread, Bingham, Grau, Pasternak, & Sangster, 2007; Whitebread 
et al., 2009). Moreover, there is recent preliminary evidence that, at the neurological level, Mc is 
associated with enhanced indicators of learning in the brain (i.e., error detection and correction 
responses related to progress monitoring) in primary school children (Rueda et al., 2011) and  
preschool-aged children (Marulis, Kim, Grammer, Carrasco, Morrison, & Gehring, 2013).  
The most robust evidence indicating the importance of Mc to learning and academic 
achievement comes from two meta-reviews. The first is a content analysis conducted by Wang, 
Haertel, & Walberg (1990). Wang and colleagues examined the most influential factors in 
learning and achievement across six general categories from distal (e.g., state and district 
variables such as demographics of the district) to proximal (e.g., classroom variables such as 
climate or instruction). These categories spanned across levels of analysis from 
district/school/classroom variables to individual variables such as cognitive, social, behavioral or 
SRL variables. The authors reviewed hundreds of studies and focused on 179 “authoritative” 
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articles with relevant data.  In all, they coded 30 variables within the 179 studies to examine their 
relationships to learning and achievement in school. Wang and her colleagues (1990) next ranked 
these relationships from 1 (weak or inconsistent) to 3 (strong) and then averaged the rankings 
across studies that included each variable.  They found that, of the 30 variables, Mc had the 
strongest relation to learning across all articles and was the only individual student variable with 
a coded average of 2.0 or above (Wang et al., 1990).  
More recently, Dignath, Buettner, & Langfeldt (2008) conducted a meta-analysis that 
examined the efficacy of interventions targeted broadly to enhance SRL in elementary-aged 
school children. They found that the most effective interventions were ones that combined 
metacognitive aspects of training with other SRL or cognitive strategies (d=1.23-1.44). 
Importantly, interventions relying exclusively on cognitive strategies produced low effects 
(d=.23-.37). 
Many researchers advocate for the early acquisition of metacognitive skills through 
instruction, scaffolding and facilitative environments for best chances of enhancing learning and 
achievement.  Further, developing and implementing these interventions or facilitative 
instructions and environments in the before school years is both more cost effective (e.g., 
Heckman & Masterov, 2007) and sustaining (e.g., Li, Farkas, Duncan, & Burchinal, 2013). Most 
studies on metacognition and learning focus on children in elementary school and beyond and 
thus there remains limited information on: what different ways of measuring developing Mc can 
reveal about children prior to entering formal schooling when academic functioning becomes 
particularly important.  
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In view of the conceptual and methodological confusion that surrounds metacognition—
coupled with its importance for learning and academic functioning—the primary research goals 
of the current series of programmatically-linked studies in this this multiple manuscript 
dissertation were to develop and examine a direct measurement tool for conceptualizing and 
assessing metacognitive knowledge in 3-5 year olds and examine how metacognitive processes 
are facilitated in young children.  
Development of Metacognition 
Researchers have argued that Mc does not emerge until at least age 7-8 (e.g., Flavell, 
1979; Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006) 
though some of these researchers have speculated that their findings were likely related —at least 
partially—to limited experiences, training or instruction and that intervening on these skills was 
both “feasible as well as desirable” for children (Flavell, 1979, p. 910). However, conclusions 
drawn from these studies have continued to be in line with a deficit perspective, postulating that 
young children are unable to be metacognitive, or thoughtful about their own thinking and 
learning.  What is often not taken into full consideration is that these assessment approaches and 
tools were often decontextualized (i.e., the children were asked abstract questions about 
hypothetical situations). Other contemporaneous studies found, for example, that, in a familiar 
context (i.e., listening to storybooks read by their mothers), 2.5-3 year olds displayed robust 
evidence of comprehension monitoring and even explicit communication of how to resolve 
comprehension discrepancies (Karabenick, 1981). Flavell himself, in 1992, suggested that 
children as young as 6 years of age would be able to reflect on their own thinking within a 
domain in which they have previous knowledge (Flavell, 1992).  In 2010, Lyons & Ghetti 
concluded that “young children may be much more adept at monitoring their mental activity than 
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is often assumed”, p. 265, pointing to the developing use of mental state verbs—e.g., know, 
think, and I don’t know—by the end of children’s 2nd year as indicators of preliminary Mc. In 
addition, Lyons & Ghetti, 2010 reviewed evidence of rudimentary forms of Mc in 30 months old 
infants who were able to successfully assess whether or not they knew something (e.g., Marazita 
& Merriman, 2004; Moore, Furrow, Chiasson, & Patriquin, 1994). Recent work has speculated 
that origins of metacognitive awareness and skills is present in 2-4 month old infants at which 
time they begin to be able to participate in joint monitoring and control interactions with adults 
(Brinck & Liljenfors 2013). 
Questions posed to children in earlier (and some recent) studies tended not to be 
developmentally appropriate or sensitive to development enough to detect Mc or McK in 
preschool-aged children. Use of differing methodologies was found to be associated with early 
(and some recent) studies’ limited evidence of Mc in children under age 7-8 (Efklides & 
Misailidi, 2010).  In general, the belief that Mc would not emerge until later in childhood likely 
originates from the way it was first conceptualized within an information-processing, Piagetian 
stage theory framework. Within this framework is the idea that higher order levels of thought 
operate on lower order levels, which is categorized within the formal operations stage of 
development that is specified to emerge well into adolescence. Related to this, Tunmer and 
Herriman (1984) argued that, to be capable of Mc, children would need to transition from 
automatic to controlled processing, which, according to the Piaget, does not occur until around 
age 7-8 (during the transition to concrete operations). Furthermore, recent researching finding 
that metacognitive processes develop far younger than originally thought (e.g., Shamir et al., 
2009; Whitebread et al., 2007; 2009; 2010 to be reviewed shortly) rings similar to findings 
several decades after Piaget’s original research (e.g., Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983) indicating 
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that many conclusions of later-developing skills (i.e., at 7-8 years) were related to measurement 
issues (e.g., the measurement was not developmentally appropriate leading to young children 
‘failing’ the task).  In fact, the underestimation of early cognitive and learning-related/SRL skills 
is particularly pervasive in the area of Mc (e.g., Veenman, et al., 2006). 
Beyond the way Mc has been measured (e.g., type of questions asked), some of these 
differences are likely due to the developmental appropriateness of the category of measurement 
applied (e.g., verbal reports vs. think alouds vs. observational studies) as well as the environment 
in which Mc was measured (e.g., a lab setting vs. a naturalistic setting such a preschool).  Indeed, 
as mentioned previously, more recently there have been several studies employing naturalistic 
observational measures—whose authors advocate against the primary reliance on self-reports or 
assessments that require verbalizations in children under these traditional threshold ages—with 
promising evidence of the application McK, strategies and regulation in 3-5 year old nursery-
school children (Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007; 2009; 2010). This robust evidence 
of Mc in preschool-aged children spanned across individual and group learning tasks and was 
predictive of cognitive ability and learning.  Due to space constraints, I will review the first two 
of these seminal studies. 
Recent Evidence of Earlier Emergence of Metacognition: Toward a More Comprehensive 
Assessment of Metacognition 
The principal research group providing seminal evidence for an earlier emergence of Mc 
is headed by Dr. David Whitebread of the University of Cambridge. Whitebread and his 
colleagues (2007) observed 1,440 3-5 year old preschoolers in their classrooms over a two-year 
period and coded their naturally occurring behaviors (verbal and non-verbal).  They found 
extensive evidence of Mc across these 3-5 year olds. Specifically, in their large sample of 
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preschool-aged children, they coded at least one—and for the majority of the children several—
instances of metacognitive behaviors (examples of behaviors that Whitebread et al., 2007 coded 
as being metacognitive are included in Appendix 1.A).  The instances in which Mc was most 
frequently seen were during learning situations that were initiated by the children themselves, 
when the children were working in small groups or pairs (as opposed to as individuals or with a 
teacher), and during learning activities that “involved extensive collaboration and talk” between 
children (Whitebread et al., 2007, p . 440).  This study was the first to empirically illustrate the 
existence of Mc in even the youngest students indicating a much earlier emergence than 
previously believed.  The authors argued that this detection was largely due to the naturalistic 
contextualized setting of the study paired with the limited reliance on verbalizations from the 
children.  The researchers cautioned that this evidence should not be taken as a reason to limit 
individual learning situations nor that the individual children were not experiencing rich and high 
level of Mc during their individual learning. It may be, they suggested, that these experiences are 
taken place internally or less likely to be explicitly exhibited or verbalized (Whitebread et al., 
2007).  
Another study with evidence of earlier emergence of Mc—in support of Whitebread et 
al., 2007—Shamir and her colleagues (2009) examined indications of 64 4-5 year old children’s 
verbal and non-verbal McK related to a memory recall task. Children were asked to recall nine 
picture cards in both individual learning and peer-assisted learning contexts in their preschool 
classrooms. Their procedural metacognitive behavior was assessed using primarily observational 
assessments with one self-report interview question (“Please tell me what you did in order to 
recall the cards”; for the peer-assisted learning context: “You remembered the cards very nicely. 
Please tell your friend what to do in order to recall the cards; please help him/her”.).  Similar to 
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Whitebread and colleagues (2007), Shamir et al. (2009) found robust evidence of McK in these 
young preschool-aged children (examples of behaviors and responses that Shamir et al., 2009 
coded as being metacognitive are can be seen in Appendix 1.B). They found that the children 
displayed significantly greater procedural than declarative McK (in both contexts) and greater 
procedural McK in the peer-assisted learning context (controlling for language ability and 
Theory of Mind).  The best predictor of cognitive performance was procedural McK in the peer-
assisted learning context whereas declarative McK did not explain any further variance.  These 
results provide an additional (cross-cultural) indication that not only are children (younger than 
previously thought) able to demonstrate McK but, also, that aspects of this ability predict their 
performance on a cognitive task. Furthermore, this ability appears to increase when children 
work with similarly-able peers.   
Taken together, the findings from Shamir and colleagues (2009) and Whitebread and 
colleagues (2007) provide ample empirical support for the proposal that previous results 
indicating later emerging Mc were—at least partially—a function of measurement.  The issue of 
measurement of Mc is multidimensional in that it is crucial to consider not only the measurement 
instrument (e.g., employing observational assessments in place of or in addition to self-reports or 
think alouds), but also the context in which the measurement takes place (e.g., naturalistic 
settings such as classrooms compared to less authentic settings such as experimental 
laboratories) and the methods (e.g., making the assessment more concrete and contextualized to a 
developmentally appropriate learning and facilitating conducive environments for Mc). 
However, these studies focused on verbal and non-verbal metacognitive behaviors where 
Mc was typically inferred rather than directly assessed. While these observational methods are a 
more sensitive way to capture Mc in young children, their exclusive use may not result in a 
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comprehensive depiction of early Mc competency. Furthermore, articulation (i.e., think-aloud) 
has successfully been used as cognitive intervention (e.g., Montague, 1993) indicating its effect 
on learning; Mc may be similarly mediated by its articulation. Therefore, it is crucial that the 
way we measure early Mc is carefully and comprehensively studied to examine the transiency, 
depth and breadth of this important skill.  
Analogous to the aims of these researchers who have recently developed comprehensive 
observational tools (including a singular declarative interview question in Shamir et al., 2009) 
that are sensitive to capturing Mc capabilities of young children, a key goal for my dissertation 
research was to develop such a measurement tool for directly assessing articulated declarative 
metacognitive knowledge in preschool-aged children. To that end, in Study 1, I developed the 
Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI)—to be discussed in depth in Chapter II—which 
was designed to comprehensively capture the declarative McK of young children sensitively and 
developmentally appropriately. To comprehensively assess metacognitive processes, the 
convergent validity between the measurement tool I created (the McKI) and an established 
measure of metacognitive behavior (Children Articulating Thinking [ChAT] Bryce & 
Whitebread 2012; Whitebread, Pino Pasternak, Marulis, Okkinga, & Vuillier, in preparation) was 
assessed in Study 2, which will be discussed in Chapter III.  
Moreover, because these studies (Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007) relied on 
correlational analyses, the precise relations between Mc and instructional factors have not been 
established. Seminal researchers have called for greater attention to examining these associations 
(e.g., Whitebread et al., 2009), thus another key aim of my programmatic dissertation studies was 
to examine these associations through experimental manipulation.  Therefore, in Study 3, I 
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conducted a Dynamic Assessment intervention to examine how metacognitive processes were 
facilitated in preschoolers, which will be discussed in Chapter IV.  
There are at least three additional (and interrelated) likely reasons that the evidence of the 
earlier emergence of Mc has only been recent and limited to a few research groups. First, being a 
predominantly internal process, Mc is challenging to measure and even more challenging with 
young children who have limited and less sophisticated expressive vocabularies.  Second, there 
are stronger and clearer links between Mc and academic achievement in older children though 
this may be a function of the first reason.  And third, there are established and validated 
measures for older children and adults such as the Motivated Strategies for Learning 
Questionnaire; (MSLQ Pintrich, Smith, Garcia & McKeachie, 1991), the Metacognitive 
Awareness Inventory (MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994), and the Learning and Study Strategy 
Inventory (LASSI; Weinstein, Palmer, & Shulte, 1987).  However, the focus of my dissertation 
research is on young children prior to formal instruction (i.e., preschool-aged children; 3-5 year 
olds). This is due primarily to the evidence indicating that this is the most effective and efficient 
time to intervene (e.g., Heckman & Masterov, 2007; Li et al., 2011) and because it is a sensitive 
period for later school success (Rimm-Kaufman & Pianta, 2000).  My resolve to target 
preschool-aged children has been strengthened by this more recent evidence (e.g., Shamir et al., 
2009; Whitebread et al., 2007; 2009; 2010) indicating that it is during this period when Mc and 
its relations to learning and academic achievement may be emerging. In addition to the important 
policy and practice implications for educators, educational psychologists, and interventionists, 
studying preschool-aged children’s Mc has the potential to make valuable contributions to the 
theories and developmental trajectories of developmental and cognitive psychology. 
Additional Measurement Issues 
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In addition to being associated with differences in identifying the age of emergence of 
Mc, there are larger challenges surrounding measurement for Mc researchers. The issue of 
measurement is particularly important when studying concepts such as Mc that tend not to be 
defined or operationalized in a consistent way.  In addition to this, researchers have been vocally 
skeptical about the value of studying what they deemed to be a “broad and elusive” construct 
(Schraw 2000, p. 304). To address these concerns, and also push Mc researchers to be more 
precise and comprehensive, Schraw (2000) bestowed four cautions derived from work of 
measurement experts (see Figure 1.3).  In my own research—including these dissertation 
studies—I have incorporated these suggestions as much as possible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Cautions from the work of measurement experts for effectively examining Mc. 
Adapted from Schraw, 2000, p. 304-308 
 Similarly, regarding the examining of Mc, Baker and Cerro (2000) have emphasized the 
importance of converging evidence from different methods with different sources of error. They 
Four cautions: (from measurement experts) when studying metacognition: 
1. Field needs a plan for comprehensive assessment of the construct 
a. Reliability and validity norms 
b. Plan for translating theory into instruments that can be 
appropriately evaluated 
2. Generate and test models 
a. Translate metacognitive theory into testable models 
3. Construct and evaluate instruments that assess specific components of 
the model 
a. Use multiple measures/using multiple methodologies 
(convergent validity) 
4. Use diverse assessment models 
a. Use multitrait, multimethod (MTMM) approach. See Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959 and Cook & Campbell, 1979. 
b. Incorporate diverse approaches including neurophysiological. 
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proposed that if these divergent methods produce similar results, this evidence can be considered 
valid, reliable, and robust: “we can be more confident that we have measured what we set out to 
measure”, Baker & Cerro, 2000, p. 129.   
Facilitating Metacognition 
 
Mechanisms of Change 
 According to Schraw & Moshman (1995), the three factors that are most likely to bring 
about metacognitive change are: cultural learning, individual construction, and peer 
interactions.  
  Cultural learning. Schraw & Moshman (1995) described cultural learning as informal 
and formal socialization, the prototypical example being explicit instruction. They focused on 
metacognitive interventions that have shown significant gains in Mc and cognition/achievement 
such as the Informed Strategies for Learning (ISL; Cross & Paris, 1988), Reciprocal Teaching 
(RT; Palincsar & Brown, 1984) and a metamemory strategy training program (Kurtz & 
Borkowski, 1987).  Another, similar intervention program within the domain of science that 
Schraw & Moshman did not discuss is the ThinkerTools Inquiry project (White & Frederiksen, 
1994; 2000).  This program focused on enhancing children’s McK related to inquiry-based 
science and helping them apply it to a physics curriculum. All of these interventions involved 
children being directly and indirectly (e.g., through modeling) taught to effectively use cognitive 
and learning strategies (and understand when and how to use them) with ample feedback and 
scaffolding.  Each of these programs was rigorously examined using comparable control groups 
and found strong evidence of efficacy of this type of explicit instruction. The results indicated an 
enhancement of not only metacognitive processes but also of domain-specific learning.  When 
 21 
 
designing my Dynamic Assessment (DA) intervention for Study 3—which will be described in 
Chapter IV—I used these types of metacognitive interventions as models within a sociocultural 
framework (Vygotsky, 1978) wherein mediated instruction is posited to enhance children's 
learning. 
Individual construction. Schraw & Moshman (1995) described individual construction 
as individuals independently constructing their own knowledge and understanding, typically 
outside of formal or informal instruction. They described this process as involving diverse 
strategies including phenomenological bootstrapping (e.g., Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993) 
where individuals use their own cognitive experiences to reflect on the nature of cognition.  
Individual construction focuses chiefly on reflection and analysis of one’s own thinking and 
develops with age and experience. I found this section limiting in its mechanistic explanation of 
change as key factors to facilitate this self-reflection and analysis to take place and develop such 
as motivation or Executive Function (EF)/SR were not discussed. However, it seems important 
to include both social and individual aspects of learning as important mechanisms of change.  
While my DA intervention is designed to take place within instructional settings, it involves 
individual construction as much of the support is focused on children constructing their own 
knowledge and understanding and reflecting on their own thinking. Thus, the design principles 
of my DA intervention are based on two of the three mechanisms of change for facilitating Mc 
described by Schraw & Moshman (1995). While I agree that peer interactions are also a powerful 
way to facilitate metacognitive processes, they were beyond the scope of this dissertation 
research. However, they will be discussed in Chapter V on future directions.  
Peer interactions. The last factor Schraw & Moshman (1995) discussed related to the 
facilitation of Mc was peer interactions. They described these as social interactions among peers 
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of “roughly the same cognitive level in relevant aspects so that none can be considered an expert 
with cultural knowledge to be passed on to the others” (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, p. 364). This 
conceptualization is similar to that of Shamir et al. (2009) in their peer-assisted learning 
condition which provides empirical support for this position as they found that the peer-assisted 
learning condition was the most facilitative of Mc in 3-5 year old children.  Peer interactions 
were described as a type of collective or socially shared reasoning whose key function was the 
resolution of divergence.  The strongest evidence implicating this factor as a mechanism of 
change was a study conducted by Geil & Moshman (1994) which included both an individual 
and group problem-solving condition. They found that 75% of the students working in groups of 
5-6 reached the correct solution, only 9% did when working as individuals did so. Interestingly, 
Geil & Moshman (1994) asked half of the groups to work on the same problem prior to the group 
collaborative problem-solving and found that 95% of the individuals comprising the groups were 
unable to successfully find the solution even though they came to the correct solution in their 
groups (only 2 students in this condition arrived at the correct solution on their own, prior to the 
group work). Schraw & Moshman (1995) suggested that these results support their notion that 
peer interactions facilitate enhanced metacognitive knowledge and processing leading to 
increased levels of problem-solving capabilities. Though they discussed the influence of cultural 
processes, Schraw & Moshman differentiated peer interactions from the other two factors.  
Schraw & Moshman (1995) viewed these factors as distinct but interacting in bringing 
about change in metacognitive processes.  Similar to my discussion of the importance of 
integrating SRL variables rather than viewing or examining any one as a sole predictor of 
learning, Schraw & Moshman described these factors as being integrated non-mutually exclusive 
conduits to enhanced Mc.   
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By interactive, we mean that improvements made via any of the three factors described  
  above reciprocally affect the remaining factors. For example, the communication of  
  specific information about cognition via direct instruction may enhance a student’s ability  
  to construct an informal or formal theory of his or her own cognition. Similarly, peer  
  discussion and collective theorizing about cognition may enhance the effectiveness of  
  direct instruction. (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, p. 365). 
Good Information Processing. All of the evidence I have reviewed here broadly 
supports a similar model of the central characteristics of learners who are “Good Information 
Processors” (see Figure 1.4) developed a few years after Schraw & Moshman’s 1995 paper 
(Borkowski, Chan, & Muthukrishna, 2000). Borkowski and colleagues (2000) described good 
information processing as the highest ideal for learning—including the successful integration of 
knowledge with higher-order skills and beliefs—and indicative of students who will be most 
successful in school and with long-term academic outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Ten major characteristics that define a “Good Information Processor”. 
From Borkowski, Chan, & Muthukrishna, 2000, p. 4. 
 Borkowski et al. (2000) focused on Mc that they portrayed as the essential underlying 
factor and describe these metacognitive learners (“good information processors”) as being able to 
1. Knows a large number of useful learning strategies. 
2. Understands when, where and why these strategies are important. 
3. Selects and monitors strategies wisely, and is extremely reflective and planful. 
4. Adheres to an incremental view regarding the growth of mind. 
5. Believes in carefully deployed effort. 
6. Is intrinsically motivated, task-oriented, and has mastery goals. 
7. Doesn't fear failure-in fact, realizes that failure is essential for success—hence, is   
    not anxious about tests—rather sees them as learning opportunities. 
8. Has concrete, multiple images of “possible-selves,” both hoped-for and feared  
     selves in the near and distant future. 
9. Knows a great deal about many topics and has rapid access to that knowledge. 
10. Has a history of being supported in all of the above by parents, schools, and  
      society at large. 
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effectively integrate their knowledge with higher-order skills (such as EF) and beliefs (such as 
academic goal orientations or other motivational beliefs) in order to successfully perform 
academic tasks. The authors are not specific in terms of a developmental trajectory, but based on 
the literature I have reviewed and my experience as a preK teacher, it follows that even in 
preschool-aged children, the successful integration of appropriate Mc with effective EF skills 
and motivational factors (behaviors, emotions and beliefs) is strongly related to their academic 
achievement in core domain areas. This view seems to be aligned with researchers who stress the 
importance of individuals viewings themselves as agents of their own thinking (e.g., Kaplan, 
2008; Kluwe, 1982) and supports interventions such as Carol Dweck’s Brainology ® program, 
which teaches children about how their brains work to help them to feel in control of their 
learning and achievement with the goal of helping them develop an “growth mindset” (i.e., an 
incremental theory of intelligence and ability). When children are taught, or come to understand, 
that their own learning and thinking is—in large part—malleable and under their own control, 
they will likely adopt the types of self-efficacy and motivational beliefs and actions associated 
with greater levels of learning (Dweck, 2006; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Dweck and her 
colleagues have found that this strong relationship between children’s mindsets and their 
learning and academic achievement is present even in preschool-aged children (Smiley & 
Dweck, 1994). Furthermore, these types of programs target metacognitive beliefs and 
knowledge. As discussed in depth in this chapter, this is likely to enhance children’s learning, 
particularly when taught or facilitated using appropriate scaffolding integrated with other SRL 
and cognitive factors. Broadly, this is what my DA intervention was designed to accomplish with 
the preschool-aged children- the same underlying principles apply to children’s McK related to a 
cognitive task. 
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 Borkowski et al. (2000) further proposed how the characteristics they identified (based on 
literature review and empirical evidence) develop and interrelate. They suggest that these factors 
successfully develop overtime and are applied to learning tasks through “high quality, interactive 
strategy instruction in both home and school” (p. 5). This facilitative instruction focuses on 
teaching children to use strategies appropriately, learning about when and how to best use them 
and how and when to recruit specific skills and metaskills (e.g., cognitive skills such as 
activating and applying prior knowledge as well as metaskills such as exertion of effort focusing 
of attention and inducing effective motivation affect and beliefs for greater learning). The 
authors have created a model (see Figure 1.5) to illustrate this process that is cyclical and 
interactive. This model reflects the framework I envision occurring even in the youngest of 
learners. One goal of my future research will be to empirically examine the components of this 
model in preschoolers using similar measures as have been described in this chapter. Though this 
is beyond the scope of these dissertation studies, such research plans will be discussed in Chapter 
V. Through gaining a better understanding of how these crucial components interrelate, interact 
and predict academic achievement, we will be better equipped to inform, design and evaluate 
early interventions for young learners (at-risk as well as typically developing and achieving) that 
may enhance learning trajectories on a long-term basis.  
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Figure 1.5. Cognitive, motivational, and self-system metacognitive components: The complete 
model. From Borkowski, Chan, & Muthukrishna, 2000, p. 10 
Metacognitive Learning Opportunities. The last factor in this non-exhaustive review of how 
Mc is best facilitated is the metacognitive learning opportunities children are provided within 
their classrooms. These opportunities include reflective and evaluative (e.g., formative 
assessment) teaching, feedback, modeling and support, teacher’s metacognitive behaviors, 
interactions and dialogue, as well as varied learning tasks within their ZPDs that are conducive to 
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reflection and evaluation. Larkin (2000) analyzed teacher’s level of metacognitive facilitation in 
a first grade science classroom.  She created a coding scheme (see Figure 1.6) to assess the types 
of metacognitive learning opportunities provided across 10 classrooms and found that a positive 
correlation between these types of opportunities and the children’s Mc and science learning.  
 
Figure 1.6. Coding scheme of teacher metacognition-facilitating behaviors. 
From Larkin, 2000, p. 8. 
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   Ornstein and his colleagues have also examined the association between classroom 
contexts and metacognitive development. In a recent study (reported in Ornstein, Grammer, 
Coffman, 2010), they examined 14 1st grade teachers’ use of Mc language (focused on 
metamemory or “mnemonic style”). They described “high mnemonic teachers” as those who 
provide a metacognitive framework in the classroom and explicitly prompt strategy development 
(e.g., by suggesting strategies in particular domains and discussing why they could be effective) 
in their students. These teachers used both explicit prompts/suggestions (e.g., “Remember when 
you write, you have to go back and read what you wrote out loud” and questions designed to 
elicit self-explanation and metacognitive awareness (e.g., “How did you solve that problem?”). 
The authors found significantly greater Mc, cognitive performance (on a card recall task) and 
effective strategy usage in the 1st graders with “high mnemonic” than “low mnemonic” teachers, 
and this difference was still present three years later when the children were assessed in 4th 
grade. Thus, these children were able to maintain their improved metacognitive awareness and 
strategy usage through the transition to three new teachers/classroom contexts (which may or 
may not have been facilitative of metacognitive processes or highly mnemonic in focus).  In the 
same volume, researchers (Waters & Kunnmann, 2010)—who found evidence of the facilitation 
of metamemory through subtle prompting as early as in 1st graders—suggested that this transfer 
(or abstraction) both research groups found was possible because of cognitive changes occurring 
at the metalevel.  They further proposed a “two-pronged” intervention approach that would 
provide training aimed at enhancing the “metacognitive-savviness” for both teachers and 
students (Waters & Kunnmann, 2010, p. 20). 
Deanna Kuhn has also emphasized the importance of these types of opportunities for the 
development and enhancement of Mc, which she has implicated as key to critical thinking and 
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higher level reasoning and learning (Kuhn, 1999; Kuhn, 2000; Shaughnessy, 2004) and to the 
greatest goal of education: transfer: 
If students participate in discourse in which they are frequently asked, 'How do you 
know?' or 'What makes you say that?' they become more likely to pose such questions to 
themselves. Eventually, we hope, they interiorize the structure of argument as a 
framework for much of their own individual thinking. (D. Kuhn interview: Shaughnessy, 
2004, p. 275).  
These metacognitive learning opportunities can also be made more explicit. My current 
view of the most effective way to facilitate Mc, particularly in young children, is a combination 
of metacognitive learning opportunities scaffolded by significant adults and explicit instruction 
regarding Mc (similar to the Dweck interventions mentioned previously). Specifically this 
explicit information would focus on the three branches of McK: how the mind works or the 
“universals of cognition” (Flavell, 1979), how learning tasks generally operate across domains, 
and how effective strategies work across tasks and domains. In addition, Kuhn has emphasized 
the importance of teachers addressing why certain strategies are more effective and appropriate 
than others in certain contexts or domains making it more likely that children will internalize and 
abstract/transfer the information and knowledge they have learned to new situations 
(Shaughnessy, 2004). These are the design principles that built the foundation of the Dynamic 
Assessment intervention that I have designed in Study 3 that will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
Other researchers, both at the genesis of theorizing about and empirically examining Mc 
(e.g., Vygotsky, 1978) as well as the contemporary (e.g., Efklides & Misailidi, 2010) have 
provided support for the view that Mc is best facilitated in both implicit (e.g., socialization, 
social communication, collaboration and interactions, imitation and modeling) and explicit (e.g., 
direct informal and formal instruction) ways.  
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In sum, metacognitive instruction/training, socialization and peer assisted interactions 
along with individual factors (e.g., construction of knowledge, language ability and other 
cognitive and  SRL variables) and contextual factors (e.g., developmentally appropriate cognitive 
tasks, scaffolded environments, metacognitive learning opportunities and dialogue, 
contextualized strategy instruction) may act as bootstrapping mechanisms for children, helping 
them to become more conscious and metacognitive in their knowledge and comprehension of 
their own thoughts and those of others (Bransford et al., 2005; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; 
Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2009).  
Interim Conclusion 
 In summary, Mc is a complex cognitive- and learning-related process that is crucial to 
enhanced learning that can be facilitated through learning opportunities and appropriate 
environments as well as taught to children as early as preschool. Though Mc is an important 
construct, it is also a challenging one both in its conceptualization and assessment as has been 
reviewed in this introductory chapter. Accordingly, along with aiming to clarify the 
conceptualization and assessment of early metacognitive development, a key aspiration of this 
dissertation research is to examine whether and how metacognitive processes can be facilitated 
with young children.  
Theoretical Grounding 
The literature reviewed thus far (e.g., work of Flavell, Brown, Kuhn and their colleagues) 
falls mostly under the information-processing theory of cognitive development within which 
constructs like metamemory, Mc, and metacognitive strategies originated (e.g., beginning with 
research on cognitive processing and memory; Miller, 1956). Within this perspective, 
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development is viewed mostly through the lens of maturational changes in children’s minds and 
brains (e.g., executive functioning or memory components that develop in line with the 
developing prefrontal cortex). These changes (i.e., development) are influenced by the way an 
individual processes incoming information; As children mature (and their brains/mind become 
more mature and developed), their ability to cognitively process becomes more advanced. 
Traditionally, a model of the mind from an information-processing perspective is analogous to 
that of a computer, though the evidence supporting this straightforward comparison is limited. 
Reliance solely on this perspective and its tenets, along with the issues inherent in the way Mc 
has traditionally been measured in young children, may be related to the pervasive view (with 
ample—though not comprehensive—supporting evidence) that Mc does not develop until middle 
childhood (approximately age 7-8). This work and theoretical grounding provides one of the 
frames for my series of dissertation studies informing my theoretical perspective, approach, and 
interpretation.  
The other important framework for my research—that broadens the way I approach the 
current studies—is sociocultural theory (Vygotsky, 1978) which has a tradition of literature that 
focuses mostly on what is conceptualized as self-regulatory processes (including metacognitive 
aspects). Similar to Whitebread and colleagues (2009), my research is guided by an integration 
of these (traditionally disparate) theoretical lines. Within the sociocultural framework is the idea 
that children’s learning and development is enhanced through social interaction with more 
developed members of their culture (e.g., adults and “more capable peers”). Children are thought 
to develop from an external to an internalized focus mediated through this social interaction. A 
concept central to this perspective is the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) or “the distance 
between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the 
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level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or 
in collaboration with more capable peers” (Vygotsky 1978, p. 86).  Thus, mediated participation 
(e.g., scaffolded or supportive instruction) and interactions with adults or more able peers is 
reputed to can have a large impact on children's cognitive development that subsequently affects 
their long-term academic achievement (and much research including Vygotsky’s own and that of 
his followers and beyond has supported this principle). These interactions often result in 
qualitative changes or “revolutionary breakthroughs” (Vygotsky, 1984, p. 249) in learning that 
are crucial to higher levels of development. Proposed mechanisms underlying these changes 
include a scaffolding transition in which the adult (or more capable peer) takes on the bulk of the 
metacognitive and self-regulatory processing (e.g., monitoring and regulating of cognition) but 
makes it explicit to the child/novice and gradually relinquishes these processes (with support and 
guidance) to the child so that the child begins to internalize the metacognitive and self-regulatory 
processes and apply them to learning contexts and tasks (Brown 1987; Palincsar & Brown, 
1984).  
  Another prominent researcher, Reuven Feuerstein, has developed parallel (developed 
independently of Vygotsky’s work) and converging theories with similar underlying beliefs and 
mechanistic explanations. Feuerstein’s theories (e.g., the Structural Cognitive Modifiability with 
a focus on Mediated Learning Experience) center on the idea that cognitive development is 
dependent on the “quality of the mediated learning that the child experiences” (Feuerstein, 1979, 
p. 102). Inherent in both Vygotsky and Feuerstein’s theories and beliefs is the fundamental 
assumption that cognitive development and capabilities/competences are dynamic and malleable 
rather than static or fixed. Relatedly, both researchers emphasize the importance of qualitative 
(conceptual) changes to reaching higher levels of cognitive functioning, development and 
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learning.  
  Feuerstein empirically supported many of Vygotsky’s arguments by showing that 
mediated instruction—or “mediated learning experiences”—provided  to young children 
(particularly those at risk for learning difficulties such as those living in poverty or children who 
had been labeled “mentally retarded”),  greatly enhanced their cognitive development and 
learning. He showed that specific adult-mediated interactions helped children develop higher 
mental functions (that, in turn, fostered higher cognitive processing and progress) (Poehner, 
2005). Feuerstein subsequently developed an educational program called the “Instrumental 
Enrichment Program” (Feuerstein, 1980) that has robust empirical support of its benefits in 
enhancing the cognitive functions requisite for academic learning and achievement.  Similar to 
the concept of the ZPD, Feuerstein’s work centers on the idea that social interactions mediate 
develop and learning and in order to appropriately and comprehensively assess a child’s level of 
development or cognitive functioning, both her or his independent and mediated performance 
should be examined.  In fact, an examination of the effects of the Instrumental Enrichment 
Program (i.e., proving a rich mediated learning experience for children at-risk) indicates that 
children’s learning with adult-mediated support is more predictive of their 
knowledge/understanding/achievement than assessments of their independent performances 
(Poehner, 2005). 
Much empirical work supports the idea underpinning the sociocultural/cognitive 
modifiability theories that adult-mediated interactions and instruction, when strategic and based 
on theories of cognitive change, is robustly effective across domains not only in increasing 
metacognitive and self-regulatory processes but also transfer to the performance task even for 
young children (e.g., Brown, Pressley, Van Meter & Schuder, 1996; Fuchs, Compton, Fuchs, 
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Bouton, & Caffrey, 2011; Perels, Merget-Kullmann, Wende, Schmitz, &  Buchbinder, 2009), 
which is particularly true for children with lower initial metacognitive or self-regulatory abilities 
(Tominey & McClelland, 2011; Whitebread, et al., in preparation). There is also evidence that 
similar results occur within peer-mediated contexts (when peers are trained in group regulatory 
and explanatory dialogue) (e.g., Palincsar & Brown, 1984; Shamir, et al., 2009; Whitebread, et 
al., in preparation).  
An integration of the information-processing and sociocultural/cognitive modifiability 
theories will guide my series of dissertation studies (cumulating in Dynamic Assessment) in the 
following ways. The information-processing theory posits that information is organized and 
processed in specific ways by minds/brains. Accordingly, I will investigate how young children 
process instructional information regarding metacognitive processes and strategies and how 
presenting/mediating this information in various ways affects subsequent development and 
learning (Haywood & Lidz 2007). The sociocultural/cognitive modifiability theoretical 
perspective suggests that the types of interactive environments children encounter can have a 
large impact on their cognitive development, subsequently affecting their learning and academic 
achievement. And, furthermore, that mediated-learning experiences are not only supportive of 
conceptual change and development, but indicative of a child’s developmental capacities and 
understanding (aligned with the ZPD). 
Importantly, for the current studies, an integration of these theoretical perspectives is 
well-suited to addressing the overarching aim of investigating why some children are more 
responsive to education, experience, instruction and intervention than others (or, conversely, why 
some educational contexts, pedagogical orientations, types of experiences, instruction and 
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intervention enhance the responsiveness of young children) and what is particularly important to 
enable and encourage children to be successful  academically.  
Research Methods 
My programmatic dissertation studies employ multiple methods culminating in the use of 
Dynamic Assessment (DA). These methods align with the sociocultural theoretical perspective 
by emphasizing the importance of scaffolding and mediated instruction in cognitive development 
and allowing for the precise investigation of its effects. DA involves a pre-test—mediated 
intervention—post-test format that examines how instruction facilitates higher levels of learning 
and understanding (Haywood & Lidz, 2007). Assessment and instruction are conducted 
simultaneously to examine how mediated interaction affects learners’ capabilities and 
competences (Poehner, 2008). Unlike traditional assessment, DA aligns with Vygotsky’s 
conceptualization of the ZPD as a more comprehensive indicator of children’s cognitive abilities, 
levels of development and predicted performance in school. To precisely investigate the 
mechanistic research questions, the DA will be approached through a microgenetic (i.e., direct 
and in-depth observation of the underlying process of change occurring in learning and 
development) lens.  This method has been strongly advocated as the best way to investigate 
learning at a fine level of specificity and for the purposes of studying change over time, 
particularly when scaffolding or instruction is involved (e.g., Siegler, 2006; Vygotsky, 1978).  
Studying Early Learning Skills 
Studying preschool children’s learning is an important avenue of research for two 
reasons. First, interventions during the preschool years have been shown to be considerably more 
effective than those provided during kindergarten and later (Camilli, Vargas, Ryan, & Barnett, 
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2010; Heckman & Masterov, 2007). Second, there is robust evidence indicating that the power of 
quality early childhood education extends far beyond the intervention to impart long-term 
(through adulthood) improvements in academic and life outcomes, particularly for children 
living in poverty (Barnett, 2011). Further, researchers have found individual differences in SRL 
well before children begin formal schooling and early childhood education has been identified as 
an important site for developing these skills (e.g., Bronson, 2000). Therefore, studying these 
developing skills and ways they are best supported early in a child’s educational trajectory (i.e., 
just before or at the transition to schooling) has strong implications for early childhood policy 
and, because this research will contribute to understanding how metacognition is associated with 
learning for diverse children, it may advance knowledge about its ability to serve as a protective 
factor for children at risk of learning difficulties (Sektnan, McClelland, Acock, & Morrison, 
2010). In addition, the preschool classroom, a naturalistic setting, allows for greater opportunities 
to view naturally-occurring Mc both in individual and group settings than would a lab or other 
artificial-learning setting. Thus, it was important for me to find a preschool setting within which 
I would be able to become familiar to the children and conduct my assessment in a naturalistic 
manner.  
Moreover, studying early metacognitive processes is of particular importance based on 
the robust evidence of associations found between Mc and learning and academic achievement 
across domains reviewed earlier. If these associations are found in preschool (i.e., prior to formal 
schooling), there would be important implications for improving developmental and educational 
trajectories, as well as school readiness (Blair, 2002; Duncan et al., 2007; Ramano, Babchishin, 
Pagani, & Kohen, 2010). 
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Consequently, in a series of programmatically-linked studies, this multiple manuscript 
dissertation was designed to contribute such knowledge by elucidating characteristics of early 
Mc and examining—at a fine-grain level—how it is facilitated.  I undertook three studies in my 
dissertation research that focused on the comparative and comprehensive assessment of Mc. 
Specifically, in Chapter II, a metacognitive knowledge interview (McKI) is presented that I 
developed and tested for its feasibility and sensitivity to development with 42 preschoolers.  In 
Chapter III, the convergent validity between the McKI that I developed and an established valid 
and reliable measure of early metacognition (ChAT; Bryce & Whitebread 2012; Whitebread, et 
al., in preparation) is empirically examined. In Chapter IV, the facilitation of emerging Mc will 
be elucidated using a Dynamic Assessment Intervention.  Lastly, in Chapter V, limitations of my 
dissertation research, the current status of research in early metacognitive development and early 
childhood education, and directions for future research will be discussed.  
The findings from my programmatic series of three dissertation research studies are 
designed to contribute to the field of cognitive development/developmental psychology and 
education in two significant ways. First, a clearer and more comprehensive conceptualization of 
Mc—a critical developmental capacity—will be revealed through Studies 1 and 2, including 
whether and how observational and direct assessment of Mc are associated and provide shared or 
unique elucidation. This information will address important gaps in our current knowledge 
specific to Mc measurement and conceptualization and to the larger context of how articulation 
may affect cognitive development and learning, which is central to moving forward in examining 
this concept and its importance to development, learning, and academic success. Clarifying this 
concept has been called for by prominent researchers (e.g., Brown, 1987, Kuhn & Dean, 2004) 
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and empirical evidence has shown that it is the least defined in research on SRL (e.g., Dinsmore, 
et al., 2008).  
Second, beyond the need for explicating the measurement of Mc, the extant research on 
early Mc offers limited elucidation of the mechanisms of change. This is precisely the aim of 
Study 3, where I seek to understand how early Mc develops and is facilitated by varied 
instruction and support using DA (Lidz, 1991). The results of Study 3 will provide information 
critical to the later design and enactment of effective early Mc intervention programs with the 
long-term goal of improving educational and life outcomes for all children and informing early 
educational curriculum and policy.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.A Whitebread et al., 2007 C.Ind.Le Coding Scheme: Verbal and Nonverbal 
Indicators of Metacognition and Self-regulation in 3- to 5-Year-Olds 
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Appendix 1.B Shamir et al., 2009 Examples of Children’s Metacognitive Behaviors
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CHAPTER II 
The Development of a Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) for Preschoolers  
Abstract 
Historically, early cognitive skills have been underestimated, largely as a function of the 
ways these competencies have been measured, which is particularly pervasive in the area of 
metacognition. Only recently have researchers begun to detect evidence of metacognition in 
preschool-aged children through the use of observational assessment tools (e.g., Whitebread et 
al., 2007, 2009).  While these observational methods are a more sensitive way to capture 
metacognition in young children, their exclusive use may not result in a comprehensive depiction 
of early metacognitive competency. In this study, we describe the development of a 
metacognitive knowledge interview (McKI) and what it reveals about metacognitive processes in 
preschool-aged children. The McKI was tested for feasibility and sensitivity with 42 
preschoolers.  Findings indicate that the McKI is (a) a developmentally appropriate sensitive 
measure for 3-5 year olds, (b) capable of eliciting articulated metacognition when engaging in a 
contextualized problem-solving task, (c) shows the expected developmental trend (i.e., older 
children perform at a higher level and scores increased over the course of a school year), and (d) 
provides sufficient variation across children. Implications for future research are discussed, 
including the importance of using multiple measurement tools when studying early 
metacognitive development.  
Keywords: Metacognition, Metacognitive Knowledge, Early Childhood, Interview, 
Assessment 
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The Development of a Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) for Preschoolers 
Toward a Conceptualization of Metacognition 
Clarifying the important but often conceptually confused construct of metacognition (Mc; 
knowledge, monitoring, and regulation of cognition) has been called for by prominent 
researchers (e.g., Brown, 1987; Kuhn & Dean, 2004) and empirical evidence has shown that it is 
the least defined in research on self-regulated learning (SRL; e.g., Dinsmore, Alexander, & 
Loughlin, 2008). The association between Mc and learning has been well established by primary 
research (e.g., Borkowski, Carr, & Pressley, 1987; Bransford, Brown & Cocking, 2000; Desoete, 
Roeyers, & Huylebroeck, Georghiades, 2004; White & Frederiksen, 1998), including more 
recent evidence with preschool-aged children (Shamir, Mevarech, & Gida, 2009; Whitebread, 
Bingham, Grau, Pasternak, & Sangster, 2007; Whitebread et al., 2009), and meta-reviews 
(Dignath, Buettner, & Langfeldt 2008; Wang, Haertel, & Walberg 1990). Furthermore, there is 
preliminary evidence that, even at the neurological level, Mc is associated with enhanced 
indicators of learning (i.e., error detection and correction responses related to progress 
monitoring) in primary school children (Rueda, Pozuelos, Paz-Alonso, Combita-Merchan, & 
Abundis, 2011) and  preschool-aged children (Marulis, Kim, Grammer, Carrasco, Morrison, & 
Gehring, 2013). However, in order to precisely examine whether and how Mc predicts learning 
and academic achievement, a clearer operationalization of Mc must be established. This is the 
issue that this examination of a new interview tool (the Metacognitive Knowledge Interview 
[McKI]) was therefore: an endeavor to make a contribution toward the conceptualization and 
measurement of early metacognitive processes.  
Developmental Trajectory of Metacognition 
 67 
 
Traditionally, Mc has been argued to emerge around age 7-8 (e.g., Flavell, 1979; 
Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006) though a 
few of these researchers proposed that this could have been due—at least in part—to limited 
experiences, training or instruction and that intervening in relation to these skills was both 
“feasible as well as desirable” (Flavell, 1979, p. 910). Nevertheless, often the conclusion drawn 
from these studies (by the authors themselves or other researchers) was that young children are 
unable to be metacognitive, or be thoughtful about their own thinking.  However, these 
assessment approaches and tools were often decontextualized (i.e., the children were asked 
abstract questions about hypothetical situations). Other contemporaneous studies revealed that, in 
a familiar context (i.e., listening to storybooks read by their mothers), 2.5-3 year olds showed 
ample evidence of comprehension monitoring and even explicit communication of how to 
resolve comprehension discrepancies (J. Karabenick, 1981). In fact, as early as 1992, Flavell 
himself indicated that children as young as 6 were able to accurately reflect on their own 
thinking within a domain in which they have previous knowledge (Flavell, 1992).  Nearly two 
decades later, Lyons & Ghetti (2010) broadly concluded that “young children may be much more 
adept at monitoring their mental activity than is often assumed” (p. 265).  These authors pointed 
to the emergence of the use of mental state verbs—particularly know, think, and I don’t know—
by the end of age 2 as indications of preliminary Mc. Lyons and Ghetti (2010) further discussed 
research indicating that as early as 30 months of age, infants have shown rudimentary forms of 
Mc by being able to successfully assess whether or not they knew something (e.g., Marazita & 
Merriman, 2004; Moore, Furrow, Chiasson, & Patriquin, 1994). Recently, researchers (Brinck & 
Liljenfors 2013) have speculated that origins of metacognitive awareness and skills may be 
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present in infants as young as 2-4 months of age (at which time they begin to be able to 
participate in joint monitoring and control interactions with adults). 
Also, questions posed to children in the earlier (and some current) studies were often not 
developmentally appropriate or sensitive enough to detect Mc or McK in young children. A 
recent review of the literature suggests that differing methodologies are likely responsible for 
early (and some recent) studies’ limited evidence of Mc in children under age 7-8 (Efklides & 
Misailidi, 2010). Furthermore, the idea that Mc doesn’t develop until later childhood likely stems 
from the manner it was conceptualized through a Piagetian lens in which ‘higher ordered levels 
of thought operating on lower ordered levels’ is categorized within formal operations, which are 
slated to emerge well into adolescence. In line with this, for example, Tunmer & Herriman 
(1984) argued that, in order to be capable of metacognitive processes, children would have 
needed to have transitioned from automatic to controlled processing, which, according to the 
Piagetian stage theory of cognitive development, occurs around age 7-8 (at the shift to concrete 
operations). Moreover, the recent evidence suggesting Mc develops much younger than 
originally believed (e.g., Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007; 2009; 2010) is coherent 
with findings several decades after Piaget’s original research (e.g., Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983) 
indicating that many conclusions from his work substantially underestimated the abilities and 
understandings of young children, and that these discrepancies arose from measurement issues of 
the same kind as in early Mc research 
             Measuring Early Learning Skills 
The underestimation (for a review of such underestimation Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983) 
of early cognitive skills is particularly pervasive in the area of early Mc (e.g., Veenman, et al., 
2006). Only recently have researchers begun to reveal evidence of Mc in preschool-aged children 
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through the use of more sensitive diagnostic tasks (e.g., Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 
2007, 2009). For example, Whitebread and his colleagues (2007) observed 1,440 3-5 year old 
preschoolers in their classrooms over a two-year period and coded their naturally occurring 
behaviors (verbal and non-verbal).  They found extensive evidence of Mc in these 3-5 year olds. 
Specifically, they coded at least one—and for many children several—instances of Mc for every 
child in the sample1 which were more frequent in particular instructional contexts (e.g., 
cooperative learning; teacher modeling).  Over a period of ten days, Shamir and her colleagues 
(2009) examined indications of 64 4-5 year old children’s verbal and non-verbal McK related to 
a cognitive task (recalling nine picture cards) in both individual learning and peer-assisted 
learning contexts in their preschool classrooms, using primarily observational assessments 
including one self-report interview question (“Please tell me what you did in order to recall the 
cards”).  Shamir et al. 2009 found similar levels of Mc as did Whitebread et al., 20072, 
particularly in a peer-assisted learning context, and also found associations to cognitive skills. 
Taken together, the findings of these research groups have provided empirical evidence to 
support the proposal that earlier findings of later emerging Mc were—at least partially—a 
function of measurement.  The issue of measurement of Mc is multidimensional in that it is 
crucial to consider not only the measurement instrument (e.g., employing observational 
assessments in place of or in addition to self-reports or think alouds), but also the context in 
which the measurement takes place (e.g., targeting naturalistic or authentic settings such as 
classrooms) and the methodology (e.g., contextualizing the assessment within a developmentally 
appropriate task or classroom situation and allowing for circumstances that are more likely to be 
                                                            
1 Examples of behaviors that were coded as being metacognitive are included in Appendix 2.A and 2.B. 
2 Examples of behaviors/ responses that were coded as being metacognitive are included in Appendix 2.C. 
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conducive to Mc). However, these studies focused mainly on verbal and non-verbal 
metacognitive behaviors and did not include structured questions posed to the children. While 
these observational methods are better able to capture Mc in young children in a more sensitive 
to development way, their exclusive use may not result in a comprehensive depiction of early Mc 
competency. 
When children are engaged in a meaningful task (e.g., scientific inquiry in a classroom 
setting), they naturally display considerable examples of metacognitive awareness and 
knowledge in addition to behaviors (Lomangino, 2000).  However, to comprehensively 
understand children’s early metacognitive processes, it is important to assess not only their 
behavior or knowledge at an observational level, but also to assess their articulated knowledge in 
a developmentally appropriate, comprehensive and direct, contextualized way.  There are other 
researchers who have recently become interested in studying young children related to 
metacognitive processing and found preliminary evidence that preschool-aged children, in the 
right conditions, are able to articulate McK about themselves, tasks, or strategies (R. Butler, 
personal communication May 8, 2012). However, comprehensive assessment tools designed to 
systematically measure children’s articulated McK have not been developed for preschool-aged 
children.  Just as researchers have recently developed comprehensive observational tools 
(including a single declarative interview question in Shamir et al., 2009) that are sensitive to 
capturing Mc capabilities of young children, the Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) 
was designed to comprehensively capture the declarative McK of young children sensitively and 
developmentally appropriately.  
Current Study 
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In the current study we investigated the appropriateness, feasibility, and reliability of a 
measurement tool designed to assess metacognitive knowledge (the Metacognitive Knowledge 
Interview; McKI) in 3-5 year olds and what it would reveal about early metacognitive processes.  
Specifically, we had three research questions.  
Our first research question was: Will the McKI (Metacognitive Knowledge Interview, a 
measure of declarative metacognitive knowledge) be sensitive to young children’s development 
and feasible enough to elicit preschool-aged children’s metacognitive knowledge about a 
cognitive task (puzzles)? We predicted, based on previous pilot work, that the McKI would be 
sensitive to development and a feasible assessment tool that would elicit 3-5 year olds 
metacognitive knowledge about a puzzle task in a way that was developmentally appropriate. As 
discussed earlier, we predicted that this tool would be more successful than previous interviews 
largely because it was contextualized within children’s preschool classroom, accompanied a 
familiar and enjoyable puzzle task and was conducted by an experimenter who was familiar to 
the children within their preschool classroom.  
Our second research question was: Will 3-5 year olds show significant improvement on 
the McKI over a school year? We predicted that the 3-5 year olds would show significant growth 
on the McKI over the preschool year for several reasons. First, the preschool years are a time of 
rapid learning-related cognitive development (Rimm-Kaufman & Pianta, 2000). Second, the 
children were all participating in a high quality preschool program with a highly qualified 
teacher (with a Bachelor of Science degree in child development and a Master of Arts degree in 
Reading Instruction). This teacher and her paraprofessional were reflective about their own 
teaching and their students’ learning and highly engaged and motivated to teach and learn. 
Furthermore, they both taught and created learning opportunities and environments that allowed 
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for the facilitation and elicitation of metacognitive processes. Third, when declarative McK has 
been examined in previous studies using interview tools in older children (e.g., Annevirta & 
Vauras, 2001), it has been shown to significantly increase over the course of each school year. 
Our third and final research question was: Will the McKI provide data that are useful for 
predictive analyses (e.g., sufficient variance of scores and general reliability) among 
preschoolers? Because this was the first study to examine preschool children’s declarative McK, 
this was an open question. However, we hypothesized that children’s scores on the McKI would 
vary to some degree based on pilot work.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 46 (42 in the final sample) children (35-64 months; 51% female) from 
three preschool classes in Southeastern Michigan. The original sample was 46 but three children 
were excluded due to being English Learners and one child was unable to complete the McKI. 
Even with encouragement, this child was only able to complete half of the interview, and most of 
this child’s responses were shrugs, or “because” responses. This child was one of the youngest in 
the sample (37.20 months) which might explain why the interview was so challenging.  The 
same teacher and paraprofessional taught all three classes in the same preschool classroom; the 
children came on different days/times based on age groups. There was a 3 to young-4 year old 
group which attended preschool on Monday and Wednesday mornings, a 4 year old group which 
attended preschool on Monday and Wednesday afternoons, and a 4.5-late 5 year old group which 
attended preschool on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday morning to early afternoons. 
Approximately 30% of families who returned consent forms reported their family income and 
46% reported maternal education.  The mean family income from this sample was $151,818 
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(median: $135,000), with incomes ranging from $34,000 to $650,000; all mothers who reported 
their level of education had some college education and 29% (n=5) had obtained a master’s 
degree (one mother reported a doctoral degree).  The sample was 62% White, 24% Asian, 9% 
Bi-racial, 2% Chaldean, 1% Hispanic, and 2% did not report their child’s race.  Out of the 
parents who returned the questionnaires, the majority (73%) reported English as their child’s first 
language.  
Procedure   
 In addition to the Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI), children were assessed on 
pre-academic performance (standardized pre-academic achievement measures in language arts 
and mathematics), individual and group motivation, and individual and group executive function. 
They were assessed over four sessions (two individual 30-45 minute sessions with the first 
author in a quiet area within the preschool classroom and two 25 minute group sessions with 
three experimenters (the first author and two other experimenters), the children’s preschool 
teacher and a paraprofessional). These sessions were conducted in the fall (Time 1; 6 weeks after 
school started) and spring (Time 2; 3 weeks before the end of the school year) giving a total of 8 
assessment sessions as part of a larger study (see Berhenke, 2013; Berhenke, Marulis, & 
Neidlinger, 2012). Because the focus of this study is on the development of the McKI, this paper 
will focus on that task.  
Measures. 
Wedgits problem-solving puzzle task. As we have argued, it is crucial that when young 
children are interviewed about their cognitive processes, it is done in a contextualized way (i.e., 
they are asked questions about a familiar cognitive task that they have just completed, that is 
ideally still within their view). This, in addition to ensuring that the wording was 
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developmentally appropriate, were the main foci in developing the McKI. In order to Re and ask 
the children about their metacognitive knowledge regarding something familiar and relevant, we 
adapted a mastery motivation puzzles task (from Smiley & Dweck, 1994) that we had previously 
piloted and found to be appropriate and enjoyable for preschool-aged children.  We chose the 
puzzle cards based on this pilot work. Children were shown a card with a puzzle design and 
asked to make Wedgit blocks (a set of building blocks) that match the design card to build a 
puzzle (see Appendix 2.D for puzzle design cards and specific procedure). Each child completed 
the first puzzle; if needed, help was provided (for the first puzzle only as this was a “warm-up”).  
Our protocol was that if the child finished the second puzzle in under four minutes, she or he 
would be given a third (more challenging) puzzle, then a fourth puzzle, and so forth, until he or 
she was unable to solve the puzzle in four minutes (only one child completed the third puzzle in 
under four minutes). After trying a puzzle for four minutes unsuccessfully, each child was told 
that the time was up for the game and the metacognitive knowledge questions began. The design 
of the Wedgits puzzle task was based on guidelines set forth by mastery motivation researchers 
for appropriately challenging tasks (Morgan, Busch-Rossnagel, Maslin-Cole, & Harmon, 1992). 
Our task successfully met these guidelines including providing tasks of increasing difficulty so 
that children were assessed working on tasks where they could complete part, but not all, of the 
solution in the time allotted. Furthermore, our goal was to design the task so that it was just 
challenging enough to elicit problem-solving strategies and thinking about those strategies such 
that tasks were within the children’s ZPDs (Vygotsky, 1978) when Mc is most likely recruited 
(Prins, Veenman, & Elshout, 2006). 
Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI).  Following the completion of the final 
(most challenging/not successfully completed in 4 minutes) Wedgits-block puzzle, children's 
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metacognitive knowledge was individually assessed by the first author using the Metacognitive 
Knowledge Interview (McKI). The McKI was developed to assess what could be revealed by a 
developmentally appropriate contextualized interview based on Flavell’s original 
conceptualization of metacognitive knowledge of: people, tasks, and strategies. Children were 
therefore asked a series of 11 questions related to the Wedgits task such as: “Do you think you 
did a good, okay, or not so good job on the puzzles? Why/Why not?”; “Would this puzzle be 
hard for another kid your age?” (knowledge about people) and “Would the puzzle be easier if all 
of the pieces were the same color?”; “Would the puzzle be easier with bigger or smaller pieces? 
Why?” (knowledge about tasks); “Would talking to yourself during the puzzle be helpful?  
Why/Why not?”; “If I think about how the pieces would fit together before I try, will the puzzle 
be easier? Why?/Why not?” (knowledge about strategies). Furthermore, in order to make the 
interview sensitive to children’s development, we asked children to respond to a puppet named 
“Gogi” (an unusual gender-neutral name; the puppet was given the gender of each child) for the 
last seven questions. The back story was that Gogi was from a far-away land and thus had never 
seen puzzles or blocks and wanted to learn about them. We then asked the children to help Gogi 
learn about the puzzles/blocks by answering questions about them (in a sense, teaching Gogi, 
about the puzzles/blocks and the child’s thinking, which many children respond to more readily 
than when asked to respond directly to questions about their thinking). See Appendix 2.E for the 
complete McKI; questions 5-11 included Gogi. 
Responses were rated on a 0-2 scale as follows: 0=not at all metacognitive, 1=partially 
metacognitive (e.g., they agreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a task but their 
reason was not related to cognition or they didn't know why), 2= appropriate metacognitive 
response (see Appendix 2.F for annotated codebook).  For the first question regarding whether 
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the children thought they did a good, okay, or not such a good job, children’s responses were 
compared to researcher-perceived scores (on the same scale of good, okay, or not-so-good; see 
Appendix 2.G). If the child’s response was aligned with the researcher; that is, the child said she 
or he did a good job on the puzzle and the researcher scored the child as doing a good job on the 
puzzle, the child received an appropriate metacognitive score (2 points). If the child’s response 
was off by one level; that is the child said she or he did a good job on the puzzle whereas the 
researcher scored the child as doing an okay job on the puzzle, the child received a partially 
metacognitive score (1 point). If the child’s response was off by two levels; that is, the child said 
she or he did a good job on the puzzle whereas the researcher scored the child as doing a not-so-
good  job on the puzzle, the child received a not at all metacognitive score (0 points). Two 
researchers independently coded 25% of the sample on all 11 questions as well as how the child 
did on the puzzle itself. Agreement between coders was high (intraclass correlation 
coefficient=.86).  
The McKI was pilot tested with 55 children in a similar preschool and from a similar 
background economically, racially, and educationally. The pilot children were also similar in age 
and gender proportions. Four questions were removed based on the pilot study because the 
children either did not understand the question or the majority responded in a way that was not 
aligned with the meaning of the question (even when the question was revised several times) or 
there was not enough variation in children’s responses, or most children responded non-verbally. 
For example, one original question asked the child to explain the best way to do the puzzle; most 
children just demonstrated rather than verbally explained even when asked to verbalize. Because 
this was designed to be an articulated metacognitive knowledge interview, these responses were 
not codeable.  Additionally, a question prompt was removed from several questions due to 
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children’s lack of meaningful response choices. In the original McKI, when children were asked 
whether something would make the puzzle easier or not (e.g., “Would the puzzle be easier with 
bigger or smaller pieces?”), if they responded in the affirmative, they were then asked if the 
puzzle would be a little or a lot easier (counter balanced). Because this choice was counter-
balanced, it was determined that most children were consistently choosing the last option 
regardless of meaning (i.e., if  “a lot” was stated last, children would consistently choose that 
option and vice versa). Thus, it appears that, this distinction between aspects of the puzzle task or 
various strategies making the puzzle a little or a lot easier was too nuanced for preschool-aged 
children. 
Pre-academic performance. The Woodcock-Johnson III tests of Letter-Word 
Identification and Applied Problems (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) were used to assess 
children’s pre-academic performance (pre-academic achievement) in language arts and 
mathematics.   
Analytic Plan 
To address our research questions, we used both qualitative (descriptive analyses of the 
children’s experiences with the McKI) and quantitative (examining descriptive statistics and 
growth over time; examining reliability indices) analyses.  
Results  
Feasibility and Elicitation of Metacognitive Knowledge 
First, we will describe qualitative results related to our first research question: Will the 
McKI be sensitive to young children’s development and feasible enough to elicit preschool-aged 
children’s metacognitive knowledge about a cognitive task (puzzles)? After several pilot 
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iterations (with 55 children), the McKI was used in this study with 42 children aged 3-5 (51% 
female; M=48.6; SD=6.49 months). The interview took between 5-8 minutes and did not appear 
to have elicited “test anxiety” or other negative emotions. Most children enjoyed being able to 
talk about their ideas or had neutral emotional responses, and there were no missing data. There 
were moderate instances of “I don’t know” responses (10% of all responses: 43 out of a possible 
396 overall at Time 1; 14% of all responses: 59 out of a possible 407 at Time 2), but as reviewed 
previously, the emerging use of terms such as “I don’t know” may be preliminary indicators of 
metacognitive processing (Lyons & Ghetti, 2010), which these authors found to begin by the end 
of children’s 2nd year.    
When asked about the interview afterwards most children said it was fun and asked if 
they could do it again. They were asked what they would tell their friends about the McKI, and 
most children said they “liked helping Gogi [the puppet] learn about the puzzles”. Some went on 
to say they would like to be friends with Gogi. Many children told the first author that they liked 
helping her learn about how children learn and several children remarked that it was like “being 
a teacher!” Thus, the preschool children seemed to enjoy having a chance to display what they 
know about their own knowledge, thinking, and learning and “teaching” it to others. It seemed to 
be a novel situation for the majority of the children in this way but the questions were viewed as 
a naturalistic extension of the puzzle game rather than a “test.” It is important to note that the 
first author spent several weeks in the children’s classroom getting to know the teachers and 
children, thus they viewed her as similar to a teacher, making the McKI a naturalistic task which 
occurred in the children’s classroom. In sum, to address our first research question, the McKI 
was feasible and sensitive to development enough for preschool-aged children as it was brief, 
enjoyable, and adaptable to naturally occurring learning tasks in the classroom. The majority of 
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children were able to articulate their metacognitive knowledge in relation to a challenge puzzle 
task (Wedgits). Cognitive pretesting (a developmentally appropriate version of the type 
described in Karabenick et al., 2007) indicated that the children interpreted and had responded to 
the questions as intended. This was subsequent to the four pilot questions being removed based 
on the children’s responses and cognitive pretesting in the pilot study. The 11 questions on the 
final version of the McKI used in this study were understood by the majority children and 
answered appropriately, to their capabilities. The McKI has subsequently been used with an 
additional 57 4-6 year old children in an ongoing study with similar findings (Marulis, et al., 
2013; additional information can be obtained from the first author).  
Quantitative Analyses 
 In addition to the qualitative analyses, we undertook quantitative analyses to 
address our second and third research questions: Will 3-5 year olds show significant 
improvement on the McKI over a school year? Will the McKI provide data that are useful for 
predictive analyses (e.g., sufficient variance of scores and general reliability) among 
preschoolers?  
For the Time 1, the mean score on the McKI was 9.0 (SD=4.56) points out of a possible 
22 points (2 points per question possible) and scores ranged from 1-18 points. Receiving one 
point per question—or a score of 11—would indicate, overall, responses that were “partially 
metacognitive” related to the puzzle task (see Appendix 2.D).  Thirty-six percent of the children 
received a score of 11 or above (with 3 children receiving a score of 15 or above). For example, 
if a child responded to the question: “Would it be helpful for Gogi [the puppet ‘from another 
land’]” to talk to herself/himself about the puzzle while doing the puzzle? Why?” by saying 
“Yes” [agreeing that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving the puzzle] but their reason was 
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not related to cognition (e.g., “because it’s fun”) or the child displayed tautological reasoning 
(e.g., “because it helps”], the response would be given one point. An example of a response that 
received full points (“metacognitive”) to this question was: “Yes, because Gogi has to focus and 
get concentration to do the puzzle. Talking to yourself does that.”  Thus, at the beginning of the 
school year, children, on average, were displaying less than partially metacognitive knowledge 
but substantially more than “not at all metacognitive” on average (the mean score was 
significantly greater than zero, t(30)=10.63, p<.001). Furthermore, a sizeable number of children 
(n=12) were scored as displaying “partially metacognitive” knowledge across the McKI.  The 
Time 1 and Time 2 McKI scores were significantly correlated (r=.59, p=.001) and, as predicted, 
children showed significant growth over the school year, t=3.75 (Mdiff=2.81), p =.001. At Time 
2, the mean score was 11.81 (SD=4.67) with a range from 5-22. As can be seen from the standard 
deviations and ranges at Time 1 and Time 2, there was considerable variation in children’s 
scores. There was a positive trend toward age differences at Time 1 (r=.36, p=.06 and Time 2 
(r=.28, p=.09) where older children tended to have higher scores on the McKI. Boys had 
significantly higher McKI scores at Time 1, t=2.61, (Mdiff=4.04), p=.01, but not time Time 2, 
t=1.06, (Mdiff=1.75), p=.30. 
Thus, by the end of the school year (approximately 7 months after the first testing 
session), children, on average, were displaying “partially metacognitive” knowledge regarding 
the puzzle task with one child receiving a full 22 points (it is important to note, however, that she 
was the oldest child in the preschool at 6.1 years and this score may indicate a ceiling effect in 
which the McKI may not be appropriate for typically developing children above 6 years; all 
other children in the sample were under 6 years old). However, 55% of the children scored above 
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11 points (24% between 15-19). Thus, a considerable number of children displayed greater than 
partial metacognitive knowledge on the McKI at the end of their preschool year. 
We also examined the McKI responses categorically. Specifically, we assessed the 
children’s use of mental state terms such as brain, think, learn, know, and I don’t know, and other 
related mental state terminology looking for evidence of children’s awareness of and reference to 
cognitive processes.  
Because there were 11 questions on the McKI, each child had at least 11 opportunities to 
use mental state terms. Overall, we found that at Time 1, 49% of the children used mental state 
terms at least once and there were 36 total instances of mental state term usages by the children. 
At Time 2, 59% of the children used mental state terms at least once and there were 60 total 
instances of mental state term usages by the children.  
Breaking this down by age groups, in the youngest group (the 3 to young-4 year olds; 
M=40.65 months at Time 1; 47.57 at Time 2), at Time 1, only one child used mental state terms 
in his or her responses with two total instances. One example of this child’s mental state 
utterance accompanying the statement,  “Puzzles are easier for me than Gogi” was “because I 
know how to do them already.” At Time 2, in the youngest class, 27% (3) of the children used 
mental state terms for a total of six instances. Examples included: “I think I did a great job on the 
puzzles because I learned how to do them”; Puzzles are easier for me than Gogi because he 
doesn’t know about puzzles.” 
In the middle age group (4 year olds; M=52.13 months at Time 1; 59.07 at Time 2), 3 
children (33%) used mental states for a total of seven instances; for example, “Yes (it would be 
helpful for Gogi to talk to himself) because it will help him know how to do it.” At Time 2, five 
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children (63%) used mental states for a total of ten instances. Example included: “No, talking to 
yourself would not be helpful to the puzzle because you need to think about stuff; the puzzle 
would be harder if the pieces were all the same color because you would forget which color they 
are.” 
In the oldest group (4.5-late 5 year olds M=58.35 months at Time 1; 65.27 at Time 2), 13 
children (76%) used mental state with a total of 27 instances including: “I think I did a good job 
on the puzzles, what helped me do a good job was my brain; I was thinking in my brain and I 
figured out how to do it.” At Time 2, 14 children (82%) used mental state words with a total of 
44 instances including “I think so (that the puzzles would not be hard for another child); if they 
were smart at puzzles like me”; “Yes, it would help to talk to yourself during the puzzle because 
you need to focus and get concentration to do the puzzle, Talking to yourself does that.” 
Some of the questions were answered at a higher level than others overall. At Time 1, 
Questions 2 (“Did you think anything was hard? Why?/Why not? What would have made it 
easier?”) and 6 (“What should Gogi do if she/he is having trouble with the puzzle?”) had the 
highest overall averages (.82 and .97 respectively). Furthermore, 24% of children received a full 
score of 2 points on Question 2 (33% received 1 point) and 42% received 2 points on Question 6 
(12% received 1 point). For most other questions at Time 1, less than 10% of the children 
received the full 2 points. At Time 2, children once again had the highest overall average scores 
on Questions 2 (1.28 points; 39% of children received 2 points and 48% received 1 point) and 6 
(1.16 points; 49% of children received 2 points and 19% received 1 point). Additionally, for 
Question 1 (Do you think you did a good job, an okay job or not so good of a job on the 
puzzles?”), 42% of the children received 2 points (but 46% received 0 points, so this question 
seemed to be dichotomizing; the average score was .94). Similarly, 42% of the children received 
 83 
 
2 points on Question 4 (“How did you know if you were getting the puzzles right?”) while 48% 
received 0 points. 
In sum, as predicted, the McKI elicited children’s metacognitive knowledge about the 
puzzle task. This included both continuous McK as coded on the 0-2 scale (see Appendix 2.F), as 
well as categorical mental state terms, both of which increased over time and with age. In 
addition, there was substantial variance in the quantitative and qualitative responses of the 3-5 
year old children on the McKI.   
Reliability 
The internal consistency of the McKI was acceptable at both Time 1 (α=.76) and Time 2 
(α=.77) (Kline, 1999). Further, the test-retest correlation was significant (r=.59, p=.001; 
controlling for language using the Woodcock-Johnson letter-word identification scale:  r=.50, 
p=.016) and age: r=.57, p=.003). These analyses, paired with the cognitive pretesting and 
elicitation of metacognitive knowledge responses in children as young as 3, indicate an 
acceptable level of reliability and practicality to continue using the McKI in further studies. As 
mentioned earlier, the McKI has subsequently been used in conjunction other studies with 
similar reliability statistics (Marulis et al., 2013). 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess preschool-aged children’s 
metacognitive knowledge using an interview tool. We were able to show that—similar to the 
efforts of recent researchers (e.g., Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007, 2009) to develop 
and test more sensitive and developmentally appropriate assessment observation tools—
preschool-aged children are far more metacognitive than previously thought (e.g., Flavell, 1979; 
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Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Veenman et al., 2006). Supporting the research of 
Whitebread and colleagues and Shamir and colleagues, our study provided evidence that young 
children are not only capable of greater metacognitive behaviors in the right contexts, but also of 
articulating McK about a cognitive task. Because of their similarity to school-related learning 
skills, being able to articulate knowledge about metacognitive skills and apply those skills to a 
learning task (i.e., the types of behaviors displayed in Shamir et al., 2009 and Whitebread et al., 
2007 and 2009) beginning in the preschool years is likely to predict later developmental, 
cognitive, and academic success more than either one alone, though this should be empirically 
investigated.  The development and assessment of the McKI measurement tool in this study 
allowed for a more comprehensive depiction of early metacognitive processes to be revealed- the 
types, frequency and levels of McK present in a sample of preschool-aged children. 
This study also provides evidence in line with research pointing to the traditional 
underestimation of early cognitive and learning-related/SRL skills (e.g., Gelman & Baillargeon, 
1983) related to measurement issues. We found that this McKI was a developmentally 
appropriate, sensitive to development measure for 3-5 year olds that elicited articulated Mc 
related to a contextualized problem-solving task (puzzles) that revealed significant growth on 
average over a preschool year along with sufficient variation across 42 young children to suggest 
that it is sensitive to inter-individual differences. As other researchers have found with older 
children (Annevirta, & Vauras, 2001), there were individual differences including a few children 
who did not show growth on the McKI and several who decreased on the McKI over the course 
of the school year.  We found considerable variance in scores. At the high end, one child 
increased by 12 points, whereas on the low end, one child decreased on the McKI by 4 points.  
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From a practical perspective, we found that the McKI could feasibly be administered in a 
preschool classroom in less than 15 minutes including the puzzle task about which the children 
were asked the metacognitive knowledge questions (administration times ranged from 10-25 
minutes with an average of 15 minutes); from a conceptual perspective, we found that, overall, 
children understood what they were being asked. Furthermore, the internal consistency and test-
retest indices were adequate.  Thus, the overarching answer to whether the McKI was reliable 
and practical for use with preschoolers is yes. Moreover, it could easily be adapted to most tasks 
and domains. For this study, we chose a puzzle problem-solving task due to most young 
children’s familiarity/experience with and prior knowledge about these types of learning tasks. 
The McKI was designed to be used with a task with which all children in this sample had similar 
lack of experience (these particular Wedgit blocks were novel) but was a familiar task in general 
as it was a puzzle building task that is common in most preschool classrooms, For example, this 
particular preschool classroom included many puzzles that the children frequently used on their 
own and with their teacher. 
We found substantially more evidence of McK than has previously been found with 
similar interviews related to metacognitive knowledge processes. For example, Kreutzer, 
Leonard, & Flavell (1975) found that children in kindergarten and first grade (compared to 
children in third and fifth grades) were largely unable to respond to questions regarding their 
memory abilities (i.e., metamemory knowledge questions). However, these questions were 
decontextualized in that they involved hypothetical situations such as “Do you remember things 
well? Are you a good rememberer? And “If I gave you 10 things to look at quickly and 
remember and you remembered six of them, how many do you think your friends would 
remember? Are there some kinds of things that are really hard to remember?”  We believe that 
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the decontextualized / hypothetical nature of the questions, as well as the level of difficulty (e.g., 
long sentences and large working memoy load of many of the questions), are the primary reasons 
for the difference between the findings of this study and ours. The McKI was contextulized with 
a familiar and developmentally appropriate puzzle task, was concrete, and was accompanied by 
questions that were asked immediately after the puzzle task while the puzzle was still in view, 
and the questions were appropriate to the working memory and receptive verbal abilities of 3-5 
year olds.  
Limitations and Recommendations 
 There are several important limitations inherent in this research as well as 
recommendations for future research. First, because we had considerable variance in the McKI 
scores at both time points, it is likely that this variance could be explained by individual 
differences in demographics such as SES, racial background and so on. However, our sample did 
not allow for such analyses as a consequence of the small numbers of children from various 
racial and SES backgrounds for example. We suggest that future research with this 
metacognitive knowledge interview take place with a population that is more diverse across 
multiple factors not only to be able to explain the variance found but also to be able to examine 
whether metacognitive knowledge may be a protective factor for children at risk for learning 
difficulties, in the same manner as has been found for other SRL variables have been found to be 
(e.g., Sektnan, McClelland, Acock, & Morrison, 2010). 
Second, because the only Mc measure included in this study tapped metacognitive 
knowledge only, we were not able to capture or examine early Mc comprehensively with this 
sample of children. For example, other aspects of Mc, such as metacognitive behavior, 
monitoring of or regulation of cognition, are important to consider to comprehensively capture 
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young children’s metacognitive processing. The preschoolers in our sample may have been 
enacting many instances of metacognitive behaviors that we did not capture with our interview 
measure. Future analyses should include coding children’s behavioral Mc such as verbal and 
non-verbal monitoring and control (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1994; Whitebread et al., 2009), 
cognitive and metacognitive strategic behaviors (Strategic Behaviour Observation Scale [SBOS]; 
Dermitzaki, Leondari, Goudas, 2009), and affective metacognitive experiences (e.g., Efklides, 
2008) during the Wedgit challenge puzzle tasks in order to analyze the associations between 
these components of Mc and the McKI.  
Third, we did not include control variables beyond the Woodcock-Johnson Letter-Word 
test for language and age. We did not have an IQ test or proxy. Other studies have found that 
intelligence and McK are strongly related in young children (Alexander, Carr, & 
Schwanenflugel, 1995), though this hasn’t yet been examined in preschool-aged children. Thus, 
future studies should measure children’s intelligence, in addition to their McK when examining 
changes over time and, particularly, when examining associations with cognitive development 
and academic achievement, which is our next goal. Though measuring intelligence in 
preschoolers is difficult, there are verbal ability tests, such as the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT; Dunn & Dunn, 1997) and non-verbal test such as Raven’s Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003) that have been used successfully with young children 
for these purposes.  
Finally, we were not able to examine ceiling and floor effects in this study systematically 
though it appears that after 6 years, the McKI would be inappropriate and ceiling effects would 
be found (as the oldest child in our sample at just over 6 years at Time 2 received the full 22 
points). On the other end of the continuum, at around 3 years or younger, it seems that the McKI 
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may be too difficult as in the pilot study there were 11 children who were under 3 or just turning 
3-years who had a very difficult time with the questions or were unable to respond. These 
children all received less than three points in total and three of them were unable to finish more 
than half of the interview. Future studies should investigate ceiling and floor effects 
systematically along with other psychometric properties of the McKI. 
Conclusion and Implications 
Though this study provided valuable information regarding the measurement of early 
metacognitive knowledge, it was not designed to address the larger issue of conceptualizing and 
assessing early metacognitive development comprehensively (i.e., with multiple measurement 
tools). Rather, it was designed to address what would be revealed by a developmentally 
appropriate metacognitive knowledge interview for preschool-aged children. It is our position 
that this type of assessment tool would ideally be used in conjunction with a systematic 
behavioral observation tool (e.g., the SBOS developed by Dermitzaki et al., 20093 and the 
C.Ind.Le and CHILD observational coding systems developed by Whitebread et al., 2007, 20094) 
to comprehensively assess young children’s metacognitive processes.  
Using both declarative and behavioral Mc measurement tools in tandem in future 
research will allow for comprehensive and precise assessment of metacognitive processes, which 
will subsequently allow for the examination of mechanisms underlying the development, 
facilitation, and predictive power of early Mc for enhancing learning and academic achievement. 
These types of studies would provide information critical to the later design and enactment of 
                                                            
3 See Appendix 2.H 
4 See Appendices 2.A and 2.B 
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effective early Mc intervention programs with the long-term goal of improving developmental 
and educational outcomes for all children and informing early educational curriculum and policy.   
However, prior to this, a clearer and more comprehensive conceptualization of metacognition 
must be revealed, which was a primary aim of this study though much work remains to be done 
in this area with young children. We believe that targeting Mc in preschool-aged children is 
paramount for researchers.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.A. Cambridgeshire Independent Learning in the Foundation Stage 
(C.Ind.Le) 
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 From Whitebread, Coltman, Pino-Pasternak, Sangster, Grau, Bingham, Almeqdad, & 
Demetrious, 2009, p. 79-80 
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Appendix 2.B. The Checklist of Independent Learning Development (CHILD) 3-5 
From Whitebread, Coltman, Pino-Pasternak, Sangster, Grau, Bingham, Almeqdad, & 
Demetrious, 2009, p. 81 
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Appendix 2.C.  Examples of Children’s Metacognitive Behavior during a Card 
Recall Task 
 
 
From Shamir, Mevarech, & Gida, 2009, p. 59 
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Appendix 2.D.  Wedgits problem-solving puzzle task 
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Appendix 2.E.  Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI)  
 
Use this protocol after children have completed the Wedgits puzzle task 
Once the Wedgits puzzle task is complete, tell child: “Thank you for working on those 
puzzles! I would like to talk to you about the puzzles you just did and about your thinking. 
My job is to learn about how kids learn and think and I have a few questions for you, 
Okay?” Once child assents, say: “Thank you. Remember, there are no right or wrong 
answers; I only want to know what you think. Just give your best answer.” (If they don't 
agree, try to prod them by saying that ‘I really need your help and want to learn about how kids 
think'.) 
1. “Do you think you did a good job, an okay job or not so good of a job on the puzzles?” 
Circle child's response. If they say they did a good job, ask “What did you do to help you 
do a good job?” If they answer okay or not so good, ask “What do you think would have 
helped you do an even better job?  
2. “Did you think anything was hard?” If no, ask: “Why not?” If yes, ask “Why? What 
would have made it easier?” 
3. “Would these puzzles be hard for another kid your age? Why/why not?”  
4. How did you know if you were getting the puzzles right?” 
 
Show child the 'alien' finger puppet and say: “I have another friend to show you. This 
puppet's name is Gogi and he/she (use same gender as the child) is from another land. S/he 
does not go to a school like yours or have a teacher like yours and doesn't know anything 
about puzzles like the ones you just did. Will you help Gogi learn about these kind of 
puzzles?” Wait for child to assent and say: “Thank you.” (If they don't agree, try to prod them 
by saying that 'Gogi really needs your help and wants to learn about these kind of puzzles'.) 
5. “Would these puzzles be easier for Gogi or you? Why?” 
6. “What should Gogi do if s/he is having trouble with the puzzle?”  
7. “Would it be helpful for Gogi to talk to herself/himself about the puzzle while doing the 
puzzle? Why would/wouldn't that be a helpful thing to do? 
“Gogi has some questions for you about puzzles like this one. Okay?” Have Gogi 'speak' 
directly to the child and ask the following: 
8. Would the puzzle be easier with bigger or smaller pieces? Why?” 
9. “If all of the puzzle pieces were the same color, like in this picture (show the Wedgits 
booklet of all purple Wedgits) will the puzzle be easier? If yes, ask: “Why?” If no, ask, 
“Why not?”  
10. “If I think about how the pieces would fit together before I try, will the puzzle be 
easier? If yes, ask: “Why?” If no, ask, “Why not?” 
11. “If I close my eyes while I do the puzzle, will it be easier? If yes, ask: “Why?” If no, ask, 
“Why not?”  
 
“Thank you for sharing all of your ideas and how you think with Gogi!  
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Appendix 2.F.  Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) Codebook and 
Annotated Scoring 
 
The Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) assesses children’s metacognitive 
knowledge (or knowledge about individuals, tasks and strategies) individually using a series of 
11 questions related to the Wedgits task [in which children are shown design cards of increasing 
difficulty and are asked to make the Wedgits building blocks look exactly like the picture on the 
card. All children completed the first puzzle. If they finished the second in less than four 
minutes, they were given a third card. After they had tried a puzzle for four minutes 
unsuccessfully, they were stopped, and asked, “If you had more time to work, would you like to 
keep trying this one (the uncompleted one, indicating a mastery goal) or build this other one 
again (the one they previously completed, indicating a performance goal)? Why?”]. For example, 
children were asked “Would talking to yourself during the puzzle be helpful? Why/why not?”. 
Please see the last two pages of this document for background literature and theoretical 
framework to support the development and assessment of this interview measure. 
 
TO SCORE:  
Rate responses to questions on a 0-2 scale for each question where: 
 0=Not at all metacognitive 
o Response does not refer to knowledge about the child’s thinking or cognitive 
ability/capability; the difficulty of the task itself or the efficacy/efficiency of a 
strategy. 
 E.g., child disagreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a 
task without an appropriate explanation (e.g., said “I don’t know” or 
“because I don’t like to do it”. *NOTE: child could receive the full 
score (2 points) for a negative response to this question IF she or he 
provided a metacognitive explanation such as talking to oneself is not 
helpful because it will distract their thinking or make them not be able 
to attend to the task. The full points refer to an “appropriate 
metacognitive response”; thus yes OR no could be a fully 
metacognitive response depending on the explanation.  
 1=Partially metacognitive  
o Response refers to knowledge about the child’s thinking or cognitive 
ability/capability; the difficulty of the task itself or the efficacy/efficiency of a 
strategy but not completely/fully or without an explanation that backs up the 
response. 
 E.g., child agreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a 
task but their reason was not related to cognition (e.g., because it’s 
fun) or they didn’t know why. 
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 2= Appropriately/fully Metacognitive 
o Response refers to knowledge about the child’s thinking or cognitive 
ability/capability; the difficulty of the task itself or the efficacy/efficiency of a 
strategy in a complete/full way or with a metacognitive explanation that backs 
up the response. 
 E.g., child agreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a 
task because it helps them remember how to do the task/ helps their 
brain think better, etc. 
 OR child disagreed that talking to oneself is helpful because it would 
distract them. 
 
If the child doesn’t/won’t answer, he/she will be given 0 points for that response (NR=no 
response) and coded as “999”. If the child says “I don’t know”, she/he will be given 0 points for 
that question/portion of the question and coded as (DK=don’t know) “999”. 
 The full set of questions is below including example responses and scoring. The actual 
scores given for this child are indicated along with what would qualify for the other levels of 
scoring.  
Metacognitive Knowledge Interview_CODED SAMPLE  
Once the Wedgits puzzle task is complete, tell child: “Thank you for working on those 
puzzles! I would like to talk to you about the puzzles you just did and about your thinking. 
My job is to learn about how kids learn and think and I have a few questions for you, 
Okay?” Once child assents, say: “Thank you. Remember, there are no right or wrong 
answers; I only want to know what you think. Just give your best answer.” (If they don’t 
agree, try to prod them by saying that ‘I really need your help and want to  learn about how kids 
think’.) 
1. “Do you think you did a good job, an okay job or not so good of a job on the puzzles?” 
Circle child’s response. If they say they did a good job, ask “What did you do to help you 
do a good job?” If they answer okay or not so good, ask “What do you think would have 
helped you do a better job?  My brain-that controls my whole body. 
2 points. His knowledge of how well he performed on the task was accurate. He 
performed above his age level by completing the second challenging puzzle accurately and 
quickly and nearly completed the 3rd puzzle (designed for children older than preschool 
and chosen to pose a challenge sufficient enough for children this age to be unable to 
complete accurately, particularly within four minutes). Further, he showed metacognitive 
knowledge about himself and what helped him/would help him do a good job on puzzles-his 
brain.  
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A score of 1 would be either an inaccurate assessment of one’s performance on the 
puzzle or an accurate response to this with a non-metacognitive response to what would 
help do a good/better job such as “being good” or “doing a good job”. If a child accurately 
assessed his/her Wedgit performance and gave a partial metacognitive response (such as: 
“liking the puzzle” because it is possible that higher enjoyment/interest in a task leads to 
higher performance but this response does not fully spell this out. Or responding to the 
question “What did you to do help you do a good job” with: “I tried hard” without 
elaboration.) He/she could get 1.5 on this question. 0 points would be given if the child was 
metacognitively inaccurate about his/her performance along with a non-metacognitive 
follow-up response. 
2. “Did you think anything was hard?” If no, ask: “Why not?” If yes, ask “Why? 
What would have made it easier?”  My brain focuses when I’m doing puzzles  
 
1 point. He said nothing was hard but other comments he made during the third 
puzzle indicated that there were parts he found very difficult. However, he had good 
metacognitive knowledge regarding why it didn’t seem difficult-he was aware that by 
being able to concentrate and maintaining focus (with your brain), the task will likely 
be/seem easier. 
A child whose response to whether anything was hard matches his/her 
comments/emotional response to the puzzle would get a full point for that part of the 
question and another full point for why he/she didn’t find it hard-e.g., the type of 
response given here. If the child said something was difficult (and this matched 
his/her response to the puzzle) and also responded with a metacognitively aware 
answer regarding what would have made it easier-e.g., having help from an 
adult/older child or getting a hint, she/he would receive 2 points. A score of 0 would be 
given if the child was metacognitively inaccurate about his/her performance along 
with a non-metacognitive follow-up response to Why/Why not. 
 
3. “Would these puzzles be hard for another kid your age? Why/why not?”  No, 
I don’t know. 
 
1 point. His answer matches the one above as to whether the task would be difficult 
depending on age but didn’t give a response as to why he thought this.  
In order to receive 2 points, a child would have to either match the response to 
Question #2 (e.g., if they said the puzzle was/wasn’t difficult for them) and follow with 
a metacognitively aware response as to why such as “these puzzles are hard for 4 year 
olds” or “we have these in our classroom so they’re not hard for us” OR, the child 
could have a different response with a metacognitively aware answer as to why such 
as “Yes, they would be hard for other kids my age because they don’t have them at 
home like I do” or “No, they wouldn’t be hard for other kids my age because they are 
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better at puzzles than me”. 0 points would be given if the child gave an answer that 
didn’t match #2 and gave a non-metacognitive follow-up response to Why/Why not. 
 
4. How did you know if you were getting the puzzles right?” I looked at the picture. 
 
2 points. He was aware not only of what strategy would be helpful in accurately 
completing the task but of which strategy he actually used while doing the task (this 
can be discerned by watching the video or noting whether the child actually used this 
strategy during the task).  
A child would be given 1 point if gave a partially metacognitive response such as “I 
thought about it hard”. 
0 points were given for non-plausible/ non-metacognitive responses such as “I just 
knew” or “because I’m smart/good”. 
 
Show child the ‘alien’ finger puppet and say: “I have another friend to show you. This 
puppet’s name is Gogi and he/she (use same gender as the child) is from another land. 
S/he does not go to a school like yours or have a teacher like yours and doesn’t know 
anything about puzzles like the ones you just did. Will you help Gogi  learn about 
these kind of puzzles?” Wait for child to assent and say: “Thank you.” (If they don’t 
agree, try to prod them by saying that ‘Gogi really needs your help and wants to  learn 
about these kind of puzzles’.) 
 
5. “Would these puzzles be easier for Gogi or you? Why?”  A lot; I focus a lot 
1 point. He was metacognitive in asserting that he (would had experience with puzzles 
and was from a school/had teachers who taught about puzzle and puzzle-related 
tasks) but not in his response as to why.  It is metacognitive to understand that 
focusing helps improve performance, but in this instance, the question was about why 
he would have an easier time than Gogi.  
In order to receive 2 points, a child would have to say something like “I have already 
done those puzzle” or “I know all about puzzles and Gogi doesn’t know about them at 
all”. 0 points are given if the child chose Gogi without a metacognitive explanation. 
The child could receive 1 point by choosing Gogi but giving a metacognitive response 
as to why such as “He looks smarter with that big brain (the toy had a brain external 
to his head).”  
 
6. “What should Gogi do if s/he is having trouble with the puzzle?” Ask someone. 
2 points. He his answer reflected metacognitive awareness of a good strategy to use 
when encountering trouble (e.g., help-seeking).  
To receive 1 point, a child could respond with an answer that indicates some 
awareness of cognitive states but not of a (potentially) successful strategy, such as 
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“Try it” (if the child had added “harder” or “again” after “Try”, she/he would receive 
the full 2 points). A score of 0 would be a response such as “Be good” which is not at 
all indicative of awareness of cognitive strategy.  
 
7. “Would it be helpful for Gogi to talk to herself/himself while doing the puzzle? Why 
would/wouldn’t that be a helpful thing to do? Yes-he has to focus and get 
concentration. Talking to yourself does that. 
 
2 points. He is both metacognitively aware that talking to oneself about a task while 
performing it can be cognitively helpful and why.  
1 point would be given if the child answered “Yes” but didn’t know why or gave a 
non-metacognitive response as to why such as “It helps” or “It’s good”. 0 points is 
given for an answer of No without a metacognitive explanation. The child could 
receive 1 point by responding “No” but giving a metacognitive response as to why 
such as “Because if you talk you might get distracted and do a bad job on the puzzle”. 
“Gogi has some questions for you about puzzles like this one. Okay?” Have the 
puppet ‘speak’ directly to the child and ask the following: 
For the last 4 questions, there was an intended ‘correct’ answer in that one response 
would make the puzzle task easier (as confirmed by asking adults these same questions). 
Thus, the child would get 1 point for answering correctly/metacognitively accurately and 
another 1 point for giving a metacognitively aware response as to why this was true. 
However, it became apparent after conducting several interviews that children sometimes 
viewed the strategies differently. Thus, if they responded differently than the adults to 
which situation would make the puzzle easier but gave a metacognitive response that 
appropriately made the first response defensible, he/she received the full 2 points (if there 
was no response given to back up their answer or a non-metacognitive response given, the 
score would be 0. In contrast, if the child responded as adults did to the first part but did 
not respond to the second part or responded non-metacognitively, she/he received 1 point).  
 
8. “Would the puzzle be easier with bigger or smaller pieces? Why?” Easier to hold in 
your hands. 
 2 points. He responded like adults for bigger pieces and gave a response that, while not 
as cognitively related as adults answered-e.g., “less pieces to have to figure out how to fit 
together or less intricate designs”, it was a plausible reason as to why bigger pieces make 
doing a puzzle easier. 
1 point would have been given if there was no response to “Why” or he had said 
something like “It’s better”. 0 points would have been given if he had said smaller was 
easier and given no response to “Why” or he had said something like “It’s better”. 
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However, 2 points would have been given if he had said “smaller” along with a 
metacognitive response such as “Smaller pieces would be easier for Gogi to hold/see” 
(Gogi is a small hand puppet). 
 
9. “If all of the puzzle pieces were the same color, will the puzzle be easier? If yes, ask: 
Why? If no, ask, “Why not?” I can’t figure out which one goes where. 
2 points. He responded like adults and gave a metacognitive response to “Why not”. 
1 point would have been given if there was no response to “Why” or he had said 
something like “It’s harder like that”. 0 points would have been given if he had said 
“Yes” with no response to “Why” or he had said something like “It’s just easier”. 
However, 2 points would have been given if he had said “Yes” along with a 
metacognitive response such as “Then you would be able to sort by size” (indicting 
less cognitive load because you don’t have two dimensions on which to sort).  
 
10. “If I think about how the pieces would fit together before I try, will the puzzle be 
easier? If yes, ask: Why? If no, ask, “Why not?” Because it is (demonstrated ‘thinking’ 
and putting the pieces in the right places). 
1 point. He responded as adults would but did not give a metacognitive response to 
“Why” (though his demonstration came close, but even after being prompted after 
this enactment, he did not respond with any indication of metacognitive awareness.  
2 points would have been given if his second response was something like “because it 
helps me focus on the puzzle” or “I’d have more time to figure out the right place”. 
0 points would be given for a response of “No” with no response as to “Why not” or a 
non-metacognitive response such as this one “Because it isn’t”. 
 
11. “If I close my eyes while I do the puzzle, will it be easier? If yes, ask: Why? If no, ask, 
“Why not?” No, he can’t see what he’s doing! He couldn’t see if he had the right piece 
or the right place on the card (pointed to the design picture card)”. 
2 points. He responded like adults and gave a metacognitive response to “Why not”.  
He would have been given 1 point for not responding to “Why not” or giving a non-
metacognitive response such as this one “Because it isn’t easier”. 0 points would be 
given for a response of “Yes” with no response to “Why” or without a metacognitive 
response to defend this (see above-adults were unable to come up with a way to 
metacognitively defend this answer except possibly by discussing how other senses 
may become more acute, but this still wouldn’t make the puzzle easier though a case 
may be able to be made for equally easy”).  
  
“Thank you for sharing all of your ideas and how you think with Gogi!  
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Notes:  While he was building the puzzle, he made a lot of metacognitive (evaluative) 
comments such as “I built this one before so I’m good at it.” And for the most challenging 
puzzle, he said  “OOOh, I can’t do that one!” Then as he worked on it, he said “I’m having 
trouble with this part” (he didn’t successfully complete it but was close). 
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Appendix 2.G.  Wedgits Puzzle Scoring 
1. Rate the accuracy of the child’s performance on the Wedgits task. These coding 
categories were designed to match the Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) 
in which the child is asked how well she or he did on the puzzle (Question #1). 
a. Good= Child accurately (e.g., the puzzle looked exactly like the picture card) 
finished the first and second puzzles within the time allotted (4 minutes). The 
child may have started (or completed) a third or even fourth puzzle, but this is 
not required to receive a score of “Good”. 
b. Okay= Child accurately (e.g., the puzzle looked exactly like the picture card) 
finished the first puzzle within the time allotted (4 minutes) and accurately 
completed at least half of the second puzzle (i.e., completed the bottom half—
that looks like a pyramid—and the green piece that is placed vertically in the 
pyramid). 
c. Not so good= Child accurately (e.g., the puzzle looked exactly like the picture 
card) finished the first puzzle within the time allotted (4 minutes) and started 
the second puzzle but did not accurately complete half of the second puzzle 
(i.e., did not complete the bottom half that looks like a pyramid). 
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Appendix 2.H. The Strategic Behaviour Observation Scale (SBOS) 
 
From Dermitzaki, Leondari, Goudas, 2009, p. 155-156 
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CHAPTER III 
The Convergent Validity between Two Measures of Metacognitive Processing in 
Preschoolers 
Abstract 
The focus of this study was to elucidate the conceptualization and measurement of early 
metacognitive skills and processes through the comparison of the data revealed by two different 
measures of metacognition in preschool-aged children. Specifically, the convergent validity 
between a metacognitive knowledge interview (McKI) and an observational metacognitive skills 
coding scheme (ChAT) was examined in 83 preschoolers (Mage=53.47 months SD=4.53; 41% 
female). The correlations between the measurement tools ranged from low to moderate and 
varied across sub-components. Furthermore, the convergent validity was moderated by the 
children’s family socio-economic background (SES); children from low-SES family background 
had less nuanced metacognitive processing than did children from higher SES family 
backgrounds. Both measures revealed evidence of early emerging metacognition in this sample 
of young children; there was some overlap but a considerable number of unique elements left to 
explore. Implications of this research include the importance of precisely conceptualizing and 
measuring metacognitive constructs and of investigating the unique elements between different 
measurement tools in order to understand its association to learning and academic achievement. 
Keywords: Metacognition, Metacognitive Knowledge, Early Childhood, Convergent Validity, 
Measurement, Observation, Interview 
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The Convergent Validity between Two Measures of Metacognitive Processing in Preschoolers 
 Metacognition (Mc) has been shown to be associated with and predictive of cognitive 
development and academic achievement across many domains and age levels (e.g., Bransford, 
Brown & Cocking, 2000; Brown & Kane, 1988; Davidson & Sternberg, 1998; Desoete, Roeyers, 
& Huylebroeck, 2006; Georghiades, 2004; Harris, Graham, Brindle, & Sandmel, 2009; Palincsar 
& Brown, 1984; Pressley, 2002; Prins, Veenman, & Elshout, 2006; White & Frederiksen, 1998). 
However, this association has rarely been studied prior to middle elementary school, (for 
exceptions see Whitebread, 1999; Shamir, Mevarech, & Gida, 2009). This positive association 
between Mc, cognition and academic achievement may be potentially encouraging for 
researchers who study cognitive development and education as well as for educational 
practitioners and curriculum and policy makers. However, there is considerable confusion and 
lack of clarity surrounding the way that Mc is conceptualized and measured. Furthermore, 
related constructs such as self-regulation (SR) and self-regulated learning (SRL) are frequently 
substituted for Mc both in conceptualization and assessment (e.g., for a review, see Dinsmore, 
Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008), and thus it is difficult to be confident about what is being studied. 
Consequently, prior to comprehensively examining the relations between Mc and 
development/academic achievement, it is essential to precisely conceptualize Mc and carefully 
assess it, beginning with young, preschool-aged children.1  Accordingly, the overarching aim of 
                                                            
1 There are recent studies examining metacognitive processes in infants (e.g., Brinck & Liljenfors 2013) that are also 
important, but in order to examine the construct comprehensively is required with children old enough to understand 
mental verbs and verbalize their knowledge, which is approximately the beginning of preschool/3 years old 
(Johnson & Wellman, 1980; also see Marulis, Palincsar, Berhenke, & Whitebread, submitted related to the 
developmental appropriateness of the McKI for children under 3) 
112 
 
this study is to examine the convergent validity of two measures of early metacognitive 
processes for what they reveal about the conceptualization and assessment of early Mc.  
Measurement Issues in Metacognition for Young Children 
 As reviewed in detail previously (Marulis, Palincsar, Berhenke, & Whitebread, 
submitted), assessing cognitive skills in young children has been a challenge for many decades, 
and only in recent decades have previous underestimations (many based on Piaget’s rigid stage-
theory of development) begun to be rectified (e.g., for a review of underestimations of early 
cognitive skills, see Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983; Wang, Baillargeon, & Brueckner, 2004). This 
issue has been slower to change in the area of Mc where researchers continue to argue that 
metacognitive processes do not emerge until children reach the ages of 7-8 (e.g., Veenman, Van 
Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006).  Hence, the influence of Piaget’s conception of progression 
into concrete operations around this age period continues to prevail, even though researchers for 
decades have found indicators of specific metacognitive processes in preschool-aged children 
(e.g., Karabenick, 1981; Moore, Furrow, Chiasson, & Patriquin, 1994) 
 More recently, several researchers have revealed robust evidence of earlier emerging Mc 
in preschool-aged children (Marulis et al., submitted; Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread, Bingham, 
Grau, Pino-Pasternak, & Sangster, 2007; 2009).  In each of these studies, however, the 
preschoolers’ metacognitive processes were primarily conceptualized and assessed using one 
method. In Marulis et al., (submitted), children’s Mc was conceptualized in the way it was 
originally coined (i.e., Flavell, 1976): “knowledge about cognition” or “thinking about thinking” 
and operationalized and assessed as metacognitive knowledge broken down into subcomponents: 
knowledge about people, tasks, and, strategies (Flavell 1979). Specifically, after finishing a 
problem-solving task, 3-5 year old children were asked developmentally appropriate 
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metacognitive knowledge interview questions about the task (see Marulis et al., submitted for 
details). In Shamir et al., Mc was conceptualized as procedural metacognition and assessed as 
metacognitive behaviors displayed by 3-5 year old children during a card recall task (e.g., 
organizing the cards on tables, along with such statements as “I have to see all of them to help 
me remember them.”). In Whitebread et al., 2007 and 2009, children’s Mc was conceptualized 
and assessed based on a model of cognitive self-regulation that included metacognitive 
knowledge (as described in Marulis et al., submitted), metacognitive regulation (Brown, 1987), 
which they defined as the cognitive processes taking place during ongoing activities, which 
involves planning, monitoring, control, and evaluation, and emotional and motivational 
regulation (Boekaerts, 1999; Corno, 2001; Zimmerman, 2000), which they defined as the 
learner’s ongoing monitoring and control of emotions and motivational states during learning 
tasks. A systematic coding scheme was developed based on this comprehensive model of self-
regulated cognitive activity. Using this coding scheme, 3-5 year old children’s metacognitive 
behaviors (verbal and non-verbal) were assessed naturalistically in their preschool classrooms 
during learning activities that were designed to be meaningful for the children and facilitated 
their metacognitive behaviors. These learning activities included child-initiated play 
(individually and in small groups), as well as activities provided by the children’s teachers 
(again, both individual and small group activities).  
Because the different ways of conceptualizing and assessing Mc have not yet been 
included in the same study, particularly with young children, we do not know how these 
metacognitive processes are related to one another in the same children, on the same tasks, or 
whether they would even be properly labeled using the same overarching term “metacognition”. 
How Mc should comprehensively be conceptualized and assessed, especially with young 
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children, remains an open question.  Therefore, the current study was designed to address this 
important limitation by including a metacognitive knowledge interview—designed to assess 
articulated metacognitive knowledge—and a systematic observational coding system—designed 
to assess metacognitive behavior—in the same investigation with 3-5 year old preschoolers.  
Measurement Issues in Metacognition 
Beyond identifying the age of emergence of and clarifying the conceptualization and 
assessment of Mc, there are larger challenges surrounding measurement for Mc researchers. The 
issue of measurement is particularly salient when examining “mysterious” constructs such as Mc 
(Brown, 1987) that have also been conceptualized and assessed in a multitude of ways. As 
Schraw (2000) has advised, researchers who choose to focus on Mc should be cognizant of the 
potential skepticism from other researchers as to the precision that can be accomplished in 
measuring this construct (which of course is essential to studying it). Schraw reminds us that 
even in our recent past (mid-1980’s) there were researchers who believed that Mc was “too 
broad and elusive to be studied effectively” (2000, p. 304) (and it is likely that this continues to 
the present day).  Fortunately, Schraw does not stop with this warning, but provided several 
concrete measurement suggestions (framed as cautions) to assuage this possible wariness as well 
as to improve the reputation, assessment and understanding of Mc (see Figure 3.1).  
 
  
 
 
 
115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Expected cautions from the measurement community regarding effectively 
examining metacognition. Adapted from Schraw, 2000, p. 304-308 
In a similar vein, Baker & Cerro (2000) have discussed the importance of converging 
evidence from different methods (that have different sources of error) in examining Mc. They 
proposed that, if different methods (i.e., with divergent sources of error) produce similar results, 
this evidence can be considered valid, reliable, and robust: “we can be more confident that we 
have measured what we set out to measure” (Baker & Cerro, 2000, p. 129).  Furthermore, they 
suggested that Mc should be assessed within the context of an instructional program and domain 
in order to obtain a more accurate picture.  Schraw (2000) concurred and recommended that, 
even if a measurement instrument has been shown to have valid and reliable psychometric 
properties (which is the first important requisite), it may not have ecological validity or may not 
accurately capture how Mc operates in real-life complex learning situations. In their meta-
analysis of recent (2004-2007) SR, SRL and Mc studies, Dinsmore et al. (2008) provided a 
frequency count of the types of measurement instruments used by Mc researchers (see Figure 
3.2), which indicated that current Mc researchers have moved away from a reliance on self-
reports, interviews and think-alouds that predominated the early research on Mc (e.g., Flavell, 
1979; Kreutzer et al., 1975). 
Four cautions: (from measurement experts) when studying metacognition: 
1. Field needs a plan for comprehensive assessment of the construct 
a. Reliability and validity norms 
b. Plan for translating theory into instruments that can be appropriately 
evaluated 
2. Generate and test models 
a. Translate metacognitive theory into testable models 
3. Construct and evaluate instruments that assess specific components of the model 
a. Use multiple measures/using multiple methodologies (convergent 
validity) 
4. Use diverse assessment models 
a. Use multitrait, multimethod (MTMM) approach. See Campbell & Fiske, 
1959 and Cook & Campbell, 1979. 
b. Incorporate diverse approaches including neurophysiological. 
116 
 
   
Figure 3.2. Measurement tools used to assess metacognition from a meta-analysis; from 
Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008, p. 402 
Many other researchers have come to a similar conclusion as Schraw (2000) and Baker & 
Cerro (2000), that, in studying Mc—particularly in young children—using multiple divergent 
measures is ideal. Gama (2005) charted several popular methods for measuring Mc in children as 
an indication of this point (see Figure 3.3). She clearly demonstrated that each method has 
relatively equitable advantages, as well as sources of error/limitations. This analysis implicates 
the use of multiple methods with different types of limitations and sources of error to provide a 
balanced and comprehensive assessment that is relatively free of bias (Gama, 2005). Thus there 
appears to be convergence of agreement on this position, which is one that has been applied to 
the current study.  
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Figure 3.3. Comparison of methods used to examine metacognition. From Gama, 2005, p. 18 
 
Influences on Metacognitive Development 
 Though this is not an exhaustive review, I will discuss several factors shown to be 
important to metacognitive development that are included in the current study as covariates or 
moderator variables: socioeconomic status (SES), executive functions (EF) and expressive 
language. There are other environmental (e.g., supportive teachers who facilitate a motivating 
classroom, Larkin, 2010; explicit teaching and modelling of metacognitive strategies, Palincsar 
& Brown, 1984), peer (e.g., shared regulation, Pino-Pasternak & Whitebread, 2013; social 
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interactions, Shamir et al., 2009), and individual (e.g., theory of mind, Flavell, 2000; private 
speech, Winsler & Naglieri, 2003) factors that have been shown to affect metacognitive 
processing, but they are beyond the scope of this study.  
Socioeconomic status and metacognitive processes. Studies have found that low family 
SES has been moderately associated with a low quality home learning environment (e.g., 
Bornstein & Bradley, 2008). Moreover, family households of children from low-SES 
backgrounds often have more chaos, less structure and routine, and more exposure to multiple 
stressors (Evans & English, 2002) including background noise and crowding (Evans, 2006) than 
children from non-low-SES backgrounds.  Beyond correlational studies, there have also been 
longitudinal studies conducted to examine the relations between SES and cognition/achievement. 
Data from the National Longitudinal Surveys  of Youth (NLSY) showed that the home 
environments of children from low-SES families were of significantly lower quality (measured 
by parenting variables such as responsivity, emotional climate and material resources  such as 
the physical environment, learning materials, and enrichment) (Bradley, Corwyn, McAdoo, & 
Coll, 2001). The same study also found that children’s home environments mediated the relation 
between SES and child development (Bornstein & Bradley, 2003; Bradley et al., 2001).   
Beyond learning opportunities and material resources in the home environment, there 
may be additional explanations for this SES-related achievement gap, which is widespread 
across cognitive and achievement indices from as early as infancy through adulthood (Bradley & 
Corwyn, 2002; Marulis & Neuman, 2010; 2013) related to the pervasiveness and concomitants 
of low-SES.  For example, Noble, McCandliss, & Farah, (2007) found that the achievement gap 
between low- and middle-income children related to language was nearly one standard deviation, 
and that SES accounted for over 30% of the variance in language task performance (this was the 
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statistically largest portion of variance accounted for compared to all brain systems they 
examined looking for mediators between the SES-achievement gap). Noble et al. (2007) 
speculated that the association they found between SES and language may have been due to the 
perisylvian brain regions (which are involved in language processing) “undergoing a more 
protracted course of maturation in vivo than any other neural region” (Sowell, Peterson, 
Thompson, Welcome, Henkenius & Toga, 2003 as cited in Noble et al., 2007, p. 476). They 
further suggested that this prolonged developmental course opens the language system to more 
vulnerability (e.g., to the multitude of environmental factors that tend to co-occur with SES). In 
fact, a recent study (Rodriquez & Tamis-LeMonda, 2011) found that environmental factors 
associated with emergent literacy skills were already present among infants as young as 15 
months old. Furthermore, studies have found that young children from low-SES backgrounds 
have significantly lower SR and executive functioning than children from higher SES 
backgrounds (Matthews, Kizzie, Rowley, & Cortina, 2010; Sektnan, McClelland, Acock, & 
Morrison, 2010). However, the children from low-SES backgrounds who did have similar SR 
skills as their higher SES peers also had similar academic functioning (unlike the children from 
low-SES backgrounds with low SR skills who had far lower academic functioning) thus these 
authors speculated that self-regulatory skills may act as a protective factor for children at risk for 
learning difficulties. These associations will be explored in the current study with the prediction 
that similar results will be found; that the children from low-SES families will obtain lower 
metacognitive scores than the children from the higher SES families and that these metacognitive 
skills may serve as protective factors.  
 Executive functioning. Research on regulation in young children includes the concept of 
executive functioning (EF), which is of particular interest to those who study preschool-aged 
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children because this is the time when these processes emerge for most children. EF refers to a 
set of cognitive components working together to regulate behavior.  Recent literature on EF 
primarily examines three such components: attentional shifting (or cognitive flexibility), 
inhibitory control and working memory (Blair and Razza, 2007).  Attentional shifting/cognitive 
flexibility refers to the ability to flexibly move or shift between divergent aspects of an object or 
response depending on the context or directions. The most common assessment measure of this 
construct is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task in which participants are asked to sort cards 
according to one rule (e.g., on the basis of color) and then asked to switch focus to another 
dimension of the cards (e.g., sort on the basis of shape). An ecological indicator of this construct 
would be a child’s flexibility in switching from their science teacher’s expectation (e.g., accurate 
representation of a physical object) to that of their art (e.g., creative interpretation of a physical 
object). Inhibitory control refers to selecting and attending to relevant information while 
inhibiting irrelevant or non-relevant information (Barkley, 1997).  There are many instruments 
that measure inhibitory control, most of which use a “Go/No-Go” paradigm that asks participants 
to press a button for a certain condition (e.g., a middle arrow points the same way as the top and 
bottom arrows) but to not press the button—thus inhibiting their dominant response—in the 
opposite condition (e.g., the middle arrow points a different way from the top and bottom 
arrows).  A contextualized indicator of inhibitory control would be a child remembering to raise 
a hand rather than call out (the dominant response) to answer a question. Working memory refers 
to cognitively maintaining and manipulating information, such as remembering and carrying out 
multi-step instructions.  Measures include being given a set of digits to remember and being 
asked to recall them backwards (thus requiring manipulation rather than simply short term 
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memory retrieval). In an applied setting, an indicator of working memory would be a child 
successfully enacting a three-step mathematical computation procedure.  
These cognitive skills begin developing in infancy and improve markedly between the 
ages of three and five, particularly on tasks that require holding information in one’s mind and 
exercising inhibitory control (Diamond, 2002). Thus, executive functioning is a prerequisite to 
self-regulation (Barkley, 1997).  Self-regulation includes the manifestation of EF skills in overt, 
observable responses in the form of children’s gross motor actions, which are also important for 
success in classrooms (Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews, & Morrison, 2009).  
EF skills, similar to metacognitive skills, are susceptible to “conceptual clutter” and 
“measurement mayhem” (Morrison & Grammer, in press). These constructs are theoretically and 
conceptually similar in that each is a higher order cognition or a “meta” skill, and there is also 
empirical evidence that they are associated in young children (Roebers, Cimeli, Röthlisberger & 
Neuenschwander, 2012; Roebers & Spiess, 2013; Whitebread, 1999). Thus, when studying 
either, it is important to include both either as a covariate or potential moderating variable. The 
current study included an established measure of EF (discussed in the Method section) for this 
purpose. 
Expressive language.  Expressive language, or expressive vocabulary (i.e., the size of a 
child’s vocabulary that he or she is able to articulate), has also been shown to be associated with 
metacognitive development (Lockl & Schneider, 2006; Lockl & Schneider, 2007). Expressive 
language tasks typically involve asking children to describe, label, or provide another name for a 
picture that is shown to them.  Some studies have shown that the only non-environmental factor 
that contributes to a closely related construct, theory of mind (thought to be a precursor to Mc; 
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Flavell 2000), is verbal ability (Hughes, Jaffee, Happe´, Taylor, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2005).  
Intervention studies have also found that when young children were given language training, 
their theory of mind also improved (e.g., Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Because Mc is 
considered “applied theory of mind” by the researcher who first coined the term (Flavell, 2000), 
it is likely that the same results would be found with metacognitive processes.  
Importantly, language has been viewed by researchers beginning with Vygostky (1986) 
as a precursor to metacognitive behavior, and has been conceptualized as “an instrument of 
thought” used to verbally mediate cognition and behavior to carry out solutions to problems 
(Vygotsky, 1986) or as “externalized thought.” Thus language allows children to better monitor 
and plan thoughts and actions (i.e., be metacognitive) and eventually internalize a model of this 
reasoning, which is crucial to becoming more metacognitive (Zakin, 2007).  Accordingly, an 
expressive language measure has been included in the current study as well that will be described 
in detail below.  
Current Study 
The main focus of the current study was to investigate the convergent validity between 
two measures of metacognitive processing in a diverse sample of preschool-aged children. In 
addition, this study investigates convergence/divergence across diverse populations (i.e., the 
tuition-based preschools compared to the Great Start Readiness Program [GSRP] need-based 
classrooms) and what each measure revealed about early emerging metacognitive processes. 
Three research questions were addressed. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
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First, what is the convergent validity between two different measures (the McKI and the 
ChAT) in preschool-aged children? What types of unique and shared information do they 
provide about the depth, breadth and variation in metacognition among 3-5 year old children in a 
preschool classroom? I hypothesized that Mc would not function as a unitary factor; thus that 
there would be overlap between data obtained by the McKI and ChAT with a considerable 
amount of unique variance left to explain.  This was an exploratory question because there are 
few studies that have assessed metacognitive processes in this age range (with the exception of 
those reviewed previously: Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007, 2009; Whitebread, Pino- 
Pasternak, Marulis, Okkinga, & Vuillier, in preparation). Furthermore, there are no studies, to 
my knowledge, that have included both a full declarative interview such as the McKI along with 
a systematic observational tool such as the ChAT in the same study for comparative purposes. 
The closest analyses to this is reflected in my recent work with David Whitebread (Whitebread et 
al., in preparation). We found a significant correlation (r=0.33, p=.004) between children’s 
responses to two direct metacognitive knowledge (McK) questions about a problem-solving 
Train Track Task (i.e.., How did you work out how to make this track?”; “Which one was the 
hardest track to make? Why?”) and their behavioral Mc (measured using ChAT).  Informed by 
this study, I expected that the McKI and ChAT measures would be significantly correlated in my 
study but did not expect that there would be substantial overlap between them such that they 
could be said to be measuring the same construct (i.e., aspect of Mc).  That said, the results may 
differ as the McKI is a comprehensive assessment tool whereas the previous analyses were done 
based on a few questions asked subsequent to a problem-solving task. 
Second, is the convergent validity moderated by the children’s family background (low 
income and/or parental education / socioeconomic status [SES])? Again, this was fundamentally 
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an exploratory question as it has not been explored in previous research. However, I 
hypothesized that children’s SES would moderate the convergent validity between the two 
measures of Mc as children with lower SES backgrounds tend to have lower declarative skills 
(e.g., Hoff, 2003). Though expressive language was controlled for, there remained the issue that 
children from low-SES backgrounds would likely have less experience articulating their McK 
(thoughts, or any type of knowledge). Thus, I hypothesized that there would be less overlap 
between the McKI and ChAT for the low-SES children than the higher –SES children. 
An important question is what measurement tools can reveal about early emerging 
metacognitive processes. Therefore, the third question was, what evidence of early-emerging 
metacognition can be observed in these two measures of metacognition? I hypothesized that both 
the McKI (declarative articulated metacognitive knowledge about the Wedgits puzzle task) and 
the ChAT (observed metacognitive behavior during the Wedgits puzzle task) would reveal 
greater evidence of metacognitive processes than what has traditionally been argued to be 
achievable prior to age 7-8 (e.g., Flavell, 1979; Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Veenman, et 
al., 2006). Based on more recent research (e.g., Marulis, et al., submitted; Shamir et al., 2009; 
Whitebread et al., 2007, 2009), I expected that children would show, on average, at least partially 
metacognitive responses on the McKI and that most children would show evidence of 
metacognitive skills (as coded by the ChAT) during the Wedgits puzzle task. I further expected 
that there would be substantial variance among children’s scores on the McKI and ChAT and 
that this variance may be moderated by children’s age, SES, and other cognitive and SRL 
variables. To a great extent, this was also an exploratory question in terms of how much evidence 
of metacognitive processes would be revealed by these measures, as well as how much variance 
would be present in this diverse sample of children. Furthermore, not only was the quantity of 
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scores attained an open question but also the quality: it was not known what types of responses 
children would provide to the McKI or whether these types of responses would vary by age, 
SES, cognitive or SRL variables. Also, it was uncertain what types of metacognitive behaviors 
would be revealed during the Wedgits puzzle task and whether some children would not display 
any metacognitive behaviors while others displayed nearly continuously metacognitive behaviors 
while building the puzzle.  This again, if found, may vary by age, SES, cognitive or SRL 
variables. 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 83 children (42.74-68.60 months, Mage=53.47 months SD=4.53; 41% 
female) from seven preschool classrooms in Southeastern Michigan. Four teachers—each with a 
dedicated paraprofessional—taught the preschool classes as follows: One teacher taught a PreK 
academy for 4-5 year olds, which was an all-day program held every week day. However, not 
every child attended every weekday; some children attended Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays 
only for example. Another teacher taught a typical half-day (tuition-based) preschool class in 
which children attended different days/times based on age. This program included a 3 through 
young-4 year old group which attended preschool on Monday and Wednesday mornings, a 4 
year old group which attended preschool on Monday and Wednesday afternoons, and a 4.5-late 5 
year old group which attended preschool on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday morning to early 
afternoons. The other two teachers taught a Great Start Readiness Program (GSRP), which is 
funded by the State of Michigan. Eligibility for this program is determined by age (children must 
be 4 years old not turning 5 before November 1st of the year of entrance), and by income and 
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other need-based family situations. The GSRP classrooms were half-day programs that were held 
Mondays through Thursdays in the mornings and afternoons.  
Across the seven classrooms, there were 108 eligible children based on age (between 3-5 
years old). During the parent orientation for the PreK academy, preschool, and GSRP, I 
participated in the parent orientations, including a presentation of what my study would entail, 
how I would partner with the school and district and the potential benefits of the research. After 
the presentations, parents were asked to fill in the consent forms (indicating whether they were or 
were not interested in having their children participate in my study). Over 90% of the parents 
(99/108) returned the consent forms indicating they were interested in having their children 
participate in my study. Prior to beginning my assessments, I spent two weeks in the children’s 
classrooms to build rapport and get to know the children and their teachers. During this time, it 
became apparent that another 15 children would not be eligible to participate—despite their 
parental permission—because they were English Language Learners (ELL) still learning basic 
English words. Furthermore, one child did not want to participate even with much 
encouragement from her teacher and me. Thus, the final sample was 83 children. There was no 
missing data or attrition over the month of this study. The final sample was 46% White, 27% 
Black, 8% Asian, 6% Bi-racial, 11% Chaldean, and 2% Hispanic.   
Procedure 
All children were individually assessed in two 10-15 minute sessions. The first session 
targeted metacognitive processes. Children were assessed using the Metacognitive Knowledge 
Interview (McKI) and the Children Articulating Thinking (ChAT) observational tool. The McKI, 
a direct interview, was administered individually with each child after they completed a Wedgits 
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challenge puzzle (to be described in detail below). These sessions were video recorded for all 
children. The Wedgits task and McKI together took approximately 10-15 minutes per child. The 
adapted ChAT coding scheme was administered to the video-taped Wedgits puzzle problem-
solving task. Thus, the ChAT metacognitive behavior coding scheme was applied during the 
puzzle task and the McKI was administered directly afterward. The McKI is designed to be 
specific to a content area or learning task while the ChAT coding scheme is designed to be used 
across domains. A second researcher independently coded 30% of the McKI and ChAT to obtain 
inter-rater agreement indices. 
The second session focused on self-regulated learning and cognitive assessment measures 
that were designed to be covariates and potential moderators. These included the Head, Toes, 
Knees, Shoulders (HTKS) measure of executive function and the Expressive Vocabulary Test 
(EVT). As described earlier, executive function skills are often related to metacognitive 
processes in children. Importantly for this study, these skills tend to be intertwined early in 
development and are difficult to parse apart. Thus, in order to obtain a “purer” measure of 
metacognitive processes across the two assessment tools (i.e., McKI and ChAT), the HTKS was 
used as a covariate in the convergent validity analyses. Expressive language is a strong predictor 
of metacognitive skills, particularly declarative/articulated metacognition (e.g., Lockl & 
Schneider, 2006, 2007). Thus, it was essential to include an expressive language measure as a 
covariate in the current convergent validity analyses. The EVT was chosen for this purpose as it 
is appropriate and normed for use with preschool aged children and includes both labeling and 
synonym segments providing a comprehensive depiction of young children expressive 
vocabulary. 
Measures 
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Wedgits problem-solving puzzle task. One of the limitations of previous assessment 
approaches with young children has been the use of decontextualized, abstract, or retrospective 
interviews. I not only endorse the use of developmentally appropriate interviews with young 
children, but advocate for their importance in directly eliciting children’s metacognitive 
knowledge. Ideally, interviews, such as the McKI developed in this study, would be used in 
conjunction with other assessment tools such as systematic observation (e.g., Whitebread et al., 
2007, 2009, in preparation) to capture young children’s metacognitive processes 
comprehensively. However, it is crucial that when young children are interviewed about their 
cognitive processes, it is done in a contextualized way (i.e., they are asked questions about a 
familiar cognitive task that they just completed, that is ideally still within their view). This, in 
addition to ensuring that the wording was developmentally appropriate, were the main foci in 
developing the McKI. As Papert aptly titled his 2005 paper on teaching children to think: “You 
can’t think about thinking without thinking about thinking about something” (Papert, 2005); this 
is particularly important for young children.  
In order to contextualize the McKI and ask the children about their metacognitive 
knowledge regarding something familiar and relevant, a mastery motivation puzzles task was 
adapted from Smiley & Dweck (1994) that had previously been piloted and found to be 
appropriate and enjoyable for preschool-aged children.  The puzzle cards were chosen based on 
previous pilot work. Children were shown a card with a puzzle design and asked to make 
Wedgits blocks (a set of building blocks) that match the design card to build a puzzle (see 
Appendix 3.A for puzzle design cards and specific procedure). Each child completed the first 
puzzle; if needed, help was provided (for the first puzzle only as this was a “warm-up”).  If the 
child finished the second puzzle in under four minutes, she or he would be given a third (more 
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challenging) puzzle, then a fourth puzzle, and so forth, until he or she was unable to solve the 
puzzle in four minutes (only one child completed the third puzzle in under four minutes). After 
trying a puzzle for four minutes unsuccessfully, each child was told that the time was up for the 
game and the metacognitive knowledge questions began. The design of the Wedgits puzzle task 
was based on guidelines set forth by mastery motivation researchers for appropriately 
challenging tasks (Morgan, Busch-Rossnagel, Maslin-Cole, & Harmon, 1992). The Wedgits 
puzzle task successfully met these guidelines including providing tasks of increasing difficulty so 
that children were assessed working on tasks where they could complete part, but not all, of the 
solution in the time allotted. Furthermore, the task was designed so that it was just challenging 
enough to elicit problem-solving strategies and thinking about those strategies such that the 
children were in their ZPDs (Vygotsky, 1978) when Mc is most likely recruited (Prins, et al., 
2006). 
Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI).  Following the completion of the final 
(most challenging/not successfully completed in four minutes) Wedgits-block puzzle, children's 
metacognitive knowledge was individually assessed by the first author using the Metacognitive 
Knowledge Interview (McKI; Marulis, Kim, Grammer, Carrasco, Morrison, & Gehring, 2013; 
Marulis, et al., submitted). The McKI was developed to assess what could be revealed by a 
developmentally appropriate contextualized interview based on Flavell’s original 
conceptualization of metacognitive knowledge of: people, tasks, and strategies. Children were 
therefore asked a series of 14 questions2 related to the Wedgits task such as: “Do you think you 
                                                            
2 Three questions were added to the McKI from Study 1: “Will it be harder/easier when you’re older? Why?”, “If 
you gather (demonstrate) the pieces you will need first and then build the puzzle, will it be easier? Why/Why not?” 
and, “What if you were watching TV while you were building it, will it be easier? Why? /Why not?” These were 
added based on feedback I received from Henry Wellman and the Gelman/Wellman language lab.  
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did a good, okay, or not so good job on the puzzles? Why/Why not?”; “Would this puzzle be 
hard for another kid your age?” (Knowledge about people: Questions 1, 4, 5, and 6 were in this 
category) and “Would the puzzle be easier if all of the pieces were the same color?”; “Would the 
puzzle be easier with bigger or smaller pieces? Why?” (Knowledge about tasks: Questions 2, 3, 
9, 10, 13, and 14 were in this category); “Would talking to yourself during the puzzle be helpful?  
Why/Why not?”; “If I think about how the pieces would fit together before I try, will the puzzle 
be easier? Why?/”Why not?” (Knowledge about strategies: Questions 7, 8, 11, and 12 were in 
this category). Furthermore, in order to make the interview sensitive to children’s development, 
children were asked to respond to a child named “Gogi” (an unusual gender-neutral name; the 
child was given the gender of each child) for the last eight questions. The back story was that 
Gogi was from a far-away land and thus had never seen puzzles or blocks and wanted to learn 
about them3. The children were then asked to help Gogi learn about the puzzles/blocks by 
answering questions about them (in a sense, teaching Gogi, about the puzzles/blocks and the 
child’s thinking, which many children respond to more readily than when asked to respond 
                                                            
The first question was added to address whether children understood the distinction between whether the puzzles 
were hard for themselves, children their own age, and their older selves (the effects of age/development and 
experience on the difficulty of a problem-solving task). The second question was added to address whether children 
would understand that an organization strategy would be helpful in making the puzzle task easier to solve. The third 
question was added to address whether children understood how attention affects performance on a learning task.  
3 In Study 1, I used a Gogi puppet for the McKI. However, though it did work as intended related to the sensitivity 
to development and children responded appropriately and sufficiently to the questions, a considerable amount of 
children became over-interested in and absorbed with the puppet and got off-task or had to be redirected back to the 
interview questions several times. In addition, several children initially responded to the children based on Gogi’s 
size. For example, a child said that they puzzle would be easier with smaller pieces for Gogi’s small hands; another 
child said that Gogi would have trouble with the puzzle because he was too small to hold the pieces and they would 
fall over. These children were re-directed to think about the puzzle pieces related to him or herself, but to avoid such 
situations, the backstory was changed slightly so that Gogi was described instead as a child the same age as the child 
in the study but from a faraway land who had no experience or knowledge of puzzles (in the same way as the 
puppet). 
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directly to questions about their thinking). See Appendix 3.B for the complete McKI; questions 
6-14 were related to Gogi. 
Responses were rated on a 0-2 scale as follows: 0=not at all metacognitive, 1=partially 
metacognitive (e.g., they agreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a task but their 
reason was not related to cognition or they didn't know why), 2= appropriate metacognitive 
response (see Appendix 3.C for annotated codebook) .  For the first question regarding whether 
the children thought they did a good, okay, or not such a good job, children’s responses were 
compared to researcher-perceived scores (on the same scale of good, okay, or not-so-good; see 
Appendix 3.D). If the child’s response was aligned with the researcher’s judgments; that is, the 
child said she or he did a good job on the puzzle and the researcher scored the child as doing a 
good job on the puzzle, the child received an “appropriate” metacognitive score (2 points).  If the 
child’s response was off by one level; that is, the child said she or he did a good job on the 
puzzle whereas the researcher scored the child as doing an okay job on the puzzle, the child 
received a “partially” metacognitive score (1 point). If the child’s response was off by two levels; 
that is, the child said she or he did a good job on the puzzle whereas the researcher scored the 
child as doing a not-so-good  job on the puzzle, the child received a “not at all” metacognitive 
score (0 points). Two researchers independently coded 30% of the sample on all 14 questions, as 
well as how the child did on the puzzle itself. Agreement between coders was high (intraclass 
correlation coefficient [ICC] =.86).  
The McKI was pilot tested with 55 children in a similar preschool and from a similar 
background economically, racially, and educationally. They were also similar in age and gender 
breakdown. Four questions were removed based on the pilot study because the children either 
did not understand the question or the majority responded in a way that was not aligned with the 
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meaning of the question (even when the question was revised several times) or there was not 
enough variation in children’s responses, or most children responded non-verbally. For example, 
one original question asked the child to explain the best way to do the puzzle; most children just 
demonstrated rather than verbally explained even when asked to verbalize. Because this was 
designed to be an articulated metacognitive knowledge interview, these responses were not code-
able, therefore, this question was removed from the interview.  Additionally, a question prompt 
was removed from several questions due to children’s lack of meaningful response choices. In 
the original McKI, when children were asked whether something would make the puzzle easier 
or not (e.g., “Would the puzzle be easier with bigger or smaller pieces?”), if they responded in 
the affirmative, they were then asked if the puzzle would be a little - or a lot - easier (counter 
balanced). Because this choice was counter-balanced, it was determined that most children were 
consistently choosing the last option regardless of meaning (i.e., if  “a lot” was stated last, 
children would consistently choose that option and vice versa). Thus, it appears that this 
distinction between aspects of the puzzle task, or various strategies making the puzzle a little or a 
lot easier, was too nuanced for preschool-aged children. 
Children Articulating Thinking (ChAT) coding scheme. The ChAT observational 
coding scheme was designed to assess metacognitive behavior during (quasi)naturalistic 
problem-solving tasks. It was first used in Bryce & Whitebread (2012) with 5-7 year olds and 
involved a series of indicators of monitoring and control as well as lack of monitoring and 
control (see Appendix 3.E) behaviors. The coding scheme was designed to address both 
children’s monitoring and regulation of their performance and their failure to do so in order to 
understand the fuller picture of their metacognitive processes (and lack thereof). Children’s 
verbal and non-verbal behaviors were both accounted for: this metacognitive skills coding was 
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originally developed by identifying 21 verbal and non-verbal behaviors from other coding 
schemes (Deloache and Brown 1987; Lambert 2001; Larkin 2000; Sangster 2010; Whitebread et 
al., 2009) and a pilot study. Bryce & Whitebread (2012) approached their study from an 
information-processing framework; thus, behaviors were coded as either Monitoring (13) or 
Control (8) processes, based on Nelson and Narens’ (1990) model. Monitoring behaviors were 
conceptualized as behaviors that serve to “update the mental representation of the task”, while 
Control behaviors assert “some action at the level of the task”, Bryce & Whitebread, 2012, p. 
202. Behaviors were coded as they occurred, and then frequencies were transformed into rates by 
dividing the number of occurrences by the number of minutes spent on the task rather than 
approached as interval coding (for details, see Bryce & Whitebread, 2012). 
Bryce & Whitebread (2012) used a quasi-naturalistic method involving a controlled 
observation of children while they completed a problem-solving task called the Train Track Task 
(TTT). The ChAT observational coding scheme was applied during this task. The TTT was 
modified from Karmiloff-Smith’s (1979) closed-circuit railway task. In the TTT, children were 
asked to build a train track to match a predefined shape from a plan (they were given a model 
picture and asked to make the tracks look the same to the best of their ability. Children were also 
told that they could use as many tracks as they needed and that they needed to tell the 
experimenter when they were finished. The experimenter did not interact with the child during 
the task except to provide “gentle encouragement” if needed. There was no time limit and, if 
children finished without saying anything, they were reminded “remember to tell me when 
you’re finished.” Providing a plan of the train track shape to be constructed was not included in 
the original task (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979) and allowed for subcomponents of monitoring/lack of 
monitoring to be observed more easily (i.e., “Checking the plan”; see Appendix 3.E).  
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In a more recent study (Whitebread et al., in preparation) an adapted version of this 
coding scheme was used with a simpler version of the same TTT with younger children (3-5 year 
olds). The ChAT coding scheme was found to be appropriate for the 3-5 year olds and predictive 
of their metacognitive and self-regulatory processes. The coding scheme was used in the same 
way as in Bryce & Whitebread (2012) though some items were dropped based on their post-hoc 
analyses (see Appendix 3.F). However, for the purposes of conceptual analysis, a metacognitive 
composite (Mc) score was created by adding the mean rates of Monitoring (MON) and Control 
(CONT) and subtracting the mean rate of Lack of Monitoring and Control (LMC). See Appendix 
3.G (Whitebread et al., in preparation). 
ChAT adapted for Wedgits task. For the purposes of this study, the (adapted) ChAT 
coding scheme (Whitebread et al., in preparation) was adapted to be appropriate for the Wedgits 
task (Appendix 3.H). Conceptually, the Wedgits task is similar to the TTT. Both tasks are 
problem-solving tasks wherein children are given a model plan that they were asked to follow. In 
both instances, they are given pieces and asked to make them look like the model plan, are not 
given assistance from the experimenter beyond gentle encouragement to “keep trying” or “do 
your best,” and are asked and reminded to tell the experimenter when they are finished with the 
task (i.e., when they believe that what they’ve built look exactly like the model plan). The main 
difference is that the Wedgits task is timed because it is designed to be a challenge mastery 
motivation task. Thus, children were given progressively more challenging puzzles until they 
were unable to complete them within four minutes (as described in detail earlier). This did not 
pose a problem for the coding scheme as behaviors were coded as they occurred in the same way 
but frequencies did not need to be transformed into rates because all children spent four minutes 
on the last (most challenging) Wedgits puzzle.  Thus, the main adaptations for the coding scheme 
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involved changing the specific behavior examples to fit the Wedgits puzzle tasks as opposed to 
the TTT. The general categories across Monitoring (e.g., “Checking Construction”: The child 
checks his/her own puzzle construction), Control (e.g., Planning: Verbalizations that precede the 
actual behavior and indicate future actions such as “I am going to put the red piece on bottom 
before this green one”), and Lack of Monitoring and Control (e.g., Finishing Error: The child 
claims to be finished when there is a discrepancy between the puzzle he/she built and the model 
plan) all aligned with the Wedgits puzzle tasks. Children received 1 point per instance of each 
metacognitive behavior displayed amongst the ChAT codes (e.g., if a child Checking her or his 
constructed four times during the Wedgit task, she or he would receive 4 points).  Specifically, 
the last Wedgit puzzle was coded because that was the most challenging puzzle for each child. 
Two researchers independently coded 30% of the sample on all ChAT codes. Agreement 
between coders was high (intraclass correlation coefficient [ICC] =.91).  
Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders (HTKS). The HTKS assessment task (Ponitz, McClelland, 
Connor, Jewkes, Farris, & Morrison, 2008; Ponitz et al., 2009) is an established and validated 
behavioral self-regulation instrument that is administered to individual children to measures 
executive function skills (see Appendix 3.I).  Using the HTKS task, an experimenter asked 
children to remember behavioral commands (e.g., “touch your toes”) and respond with an action 
that is in conflict with these commands (e.g., child must touch their head when they hear the 
command “touch your toes”). In this way, children would need to recruit their working memory 
regarding the commands and response inhibition in order to inhibit their dominant response to 
follow the command. Furthermore, as the task gets increasingly difficult, children must recruit 
cognitive flexibility (i.e., the commands switch at the end so that when asked to “touch your 
toes,” the child must touch their shoulders instead of their head).  
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Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT). The EVT (Williams, 1997) is a standardized norm-
referenced (conormed with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III; PPVT-III; Dunn & Dunn, 
1997) test of expressive vocabulary for children through adults (ages 2.5-90). The EVT is 
indivivdually administered and takes approximately 5-10 minutes for preschool-aged children. 
The EVT has two sections: labeling and synonyms. Using the EVT, the experimenter asked the 
children to look at pictures (see Appendix 3.J) and provide a one-word response describing what 
was in the picture. In the next section, children were asked for synonyms. They were told a one-
word name for a picture and were asked to provide another one-word word for the same picture 
(see Appendix 3.J). 
Analytic plan 
To examine the shared and unique variance/analyze the convergent validity of the two 
measures of Mc in this preschool sample, Pearson correlations were performed, controlling for 
age, executive function (HTKS) and expressive language (EVT).  
Results 
Descriptive Results 
 The results for the entire sample on the metacognitive assessment tools, as well as the 
sample split by GSRP and tuition-based classrooms, can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In 
general, these tools both revealed more metacognitive capabilities in these preschool-aged 
children than previous studies—particularly involving interviewing children—with the exception 
of several studies reviewed (e.g., Karabenick, 1981; Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007, 
2009).  It is important to note that two subcomponents needed to be removed from the ChAT 
observational coding scheme. Within the CONT code, the Sorting code needed to be removed 
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because there was only one instance of one child who was coded as sorting during the Wedgits 
puzzle tasks in the entire sample of 83 children. Additionally, the Goal neglect code within the 
LMC subcomponent was removed because there were only four instances across three children 
in the entire sample who displayed this code. Specifically, there were numerous instances in 
which children seemed to neglect the goal of building the model puzzle, however, to qualify for 
this code, the child was required to verbalize (see Appendix 3.H). For example, to be coded as 
“Goal neglect”, the child would need to say something to indicate that he or she was neglecting 
the goal, such as: “I am going to build a house now!” as he or she started to build off-task and 
neglect the model card puzzle task. 
Table 3.1 
Metacognitive Assessment Scores on the McKI and ChAT Measurement Tools 
Tool n/ Age M(SD) Range Gender/Age 
McKI 83 
Mage=53.47 months 
11.55(4.90) 0-24.50 
(max=28) 
Greater with age R=.32, b=.35, p=.003 
No gender diff: t(81)=.47 (Mdiff=-1.68), p=.64 
ChAT 83 
Mage=53.47 months 
18.22(15.82) -18-48 Greater with age R=.30, b=.1.04, p=.006 
No gender diff: t(81)=.27 (Mdiff=.-30), p=.78 
 
    The lower-SES classes (i.e., the GSRP classes) had significantly lower scores on both the 
McKI (GSRP M=9.49, SD=4.43; Tuition M=13.66, SD=4.49), t(81)=4.26, p<.001 (Mdiff=4.17) 
and the ChAT (GSRP M=14.71 SD=17.42; Tuition M=23.85, SD=12.60), t(81)=2.74, p=.008 
(Mdiff=9.14). See Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4. Mean scores on the metacognitive assessment measures (McKI and ChAT) for the 
GSRP and Tuition preschool classes controlling for age, executive function (HTKS), and 
expressive vocabulary (EVT). 
  In addition, the subcomponents of the McKI and ChAT measurement tools (see Table 
3.2) showed a similar pattern of results wherein the GSRP classes scored significantly lower on 
all assessment measures (McKI_People, t(81)=2.86, p=.005 Mdiff=4.51, McKI_Task t(81)=4.52, 
p<.001 Mdiff=2.27,  McKI_Strategies, t(81)=2.69, p=.009 Mdiff=.83; MON t(81)=2.76, p=.007 
Mdiff=1.07, and LMC t(81)=2.60, p=.01 Mdiff=3.39) except for one subcomponent within the 
ChAT codes: CONT t(81)=1.24, p=.22 Mdiff=1.64. 
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Table 3.2. 
McKI and ChAT Subcomponent Assessment Scores for GSRP and Tuition Preschool Classrooms 
 McKI 
 
ChAT 
M(SD);  
Range 
People Tasks Strategies MON CONT LMC 
All children 
n=83 
Mage=53.47 
months 
2.97(1.84); 
0-8 
5.36(2.55); 
0-12 
3.22(1.45); 
0-6.5 
15.33 (7.49); 
2-33 
8.12 (6.03); 
0-24 
 
5.16 (6.15); 
0-22 
 
GSRP 
n=42 
Mage=53.17 
months 
 
2.44(1.69); 
0-8 
4.23(2.28); 
0-10 
2.80(1.47); 
0-6.5 
13.09(1.17); 
2-29 
7.03(6.64);0-
22 
6.83(3.44);0
-22 
Tuition 
n=41 
Mage=53.77 
months 
 
3.51(1.84); 
0-8 
6.51(2.30); 
0-12 
3.64(1.31); 
0-6.5 
17.61(6.74);3
-33 
8.95(5.28);0-
24 
3.43(3.88);0
-15 
 
Correlations: Convergent Validity 
To address the first research question: What is the convergent validity between two 
different measures (the McKI and the ChAT) in preschool-aged children? a Pearson correlational 
analyses was performed controlling for expressive vocabulary (using the EVT) and executive 
function (using the HTKS) and using familywise Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. The overall correlation between the McKI and ChAT measurement tools was low, 
r=.39, p<.001 (See Figure 3.5 for a correlation scatterplot), and the McKI overall had a low 
association to the main subcomponents of the ChAT as follows: r=.30, p=.007 for Monitoring 
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(MON); r=.25, p=.03 for Control (CONT), and r=.26, p=.02 for Lack of Monitoring and Control 
(LMC).  
Figure 3.5. Scatterplot showing the correlation between the metacognitive assessment 
measures (McKI and ChAT) controlling for age, executive function (HTKS), and expressive 
vocabulary (EVT). 
Furthermore, correlational analyses were performed on the subcomponent of the McKI 
and ChAT measurement tools, it became clear that the low correlation was being driven by a few 
subcomponents. Specifically, the only significant correlations between the McKI and the sub-
subcomponents of the ChAT can be seen in Table 3.3 and subcomponents of the ChAT and 
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McKI can be seen in Table 3.4 (for the complete correlation table, see Table 3.5 for more 
details).  
Table 3.3.  
Correlations between the metacognitive assessment measures (McKI and ChAT) controlling for 
age, executive function (HTKS), and expressive vocabulary (EVT). 
 ChAT  
(overall) 
MON CONT LMC 
McKI r=.39, p=.001 
 
r=.30, p=.007 r=.25, p=.03  r=-26, p=.02 
 
 
 
Next, the subcomponents of the McKI were examined: The metacognitive questions 
related to people (Questions 1, 4, 5, and 6)4, the metacognitive questions related to tasks 
(Questions 2, 3, 9, 10, 13, and 14), and the metacognitive questions related to strategies 
(Questions 7, 8, 11, and 12) (See Appendix 3.B for all McKI questions). As can be seen in Table 
3.4, significant and low to low-moderate correlations were found between the overall ChAT 
measure and the three McKI subcomponents. Furthermore, there were several significant 
                                                            
4 These subcomponents have not been validated nor do I consider them subfactors. As described earlier, 
conceptually, I designed the McKI to follow Flavell’s original conceptualization (Flavell 1979) of metacognitive 
knowledge being broken into knowledge about people, tasks, and, strategies, and thus I included sub-groups of 
questions to address each category. The subcomponents were moderately reliable (α=.55 for McKI_Strategies; .62 
for McKI_People; and .68 for McKI_Tasks, all ps<.001) though this is an area that needs to be rigorously examined 
in future research, such as a factor analysis with a larger sample. 
Awareness    .10, p=.39 
CheckConst: .04, p=.71 
CheckPlan:   .27, p=.01 
Eval              .15, p=.18  
 Plan   .11, p=.34 
 Seek  .30, p=.007 
BrutForce  .04, p=.75 
FocJoin    -.33, p=.002 
FinError   -.001. p=.90 
Repetition .22, p=.04 
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relations found between the subcomponents of the McKI and the ChAT, particularly between the 
McKI strategies subcomponent and at least one of each of the ChAT subcomponents.  
Table 3.4. 
Correlations between the McKI and ChAT subcomponent assessment scores controlling for age, 
executive function (HTKS), and expressive vocabulary (EVT). 
 ChAT  
(overall) 
 
MON 
 
CONT 
 
LMC 
 
McKI_ 
People 
 
r=.32, 
p=.004 
 
r=.28, p=.011  
 
r=.22, p=.05 r=-.23, p=.03 
 
McKI_ 
Tasks 
 
r=.24, 
p=.03 
 
r=.23, p=.04  
 
r=.13, p=.25 
 
r=-.15, p=.18 
 
McKI_ 
Strategies 
r=.44, 
p<.001 
r=.31, p=.005  
 
r=.36, p=.001 
  
r=-.32, p=.004 
 
 
Awareness     .15, p=.19 
CheckConst: .11, p=.34 
CheckPlan:   .19, p=.09 
Eval              .19, p=.08 
Awareness    .004, p=.97 
CheckConst: .05, p=.64 
CheckPlan:   .18, p=.10 
Eval              .17, p=.12 
Awareness     .11, p=.32 
CheckConst: .02, p=.84 
CheckPlan: .39, p<=.001 
Eval           -.04, p=.76 
Plan .03, p=.80 
Seek .18, p=.11 
Plan .18, p=.10 
Seek .41, p<=.001 
BrutForce .04, p=.74 
FocJoin -.25, p=.02 
FinError -.06. p=.62 
Repetition .01, p=.90 
BrutForce  .006, p=.96 
FocJoin -  .23, p=.04 
FinError - .04. p=.75 
Repetition .27, p=.02 
BrutForce .04, p=.72 
FocJoin -.40, p<=.001 
FinError .001. p=.94 
Repetition .23 p=.04 
Plan .12, p=.29 
Seek .24, p=.03 
143 
 
Table 3.5  
Correlations for all children controlling for age, executive function (HTKS), and expressive vocabulary (EVT). 
Note: tp =.05; *p <.05, **p<.001 
Variable   1 2 3    4    5     6       7      8      9    10    11  12  13    14 15      16 17 18 
1.  McKI - .39**  .30* .25* -.26* .10 .04 .27* .15 .11 .30* .04 -.33* -.001 .22* .76** .90** .73**   
2.  ChAT  - .88** .78** -.75** .36** .35* .83*    .15 .50** .78** -.09 -.74** -.13 -.03 .32* .24* .44**   
3. Monitoring (MON)      -   
.58** 
  -.51**  .29* .45**   88**   .33* .30* .64** -.10 -.46** -.13 -.05 .28* .23* .31*   
4. Control (CONT)    - 
 -
.39** 
 .34*  .13   
.62** 
 -.08 .80** .87** -.13 .25* -.37** -.17 .22t  .13 .36*   
5.  Lack of Monitoring & 
Control    
    (LMC) 
    - -.29* -.30* -.50** .05 -.18 -.45** .31* .92** .25* .11 -.23* -.15 -.32*   
6.  MON_ Awareness      - -.07* .09 .22* .46** .14 -.14 -.27* .10 -.13 .15 .004 .11   
7.  MON_Checking 
Construction 
      - .29*  -
.24* 
.27* .24* -.02t -.24* .05 -.22* .11 .05 .02   
8.  MON_Checking Plan        - -.01 .27* .73** -.10 -.46** -.12 -.13 .19 .18 .39**   
9. MON_Evaluation         - .09 -.08 .16 .04 -.18 .06 .19 .17 -.04   
10. CONT_Planning          - .40** -.12 -.15 .14 -.21t .12 .03 .18   
11. CONT_ Seeking           - -.10 -.45** .05 -.08 .24* .18 .41**   
12.  LMC_Brute Force                - -.01 -.06 .36** .04 .006 .04   
13.  LMC_Focus Joining                 - .09 -.14 -.25* -.23* -.40**   
14.  LMC_Finishing Error 
 
                 - -.15 -.06 .04 .001   
15.  LMC_Repetition 
 
                  - .01 .27* .23*   
16. McKI_People                - .54** .33*   
17.  McKI_Task 
 
                - .24*   
18.  McKI_Strategies                    -   
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Convergent validity moderated by SES. To address whether the children’s SES 
background would moderate the convergent validity between the McKI and ChAT measures, the 
relations between the measures were examined separately for the GSRP classes and the Tuition 
classes (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7). Focusing first on the overall correlations between the McKI and 
ChAT, while there was a significant (but low) correlation between the scores on the McKI and 
ChAT tools or the children in the GSRP classrooms, this was not true for the children in the 
Tuition-based classrooms (see Table 3.7). Furthermore, amongst the subcomponents of the 
ChAT measure, there were four significant correlations for the children in the GSRP classrooms’ 
scores (rs between .25-.40), while there was only one significant correlation for the children in 
the Tuition-based classrooms’ scores (r=.26, p=.01) 
Table 3.6.  
Correlations between the McKI overall and ChAT subcomponent scores for GSRP and Tuition 
preschool classrooms controlling for age, executive function (HTKS), and expressive vocabulary 
(EVT). 
 ChAT  
(overall) 
MON CONT LMC 
McKI GSRP  
r=.38, p=.01 
 
Tuition 
r=.25, p=.12 
 GSRP    
 
 
 
A similar pattern of results was found for the subcomponents of the McKI measure. 
Eleven significant correlations were found for the children in the GSRP classrooms’ scores (all 
Awareness     
CheckConst:  
CheckPlan GSRP & Tuition 
Eval               
 Plan    
 Seek  GSRP  
BrutForce   
FocJoin   GSRP 
FinError    
Repetition  
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rs between .25-.46), while there was only three significant correlations for the children in the  
Tuition-based classrooms’ scores (rs=.26-.46). 
Table 3.7.  
Correlations between the ChAT overall and McKI subcomponent assessment scores for GSRP 
and Tuition preschool classrooms controlling for age, executive function (HTKS), and expressive 
vocabulary (EVT).  
 ChAT  
(overall) 
MON 
 
CONT 
 
LMC 
GSRP 
 
McKI_ 
People 
Tuition  
r=.40, p=.01 
 
r=.27, p=.09  
 
r=.46, p=.003  
 
r=-.22, p=.18 
   
 r=.09, p=.59 
r=.15, p=.36  
 
    r=-.10, p=.54     r=-.20, p=.23 
 
GSRP 
 
McKI_ 
Tasks 
Tuition 
 r=.07, p=.65 
 
 
    r=.03, p=.85 
 
      r=-.01, p=.95 
 
    r=-.07, p=.69 
 
 r=.22, p=.19 
 
    r=.20, p=.23      r=.15, p=.37 
 
r=-.09, p=.56  
 
Awareness    .19, p=.24 
CheckConst: .002, p=.99 
CheckPlan:   .29, p=.06 
Eval              .02, p=.93 
Plan .35, p=.02 
Seek .46, p=.003 
BrutForce  .09, p=.59 
FocJoin    -.25, p=.12 
FinError   -.08. p=.65 
Repetition .06, p=.71 
Awareness     .06, p=.70 
CheckConst: .10, p=.54 
CheckPlan:  -.08, p=.61 
Eval              .36, p=.02 
Plan -.01, p=.95 
Seek -.17, p=.32 
BrutForce -.09, p=.57 
FocJoin -.17, p=.28 
FinError -.04, p=.83 
Repetition -.05, p=.76 
Awareness    -.27, p=.09 
CheckConst: .02, p=.89 
CheckPlan:   .08, p=.64 
Eval              .02, p=.91 
Plan -.05, p=.76 
Seek .03, p=.87 
BrutForce .06, p=.72 
FocJoin -.16, p=.32 
FinError -.04. p=.82 
Repetition .46, p=.003 
Awareness      .12, p=.46 
CheckConst: -.06, p=.56 
CheckPlan:    .02, p=.89 
Eval               .38, p=.02 
Plan .11, p=.53 
Seek .13, p=.42 
BrutForce -.06, p=.73 
FocJoin -.16, p=.33 
FinError -.03. p=.87 
Repetition .17, p=.31 
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GSRP 
McKI_ 
Strategies 
 
Tuition 
r=.44, p=.005 
 
    r=.32, p=.004 
 
  r=.39, p=.01 
 
    r=-.29, p=.07 
 
 r=.33, p=.04 
 
    r=.16 p=.33 
 
    r=.36, p=.10 
 
    r=-.32, p=.04 
 
 
Discussion 
As described earlier, this is the first study to examine the convergent validity between 
two measures of early metacognitive processing in preschool-aged children though measurement 
experts have been recommending the use of a multitrait, multimethod (MTMM; Campbell & 
Fiske 1959 & Cook & Campbell 1979) approach for many decades. Moreover, at the Buros 
Symposium dedicated to research on Mc (see Schraw, 2000), this point was emphasized as being 
particularly important for the often conceptually and methodologically messy construct of Mc. 
The use of diverse assessment methods was recommended, with the idea of first examining 
convergent validity between measurement tools. Similar recommendations were still being made 
more recently for metacognition researchers focused on “understanding the construct being 
measured”, “selecting the outcome that matches the construct being studied”, and “using 
multiple outcome measures whenever possible” (Schraw 2009, p. 40). Despite these continued 
recommendations, most research focused on Mc does not follow these proposals put forth, 
particularly regarding multiple measurement tools or carefully aligning the tool with the 
construct being examined.  
Awareness     .15, p=.34 
CheckConst: -.45, p=.78 
CheckPlan:    .40, p=.01 
Eval               .001, p=.99 
Plan .28, p=.08 
Seek .41, p=.01 
BrutForce .05, p=.77 
FocJoin -.25, p=.03 
FinError -.07. p=.67 
Repetition .28, p=.08 
Awareness  .01, p=.94 
CheckConst: .01, p=.95 
CheckPlan: .23, p=.15 
Eval -.05, p=.78 
Plan .13, p=.45 
Seek .31, p=.05 
BrutForce .10, p=.54 
FocJoin -.46, p=.003 
FinError -.08. p=.64 
Repetition .18, p=.28 
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This study was designed to begin to address these issues by examining multiple 
measurement tools of early Mc, which has provided evidence in support of these 
recommendations. Had only one of the measurement tools been included in this study, very 
different information would have been inferred about children’s metacognitive processing based 
on the Wedgits problem-solving puzzle task. This information will also allow future researchers 
to make more precise decisions about the selection of their outcome measures so that they align 
the construct that they are studying. For example, if a researcher would like to focus on 
children’s McK about a task and how well they are able to articulate it, the McKI would be an 
appropriate tool whereas the ChAT would not. In contrast, if a researcher were searching for a 
tool to measure children’s online/applied metacognitive behaviors (or how well children were 
able to apply metacognitive principles to a problem-solving task), the ChAT would be 
appropriate whereas the McKI would not. And, judging by the correlation of .39, these outcome 
measures should not be substituted for one another. This is particularly important to note because 
there are few instruments for assessing metacognitive processing at the preschool-aged level 
(Basilio & Marulis, 2014), thus, researchers must be careful when choosing among the few that 
do exist or further examine and validate the tools that exist. This caution comes on top of the 
general concern inherent to measuring early learning skills (e.g., Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983).  
Therefore, this study has not only provided new measurement-related evidence for 
researchers studying early metacognitive processes but also evidence that preschool-aged 
children are far more metacognitive than previously thought. Overall, both measures revealed 
greater evidence of early emerging metacognition than previous studies (e.g., Flavell, 1979; 
Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Veenman et al., 2006) would have predicted. This was true 
for all classrooms, though the children in the Tuition-based preschool classrooms (from middle 
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to high-SES families) had significantly greater scores on both metacognitive assessments. The 
assessments were administered within the first few weeks of school, thus, it is probable that 
children between the GSRP and Tuition-based classroom had considerably divergent experiences 
prior to entering preschool. The children in the GSRP classrooms likely had considerably less 
experience with learning opportunities (e.g., Hart & Risley, 1995, 2003; Hoff, 2003; quality 
mother-child interactions, being read to and communicated with interactively, hearing 
decontextualized language, cognitive stimulation and support) than the children in the Tuition-
based classrooms, which may partially explain the differences in early metacognitive processes. 
And, as described earlier, there are many other factors associated with low-SES family 
backgrounds (e.g., limited material resources; brain changes related to environmental factors) 
that are likely to be related to the differences in the GSRP and Tuition-based classroom 
metacognitive scores across the McKI and ChAT tools. 
As hypothesized, a significant, but small (r=.39 overall) correlation between the 
interview measure (McKI) and the observational measure (ChAT) of metacognitive processes in 
young, preschool-aged children was found. The correlations between the 
components/subcomponents of the McKI and ChAT measurement tools varied, with several 
being significant, but only one correlation that was above .39 (r=.44 between the ChAT tool and 
the McKI_Strategies subcomponent. This was not surprising, as conceptually the questions 
regarding McK about the puzzle task strategies were the most similar to the use of metacognitive 
behaviors/strategies during the puzzle task. Though, it was interesting that even when there was 
conceptual similarity, the correlation still remained low-moderate; it was not true that the same 
children who were able to articulate their declarative McK about puzzle strategies were the same 
children who were able to successfully perform behaviors/strategies during the puzzle. Thus, 
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there was some overlap between the measures and their subcomponents but substantial unique 
elements left to explore. This indicates that early metacognitive processes—related to a problem-
solving puzzle task—were not functioning as a unitary general skill. 
The second, related, research question was whether the convergent validity (or lack 
thereof) between the McKI and ChAT measures would be moderated by the children’s family 
background (SES). This was examined by comparing the McKI and ChAT (and subcomponent) 
scores from the children in the GSRP preschool classrooms to those of the children in the 
Tuition-based preschool classrooms. The metacognitive processes were substantially more 
nuanced for the children in the Tuition-based preschool classrooms than the children in the 
GSRP preschool classrooms. It seems that the metacognitive processes of the children from the 
low-SES family backgrounds functioned more generally that those of the children from higher 
SES families. However, even with the children in the GSRP preschool classrooms, there was still 
a considerable amount of unique variance to explore; the overlap between these metacognitive 
processes was not substantial even though there were far more instances of overlap than for the 
children in the Tuition-based preschool classrooms. This may be because the children in the 
GSRP preschool classrooms, from low-SES homes, have not have the same learning 
opportunities and experiences as the children in the Tuition-based preschool classrooms, and 
thus have not developed particular skills to be applied to particular tasks (or the knowledge 
regarding when and how to apply skills and knowledge to specific tasks). When separated into 
classroom groups, the metacognitive processes (McKI and ChAT) of the children in the Tuition-
based preschool classrooms were not correlated. Thus, it appears that, with experience and 
knowledge, metacognitive skills become more nuanced (possibly mirroring the development of 
executive function skills from a unitary model of executive function at preschool-early 
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elementary age to a multiple dimension model in older children and adults, e.g., Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000; Wiebe, Espy, & Charak, 2008). A 
review study that examined associations between Mc and giftedness in children support these 
results as well finding that giftedness was differentially associated with metacognitive skills 
(depending on what type of metacognitive skill was being investigated across studies reviewed; 
there were only developmental effects but no effects of giftedness found for cognitive 
monitoring but there were giftedness effects for declarative metacognitive knowledge for 
example). Mc should not be considered unidimensional term (Alexander, Carr, & 
Schwanenflugel 1995). 
Limitations and Recommendations 
 There are several limitations to address, as well as recommendations for future research. 
First, though the ChAT observational measurement tool and its subcomponents have previously 
been examined and validated psychometrically (Bryce & Whitebread, 2012; Whitebread et al., in 
preparation), this is not yet true for the McKI and the subcomponents. Though the McKI has 
been found to have adequate reliability (re-test and the subcomponents hung together 
moderately, Marulis et al., submitted), it has not been comprehensively examined 
psychometrically or validated, such as through factor analysis. Thus, the McKI subcomponents 
that have been described and analyzed in this study are more conceptually-based than 
statistically validated. However, this type of validation analysis is planned for future studies with 
a larger sample5. Moreover, though the ChAT observational coding scheme has previously been 
                                                            
5 Another option would be to combine the samples from Study 1 (n=42; Marulis et al., submitted), from this study 
(n=83), and from my neurocognitive study (n=61; Marulis et al., 2013), which would result in nearly 200 children, 
which may be enough for a factor analysis study. 
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validated (Bryce & Whitebread, 2012; Whitebread et al., in preparation), this validation was 
conducted using a different, though similar, problem-solving task, the TTT described earlier. In 
the current study, the Wedgits problem-solving task, and the ChAT codes functioned similarly to 
the TTT and there is no reason to think that the validation would be different, however this 
should be investigated in future studies with larger samples as well6.   
Second, the children’s metacognitive behavior that was assessed (using the ChAT 
observational coding scheme) was metacognitive skills specific to the Wedgits problem-solving 
puzzle task. Thus, my focus was relatively constrained. Children’s monitoring or controlling of 
emotions or motivation were not coded, for example, during the Wedgits task; rather only the 
metacognitive behaviors they displayed related to the cognitive task were targeted. To control for 
children’s emotional and motivation regulation, as much as possible, the Wedgits task was 
designed (including several pilot iterations) to be inherently motivating, fun, and the appropriate 
level of challenge for preschool-aged children (Berhenke, 2013; Marulis et al, submitted).  
However, children’s monitoring and control of their emotions and motivation were not 
accounted for in this coding scheme even though being able to monitor and control emotions and 
motivation is important to being able to successfully apply metacognitive skills to a cognitive 
task like the Wedgits problem-solving puzzle task.  This is something that I plan to take into 
consideration in future studies.  
Third, because both of the metacognitive measurement tools were applied to one specific 
cognitive task (the Wedgits puzzle task), it is not possible to know whether these findings of low 
                                                            
6 In addition, because I had to eliminate two of the ChAT codes (CONT_Sorting and LMC_Goal Neglect) due to 
limited child behaviors qualifying for these codes, the ChAT coding scheme adapted for the Wedgits task with these 
codes eliminated should be validated in the same way that the original ChAT scheme has been validated. 
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overlap between the McKI and ChAT would generalize beyond this specific task. However, 
previous studies (Bryce & Whitebread, 2012; Whitebread et al., in preparation) have similar 
metacognitive findings regarding the ChAT tool, suggesting the current findings may generalize. 
Furthermore, this task does not require previous knowledge and is designed to be relatively 
domain-general. Accordingly, it seems likely that the findings would generalize to other 
problem-solving tasks, though future investigations should empirically examine this. Future 
studies should also be designed using cognitive tasks that tap different areas of cognition such as 
attention or memory and specific content areas such as mathematics or science. The McKI and 
ChAT can fairly easily be adapted to these different areas and domains of cognition, though it is 
important that the task have a plan for the child to follow.  However, it remains an open question 
whether early metacognitive processes are similarly nuanced across domains and aspects of 
cognition as they are specific to the Wedgits problem-solving task.  These are important 
developmental questions to pursue. 
Fourth, though some general overlap was found (potentially, a general metacognitive 
functioning skill), there was a considerable amount of unique variance across the McKI and 
ChAT measurement tools, that could not be fully explained by articulation or verbal skills due to 
the expressive language covariate (the correlation including these covariates was r=.39; without 
these included, it was r=.50, both ps<.001). Furthermore, this variance was not explained by 
general EF skills (including working memory, response inhibition, and cognitive flexibility).  
However, it may be that including a general IQ or cognitive development covariate would help 
explain the variance, though this is challenging to assess at the preschool-level. It seems more 
likely that these metacognitive skills are relatively independent of one another and should be 
viewed in that way rather than labeled under the same umbrella term. For this reason, researchers 
153 
 
should be more precise about labeling metacognitive terms and using these constructs (i.e., 
conceptualizing and assessing) in their research. For example, using metacognitive knowledge 
for the McKI and metacognitive behaviors/skills for the ChAT.  
Finally, ceiling and floor effects were not able to be examined in either the McKI or the 
ChAT measures. Based on a previous study (Marulis et al., submitted) it does seem that, after 6 
years of age, the McKI would be inappropriate and ceiling effects would be found, and that the 
McKI may be too difficult for children under the age of 3.  The ChAT has previously been used 
and validated with children from 3-7 years old (Bryce & Whitebread, 2012; Whitebread et al., in 
preparation). Because the ChAT involves frequency counts and there are no standards for this 
age group, there are no ceiling or floor effects.  As in the previous studies, the coding scheme 
was developmentally appropriate for the children in this study.  Future studies should investigate 
ceiling and floor effects systematically along with other psychometric properties of the McKI 
and ChAT specific to the Wedgits puzzle task. 
Conclusion and Implications 
Regardless of the limitations described—many of which I plan to address in future 
investigations—this study examined an important area of early cognitive development: how 
early metacognitive processes function in preschool-aged children and whether Mc is a singular 
or more nuanced construct. This study provided valuable information regarding the measurement 
of early metacognitive processing and was designed to address the broader issue of 
conceptualizing and assessing early metacognitive development comprehensively. Using a 
structured interview tool like the McKI combined with a systematic behavioral observation tool 
like ChAT is the ideal way to comprehensively assess young children’s metacognitive processes. 
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This allows for the “best of both worlds” by limiting verbalization requirements during the 
observation task (ChAT) while also providing opportunities for children to elaborate on and 
explain their behavior and thinking about the task after completing the cognitive task (which is 
only four minutes long, so there was not a lot of time in between the task and the interview 
questions).  Furthermore, from a psychometrics perspective, as discussed previously, this allows 
for a MTMM approach with different sources of error. 
This is important for conceptualizing as well as measuring this important skill, which is 
potentially vital to moving forward in examining this construct for its association to and 
predictive power for cognitive development and academic success, particularly for children at 
risk for learning difficulties (Matthews et al., 2010; Sektnan et al., 2010). In turn, this is crucial 
to my long-term goal of informing and designing effective metacognitive interventions to affect 
the developmental and academic trajectories for all young children, beginning in preschool when 
these skills may be most malleable and interventions most sustainable (Heckman & Masterov, 
2007; Li, Farkas, Duncan, Burchinal, & Vandell, 2013). 
 
 
 
  
155 
 
 Appendices 
Appendix 3.A.  Wedgits problem-solving puzzle task 
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Appendix 3.B.  Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) 
Use this protocol after children have completed the Wedgits puzzle task: Once the Wedgits 
puzzle task is complete, tell child: “Thank you for working on the puzzles! I would like to 
talk to you about the puzzles you just did and about your thinking. My job is to learn about 
how kids learn and think and I have a few questions for you, Okay?” Once child assents, 
say: “Thank you. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; I only want to know 
what you think. Just give your best answer.” (If they don't agree, try to prod them by saying 
that ‘I really need your help and want to learn about how kids think'.) 
1. “Do you think you did a good job, an okay job or not so good of a job on the puzzles?” 
Circle child's response. If they say they did a good job, ask “What did you do to help you 
do a good job?” If they answer okay or not so good, ask “What do you think would have 
helped you do an even better job?  
2. “Did you think anything was hard?” If no, ask: “Why not?” If yes, ask “Why? What 
would have made it easier?” 
3. “Will it be harder/easier when you’re older? Why?” 
4. “Would these puzzles be hard for another kid your age? Why/why not?”  
5. How did you know if you were getting the puzzles right?”  
I know a kid named Gogi and he/she (use same gender as the child) is from another land. 
S/he doesn't know anything about puzzles like the ones you just did. Will you help Gogi 
learn about these kind of puzzles?” Wait for child to assent and say: “Thank you.” (If they 
don't agree, try to prod them by saying that 'Gogi really needs your help and wants to learn about 
these kind of puzzles'.) 
6. “Would these puzzles be easier for Gogi or you? Why/Why not?” 
7. “What should Gogi do if s/he is having trouble with the puzzle?”  
8.  “Would it be helpful for Gogi to talk to herself/himself about the puzzle while doing 
the puzzle? Why would/wouldn't that be a helpful thing to do? 
9. “Would the puzzle be easier with bigger or smaller pieces? Why?  
10.   “If all of the puzzle pieces were the same color, like in this picture (show the Wedgits 
booklet of all purple Wedgits) will the puzzle be easier? If yes, ask: “Why?” If no, ask, 
“Why not?”    
11. “If you think about how the pieces would fit together before I try, will the puzzle be 
easier? If yes, ask: “Why?” If no, ask, “Why not?” What if you figured out how to do it 
first? Why/Why not?”  
12. “If you gather (demonstrate) the pieces you will need first and then build the puzzle, 
will it be easier? Why/Why not?”  
13. “What if you were watching TV while you were building it, will it be easier? Why? 
/Why not?” 
14.  “If you close your eyes while doing the puzzle, will it be easier? If yes, ask: “Why?” If 
no, ask, “Why not?”  
“Thank you for sharing all of your ideas and how you think with Gogi!” 
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Appendix 3.C.  Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) Codebook and Annotated 
Scoring 
 
The Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) assesses children’s metacognitive knowledge 
(or knowledge about individuals, tasks and strategies) individually using a series of 14 questions 
related to the Wedgits task [in which children are shown design cards of increasing difficulty and 
are asked to make the Wedgits building blocks look exactly like the picture on the card. All 
children completed the first puzzle. If they finished the second in less than four minutes, they 
were given a third card. After they had tried a puzzle for four minutes unsuccessfully, they were 
stopped, and asked, “If you had more time to work, would you like to keep trying this one (the 
uncompleted one, indicating a mastery goal) or build this other one again (the one they 
previously completed, indicating a performance goal)? Why?”]. For example, children were 
asked “Would talking to yourself during the puzzle be helpful? Why/why not?”  
TO SCORE:  
Rate responses to questions on a 0-2 scale for each question where: 
 0=Not at all metacognitive 
o Response does not refer to knowledge about the child’s thinking or cognitive 
ability/capability; the difficulty of the task itself or the efficacy/efficiency of a 
strategy. 
 E.g., child disagreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a 
task without an appropriate explanation (e.g., said “I don’t know” or 
“because I don’t like to do it”. *NOTE: child could receive the full 
score (2 points) for a negative response to this question IF she or he 
provided a metacognitive explanation such as talking to oneself is not 
helpful because it will distract their thinking or make them not be able 
to attend to the task. The full points refer to an “appropriate 
metacognitive response”; thus yes OR no could be a fully 
metacognitive response depending on the explanation.  
 1=Partially metacognitive  
o Response refers to knowledge about the child’s thinking or cognitive 
ability/capability; the difficulty of the task itself or the efficacy/efficiency of a 
strategy but not completely/fully or without an explanation that backs up the 
response. 
 E.g., child agreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a 
task but their reason was not related to cognition (e.g., because it’s 
fun) or they didn’t know why. 
 2= Appropriately/fully Metacognitive 
o Response refers to knowledge about the child’s thinking or cognitive 
ability/capability; the difficulty of the task itself or the efficacy/efficiency of a 
strategy in a complete/full way or with a metacognitive explanation that backs 
up the response. 
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 E.g., child agreed that talking to oneself can be helpful in solving a 
task because it helps them remember how to do the task/ helps their 
brain think better, etc. 
 OR child disagreed that talking to oneself is helpful because it would 
distract them. 
 
If the child doesn’t/won’t answer, he/she will be given 0 points for that response (NR=no 
response) and coded as “999”. If the child says “I don’t know”, she/he will be given 0 points for 
that question/portion of the question and coded as (DK=don’t know) “999”. 
 The full set of questions is below including example responses and scoring. The actual scores 
given for this child are indicated along with what would qualify for the other levels of scoring.  
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Metacognitive Knowledge Interview_CODED SAMPLE  
 
Once the Wedgits puzzle task is complete, tell child: “Thank you for working on those 
puzzles! I would like to talk to you about the puzzles you just did and about your thinking. 
My job is to learn about how kids learn and think and I have a few questions for you, 
Okay?” Once child assents, say: “Thank you. Remember, there are no right or wrong 
answers; I only want to know what you think. Just give your best answer.” (If they don’t 
agree, try to prod them by saying that ‘I really need your help and want to learn about how kids 
think’.) 
1. “Do you think you did a good job, an okay job or not so good of a job on the puzzles?” 
Circle child’s response. If they say they did a good job, ask “What did you do to help you 
do a good job?” If they answer okay or not so good, ask “What do you think would have 
helped you do a better job?  My brain-that controls my whole body. 
2 points. His knowledge of how well he performed on the task was accurate. He 
performed above his age level by completing the second challenging puzzle accurately 
and quickly and nearly completed the 3rd puzzle (designed for children older than 
preschool and chosen to pose a challenge sufficient enough for children this age to be 
unable to complete accurately, particularly within four minutes). Further, he showed 
metacognitive knowledge about himself and what helped him/would help him do a 
good job on puzzles-his brain.  
A score of 1 would be either an inaccurate assessment of one’s performance on the 
puzzle or an accurate response to this with a non-metacognitive response to what 
would help do a good/better job such as “being good” or “doing a good job”. If a child 
accurately assessed his/her Wedgit performance and gave a partial metacognitive 
response (such as: “liking the puzzle” because it is possible that higher 
enjoyment/interest in a task leads to higher performance but this response does not 
fully spell this out. Or responding to the question “What did you to do help you do a 
good job” with: “I tried hard” without elaboration.) He/she could get 1.5 on this 
question. 0 points would be given if the child was metacognitively inaccurate about 
his/her performance along with a non-metacognitive follow-up response. 
 
2. “Did you think anything was hard?” If no, ask: “Why not?” If yes, ask “Why? What 
would have made it easier?”  My brain focuses when I’m doing puzzles  
1 point. He said nothing was hard but other comments he made during the third 
puzzle indicated that there were parts he found very difficult. However, he had good 
metacognitive knowledge regarding why it didn’t seem difficult-he was aware that by 
being able to concentrate and maintaining focus (with your brain), the task will likely 
be/seem easier. 
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A child whose response to whether anything was hard matches his/her 
comments/emotional response to the puzzle would get a full point for that part of the 
question and another full point for why he/she didn’t find it hard-e.g., the type of 
response given here. If the child said something was difficult (and this matched 
his/her response to the puzzle) and also responded with a metacognitively aware 
answer regarding what would have made it easier-e.g., having help from an 
adult/older child or getting a hint, she/he would receive 2 points.  
A score of 0 would be given if the child was metacognitively inaccurate about his/her 
performance along with a non-metacognitive follow-up response to Why/Why not. 
 
3. “Will it be harder/easier when you’re older? Why?” Easier, because I will be bigger 
and more growned up. I will learned more in school and I will know more about 
puzzles then so it will be easier.  
2 points. He was aware and responded that the puzzle will get easier as he gets older, 
not only because of maturation, but because he will learn more (about 
strategies/problem-solving) which is learned in school as he mentioned, and with this 
knowledge, these puzzles will be easier. 
A score of 1 point would be obtained if the child had responded that the puzzle would 
be easier without an explanation (or with an explanation such as “I don’t know” or “I 
like it”).  
A score of 0 would be obtained if the child had responded that the puzzle would be 
harder without a metacognitive explanation. 
 
4.  “Would these puzzles be hard for another kid your age? Why/why not?”  No, I don’t 
know. 
1 point. His answer matches the one above as to whether the task would be difficult 
depending on age but didn’t give a response as to why he thought this.  
In order to receive 2 points, a child would have to either match the response to 
Question #2 (e.g., if they said the puzzle was/wasn’t difficult for them) and follow with 
a metacognitively aware response as to why such as “these puzzles are hard for 4 year 
olds” or “we have these in our classroom so they’re not hard for us” OR, the child 
could have a different response with a metacognitively aware answer as to why such 
as “Yes, they would be hard for other kids my age because they don’t have them at 
home like I do” or “No, they wouldn’t be hard for other kids my age because they are 
better at puzzles than me”.  
0 points would be given if the child gave an answer that didn’t match #2 and gave a 
non-metacognitive follow-up response to Why/Why not. 
 
 
5. How did you know if you were getting the puzzles right?” I looked at the picture. 
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2 points. He was aware not only of what strategy would be helpful in accurately 
completing the task but of which strategy he actually used while doing the task (this 
can be discerned by watching the video or noting whether the child actually used this 
strategy during the task).  
A child would be given 1 point if gave a partially metacognitive response such as “I 
thought about it hard”. 
0 points were given for non-plausible/ non-metacognitive responses such as “I just 
knew” or “because I’m smart/good”. 
 
“I know a kid named Gogi and he/she (use same gender as the child) is from another land. 
S/he is the same age as you but has never seen puzzle like the ones you just did and 
doesn't know anything about puzzles like these ones. Will you help Gogi learn about these 
kinds of puzzles?” Wait for child to assent and say: “Thank you.” (If they don't agree, try to 
prod them by saying that 'Gogi really needs your help and wants to learn about these kind of 
puzzles'.) 
 
6. “Would these puzzles be easier for Gogi or you? Why?”  A lot; I focus a lot 
1 point. He was metacognitive in asserting that he (would had experience with puzzles 
and was from a school/had teachers who taught about puzzle and puzzle-related 
tasks) but not in his response as to why.  It is metacognitive to understand that 
focusing helps improve performance, but in this instance, the question was about why 
he would have an easier time than Gogi.  
In order to receive 2 points, a child would have to say something like “I have already 
done those puzzle” or “I know all about puzzles and Gogi doesn’t know about them at 
all”.  
0 points are given if the child chose Gogi without a metacognitive explanation. The 
child could receive 1 point by choosing Gogi but giving a metacognitive response as to 
why such as “He looks smarter with that big brain (the toy had a brain external to his 
head).”  
 
7. “What should Gogi do if s/he is having trouble with the puzzle?” Ask someone. 
2 points. He his answer reflected metacognitive awareness of a good strategy to use 
when encountering trouble (e.g., help-seeking).  
To receive 1 point, a child could respond with an answer that indicates some 
awareness of cognitive states but not of a (potentially) successful strategy, such as 
“Try it” (if the child had added “harder” or “again” after “Try”, she/he would receive 
the full 2 points).  
A score of 0 would be a response such as “Be good” which is not at all indicative of 
awareness of cognitive strategy.  
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8. “Would it be helpful for Gogi to talk to herself/himself while doing the puzzle? Why 
would/wouldn’t that be a helpful thing to do? Yes-he has to focus and get 
concentration. Talking to yourself does that. 
2 points. He is both metacognitively aware that talking to oneself about a task while 
performing it can be cognitively helpful and why.  
1 point would be given if the child answered “Yes” but didn’t know why or gave a 
non-metacognitive response as to why such as “It helps” or “It’s good”.  
0 points is given for an answer of No without a metacognitive explanation. The child 
could receive 1 point by responding “No” but giving a metacognitive response as to 
why such as “Because if you talk you might get distracted and do a bad job on the 
puzzle”. 
“Gogi has some questions for you about puzzles like this one. Okay?” She/he would like to 
know more about puzzles like this one. 
For the last 4 questions, there was an intended ‘correct’ answer in that one response would 
make the puzzle task easier (as confirmed by asking adults these same questions). Thus, the 
child would get 1 point for answering correctly/metacognitively accurately and another 1 
point for giving a metacognitively aware response as to why this was true. However, it 
became apparent after conducting several interviews that children sometimes viewed the 
strategies differently. Thus, if they responded differently than the adults to which situation 
would make the puzzle easier but gave a metacognitive response that appropriately made 
the first response defensible, he/she received the full 2 points (if there was no response 
given to back up their answer or a non-metacognitive response given, the score would be 0. 
In contrast, if the child responded as adults did to the first part but did not respond to the 
second part or responded non-metacognitively, she/he received 1 point). For example, if the 
child responded that the puzzle would be easier with smaller pieces because smaller pieces 
are easier to manipulate/hold in their hands (because children have smaller hands) for 
example. 
9. “Would the puzzle be easier with bigger or smaller pieces? Why?” Easier to hold in 
your hands and make the puzzle with. 
 2 points. He responded like adults for bigger pieces and gave a response that, while not 
as cognitively related as adults answered-e.g., “less pieces to have to figure out how to fit 
together or less intricate designs”, it was a plausible (metacognitive) reason as to why 
bigger pieces make doing a puzzle easier. 
1 point would have been given if there was no response to “Why” or he had said 
something like “It’s better”.  
0 points would have been given if he had said smaller was easier and given no response to 
“Why” or he had said something like “It’s better”.  
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10. “If all of the puzzle pieces were the same color, will the puzzle be easier? If yes, ask: 
Why? If no, ask, “Why not?” I can’t figure out which one goes where. 
2 points. He responded like adults and gave a metacognitive response to “Why not”. 
1 point would have been given if there was no response to “Why” or he had said 
something like “It’s harder like that”. 0 points would have been given if he had said 
“Yes” with no response to “Why” or he had said something like “It’s just easier”. 
However, 2 points would have been given if he had said “Yes” along with a 
metacognitive response such as “Then you would be able to sort by size” (indicting 
less cognitive load because you don’t have two dimensions on which to sort).  
 
11. “If I think about how the pieces would fit together before I try, will the puzzle be 
easier? If yes, ask: Why? If no, ask, “Why not?” Because it is (demonstrated ‘thinking’ 
and putting the pieces in the right places). 
1 point. He responded as adults would but did not give a metacognitive response to 
“Why” (though his demonstration came close, but even after being prompted after 
this enactment, he did not respond with any indication of metacognitive awareness.  
2 points would have been given if his second response was something like “because it 
helps me focus on the puzzle” or “I’d have more time to figure out the right place”. 
0 points would be given for a response of “No” with no response as to “Why not” or a 
non-metacognitive response such as this one “Because it isn’t”. 
 
12. “If you gather (demonstrate) the pieces you will need first and then build the puzzle, will 
it be easier? Why/Why not?” No, that won’t be easier. I don’t know why. 
0 points because the child was not aware and did not respond that gathering the 
pieces you would need first would make the task easier (using an organizational 
strategy) and also did not explain his answer metacognitively to justify his negative 
response. 
1 point could have been given if he had said Yes, it would have made the puzzle easier 
but he didn’t know why. 
2 points could have been given if he had said Yes, it would have made the puzzle 
easier to gather the pieces first before building with an explanation related to 
organizing the pieces/his thinking or helping him think about how the puzzle would 
go together. 
 
13. What if you were watching TV while you were building it, will it be easier? Why? 
/Why not?” No, I don’t think so…. I don’t think it would be easier. 
1 point. He was aware and responded that watching TV at the same time as building 
the puzzle would not make it easier. However, he did not have an explanation as to 
why this would be beyond tautological reasoning.  
A child could receive 2 points if he or she had responded that No the puzzle would not 
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be easier because they would be distracted or it would be harder to concentrate or 
something along those lines.  
0 points would be given if the child responded that the puzzle would be easier without 
a metacognitive explanation.  
 
14.  “If you close your eyes while doing the puzzle, will it be easier? If yes, ask: Why? If 
no, ask, “Why not?” No, he can’t see what he’s doing! He couldn’t see if he had the 
right piece or the right place on the card (pointed to the design picture card)”. 
2 points. He responded like adults and gave a metacognitive response to “Why not”.  
He would have been given 1 point for not responding to “Why not” or giving a non-
metacognitive response such as this one “Because it isn’t easier”.  
0 points would be given for a response of “Yes” with no response to “Why” or without 
a metacognitive response to defend this (see above-adults were unable to come up with 
a way to metacognitively defend this answer except possibly by discussing how other 
senses may become more acute, but this still wouldn’t make the puzzle easier though a 
case may be able to be made for equally easy”).  
  
 
  
“Thank you for sharing all of your ideas and how you think with Gogi!  
 
Notes:  While he was building the puzzle, he made a lot of metacognitive (evaluative) 
comments such as “I built this one before so I’m good at it.” And for the most challenging 
puzzle, he said  “OOOh, I can’t do that one!” Then as he worked on it, he said “I’m having 
trouble with this part” (he didn’t successfully complete it but was close). 
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Appendix 3.D.  Wedgits Puzzle Scoring 
1. Rate the accuracy of the child’s performance on the Wedgits task. These coding 
categories were designed to match the Metacognitive Knowledge Interview (McKI) 
in which the child is asked how well she or he did on the puzzle (Question #1). 
a. Good= Child accurately (e.g., the puzzle looked exactly like the picture card) 
finished the first and second puzzles within the time allotted (4 minutes). The 
child may have started (or completed) a third or even fourth puzzle, but this is 
not required to receive a score of “Good”. 
b. Okay= Child accurately (e.g., the puzzle looked exactly like the picture card) 
finished the first puzzle within the time allotted (4 minutes) and accurately 
completed at least half of the second puzzle (i.e., completed the bottom half—
that looks like a pyramid—and the green piece that is placed vertically in the 
pyramid). 
c. Not so good= Child accurately (e.g., the puzzle looked exactly like the picture 
card) finished the first puzzle within the time allotted (4 minutes) and started 
the second puzzle but did not accurately complete half of the second puzzle 
(i.e., did not complete the bottom half that looks like a pyramid). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
166 
 
Appendix 3.E.  Children Articulating Thinking (ChAT) coding scheme. 
 
              From Bryce & Whitebread, 2012, p. 203 
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Appendix 3.F.  ChAT coding scheme from Bryce & Whitebread 2012: Codes used 
  Number (%) of 5‐year‐old 
children who show this 
behaviour (total N=34) 
Number (%) of 7‐year‐old 
children who show this 
behaviour (total N=32) 
Monitoring Codes     
Checking Own  34 (100)  32 (100) 
Checking Plan  31 (91)  31 (97) 
Prospective Mon  8 (24)  5 (16) 
Clarification  2 (6)  5 (16) 
Reviewing  24 (71)  18 (56) 
Self‐questioning  4 (12)  4 (13) 
Task Difficulty  10 (29)  6 (19) 
Error Detection  19 (56)  21 (66) 
Commentary  10 (29)  11 (34) 
Use other for Mon*  20 (59)  9 (28) 
Evaluation  5 (15)  3 (9) 
Justified Termination*  21 (62)  25 (78) 
Memory Monitoring  2 (6)  6 (19) 
     
Control Codes     
Clearing Space*  18 (53)  28 (88) 
Plan*  19 (56)  15 (47) 
Sorting  17 (50)  12 (38) 
Seeking*  27 (79)  31 (97) 
Request Help  3 (9)  1 (3) 
Change Strategy  33 (97)  31 (97) 
Gesture  16 (47)  14 (44) 
Memory Aid  7 (21)  2 (6) 
     
Failure of Monitoring and Control   
Perseveration  27 (79)  24 (75) 
Distraction  8 (24)  3 (9) 
Off‐task*  9 (26)  2 (6) 
PersAndDis  30 (88)  26 (81) 
Number and percentage of children in each group who showed each of the individual behavior codes. Those shaded 
grey were shown by less than 25% of children in each group, and although they contribute to the macro-level codes 
they will not be analyzed in terms of individual behaviors. Those with * show a significant chi-squared result 
between the age groups 
From post-hoc analyses conducted by Donna Bryce and Deborah Pino-Pasternak 2013 
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  Appendix 3.G. Adapted ChAT coding scheme. 
 Description Example (Verbal) Example (Non-Verbal) 
M
O
N
IT
O
R
IN
G
 
Awareness: Reference to previous 
knowledge or current understanding 
about the task 
“It is good that you can use the pieces 
on either side” 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only 
Checking Construction: The child 
checks at his/her own construction 
This behavior might be accompanied by 
verbalizations such as “Let me have a 
look…”  
Characterized by a clear pause and 
glance directed at the track made so far 
Checking Plan: The child checks at 
the plan before continuing building the 
track 
This behavior might be accompanied by 
verbalizations such as “Let me see…”  
Checking behavior is characterized by a 
clear pause and glance directed at model 
Evaluation: Assessment of task 
difficulty, own competence, and 
quality of construction. 
“This is tricky” 
“I can’t take it apart” 
The child smile after finishing the track  
 
C
O
N
TR
O
L
 
Planning: Verbalizations that precede 
the actual behavior and indicate future 
actions 
“I’m going to do the straight bits first” 
 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only 
Seeking:  The child seeks materials 
before and during the task or seeks the 
correct position of a particular piece 
before placing it 
“Curvy bits, curvy bits…” (while 
looking for them) 
The child looks around at different 
pieces, selects one and places it straight 
away 
 
169 
 
Sorting: The child sorts, organizes, 
groups materials or arranges the 
space/own construction before or 
during the activity 
“I will put this (the plan) on the side” The child compares the length of two 
pieces 
The child groups all similar pieces 
together 
L
A
C
K
 M
O
N
/C
O
N
T
 
Brute Force: When a piece won’t fit, 
the child tries to force it 
This behavior is observed through the 
child’s actions 
The child uses both hands to push a piece 
down  
Focus Joining: Focus on joining the 
track up rather than copying the shape 
in the model 
This behavior is observed through the 
child’s actions 
The child focuses exclusively on joining 
the track, failing to consider previous 
errors 
Finishing Error: The child claims he 
is finished when there is a major 
discrepancy between the track and the 
plan 
“I’m done!” 
“Finished” 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only 
Goal Neglect: The child shows 
awareness of error but does not act 
accordingly 
“This one is bigger than the other” (but 
does not fix it) 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only 
Off-Task: The child gets distracted or 
engages in irrelevant conversation  
“Do you know Ms. Smith, my mom’s 
friend?” 
Child gets distracted by looking at the 
window 
Repetition: The child repeats an 
incorrect placement or piece selection  
This behavior is observed through the 
child’s actions 
The child takes a long curve, tries and it 
doesn’t fit, removes the piece and then 
immediately selects the same type of 
piece again 
From Whitebread, Pino-Pasternak, Marulis, Okkinga, & Vuillier, in preparation
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Appendix 3.H. Adapted ChAT (Children Articulating Thinking) Metacognitive Behavior Coding Scheme 
 
 Description Example (Verbal) Example (Non-Verbal) 
M
O
N
IT
O
R
IN
G
 
Awareness: Reference to previous 
knowledge or current understanding 
about the task. 
“It is good that you can use the pieces 
on either side” 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only. 
Checking Construction: The child 
checks at his/her own construction. 
This behavior might be accompanied 
by verbalizations such as “Let me 
have a look…”  
Characterized by a clear pause and glance 
directed at the puzzle made so far. 
Checking Plan: The child checks at the 
plan (model card) before continuing 
building the puzzle. 
This behavior might be accompanied 
by verbalizations such as “Let me 
see…”  
Checking behavior is characterized by a clear 
pause and glance directed at model. 
Evaluation: Assessment of task 
difficulty, own competence, and quality 
of construction. 
 
“This is tricky.” 
“I don’t know how to make this one.” 
“I did it!” 
The child smiles after finishing the puzzle.  
C
O
N
TR
O
L
 
Planning: Verbalizations that precede 
the actual behavior and indicate future 
actions. 
“I’m going to do the small (or top) 
pieces first.” 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only. 
Seeking:  The child seeks materials 
before/ during the task or seeks the 
correct position of a particular piece 
before placing it. 
“Yellow piece, yellow piece …” 
(while looking for the yellow Wedgit 
block). 
The child looks around at different pieces, 
selects one and places it straight away. 
Sorting: The child sorts, organizes, 
groups materials or arranges the 
space/own construction before or 
during the activity. 
 
 
“I will put this (the plan) on the side.” The child compares the shape/color of two 
pieces. 
The child groups all similar pieces together. 
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L
A
C
K
 M
O
N
/C
O
N
T
 
Brute Force: When a piece won’t fit, 
the child tries to force it. 
This behavior is observed through the 
child’s actions. 
The child uses both hands to push a piece 
down.  
Focus Joining: Focus on joining the 
puzzle pieces together up rather than 
copying the shape in the model. 
This behavior is observed through the 
child’s actions. 
The child focuses exclusively on joining the 
pieces together, failing to consider previous 
errors (i.e., building a tower rather than the 
same tower on the plan/ model card) 
Finishing Error: The child claims to 
be finished when there is a major 
discrepancy between the puzzle he/she 
built and the plan (model puzzle). 
“I’m done!” 
“Finished.” 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only. 
Goal Neglect: The child shows 
awareness of error but does not act 
accordingly. 
“This one is bigger (or a different 
color) than the one on the card” (but 
does not fix it). 
This behavior is evidenced through 
children’s verbalizations only. 
Repetition: The child repeats an 
incorrect placement or piece selection. 
This behavior is observed through the 
child’s actions. 
The child takes a green Wedgit block, tries 
and it doesn’t fit, removes it and immediately 
selects the same block again. 
Adapted from Whitebread, Pino-Pasternak, Marulis, Okkinga, & Vuillier, in preparation (whose coding scheme was adapted from Bryce & 
Whitebread, 2012 and Whitebread et al., 2009) 
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   Appendix 3.I: The Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders (HTKS) measure of Executive Function         
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Appendix 3.J: The Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT) measure of Expressive Language 
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CHAPTER IV 
A Dynamic Assessment (DA) Intervention for Facilitating Metacognitive Processing in 
Preschoolers  
Abstract 
This study focused on examining whether a Dynamic Assessment (DA) intervention would 
enhance the metacognitive skills of preschool-aged children and whether their metacognitive 
skills would predict their cognitive and pre-academic skills. Eighty-three diverse preschoolers 
(Mage=53.47 months) were randomly assigned to an intervention or comparison group to assess 
the facilitation of metacognitive processes. Children’s cognitive and metacognitive skills were 
assessed before and after participating in a DA intervention (or repeated exposure).  Children in 
the DA obtained significant gains on both cognitive and metacognitive skills whereas children in 
the comparison condition did not. Mediated/explicit instruction (within the DA) seemed to be 
most effective at facilitating metacognitive processes.  Children’s metacognitive skills were 
positively related to cognitive development and pre-academic functioning in language arts, 
mathematics, problem solving, and memory. Individual differences in metacognitive skills 
predicted children’s pre-academic functioning in language arts and mathematics. Children at risk 
for learning difficulties who had higher metacognitive skills also had higher cognitive and pre-
academic skills indicating that metacognition may serve as a protective factor. 
Keywords: Metacognition, Metamemory Knowledge, Dynamic Assessment, Early Childhood, 
SES Achievement Gap 
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A Dynamic Assessment (DA) Intervention for Facilitating Metacognitive Processing in 
Preschoolers  
Importance of Metacognition to Learning  
 Since its inception as a theoretical and empirical concept (Flavell, 1976), metacognition 
(Mc; cognition about cognition) has been conceptually tied to learning and cognition. In fact, the 
need to search for such a construct was due in large part to “learning failures”. In the seminal 
paper in which Flavell introduced the term “metacognition” (Flavell, 1976), he described the 
need for this new construct and area of research based on recent studies of problem-solving 
performances of children. He highlighted problem-solving as being the “central problem in 
learning and development, namely, how and under what conditions the individual assembles, 
coordinates, or integrates his already existing knowledge and skills into new functional 
organizations”, Flavell 1976, p. 231. However, he also pointed to the puzzling limited success of 
children’s problem-solving and speculated that this new and important concept was—at least in 
part—related to this: 
Resnick and Glaser’s research provides us with some striking examples of children 
failing to solve problems for which they possess the necessary solution procedures. They 
ought to solve these problems, we think, and yet they do not. Why not? My own guesses 
on the matter originate in the expected place, namely, the area in which I have done most 
of my recent research and thinking. This area is the development of metacognition 
(Flavell, 1976, p. 232). 
 Flavell continued to highlight the centrality of Mc to problem-solving, learning and 
cognition as he developed this new area of research further (Flavell 1979). Moreover, other 
prominent researchers endorsed the importance of this new field of research for learning and 
development and agreed that Mc was “at the very roots of the learning process,” (Brown 1987, p. 
66). Furthermore, researchers underscored the importance of Mc for addressing mechanisms of 
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change, development, and cognitive progress. For example, addressing children’s metacognitive 
processes during problem-solving would address “when to store information and how, where, 
and when to retrieve it… The "how" includes a variety of storage and retrieval strategies. The 
"where" refers to a variety of storage and retrieval resources (the child's head, the heads of 
others, and numerous nonhuman resources).  The "when" has already been alluded to, and may 
be pertinent to Resnick and Glaser's findings. It refers to the child's growing sense that such and 
such situations call for active, deliberate attempts to learn and store, and that so and so situations 
call for active, deliberate attempts to retrieve and apply what is in store”  (Flavell, 1976,  p. 233). 
 There have been many different conceptualizations of Mc from its original “thinking 
about thinking” conceptualization (Flavell, 1976) to “knowledge and regulation of cognition 
(Brown 1987) to a more nuanced “knowledge of: person (self); task; strategies (Flavell, 1979) to 
the more recent “control and monitoring of cognitive processes” (Nelson & Narens 1990).  
Generally, researchers agree that Mc can be conceptualized as the knowledge, regulation, and 
monitoring of cognitive processes, which is the way it is being used in this study. 
In the 1920s to early 1930s, well before the official appearance of the Mc construct, 
Vygotsky (1978, 1986) discussed—at great length—the importance of self-regulatory processes 
(such as the metacognitive skills Flavell later described) to development and learning. He 
consistently referred to the facilitative nature of these processes for moving to higher mental 
functioning: “Intellectualization of a function and voluntary control of it are just two moments of 
one and the same process of the formation of higher mental functions,” Vygotsky, 1986, p. 167).  
He made a clear distinction between the “lower” mental functions (such as perception, memory, 
and, attention) and “higher” (or “cultural” as he viewed them) mental functions which “appear 
gradually in a course of radical transformation of the lower functions” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. xi).  
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Vygotsky proposed that this “transformation” occurred through psychological tools such as 
language, (including: private / inner speech or expressive / communicative language.  
Empirical Evidence 
 
In addition to the robust theoretical and conceptual links between Mc and learning, there 
is substantial evidence implicating strong associations between Mc and greater levels (and depth) 
of learning and academic achievement across grade levels and even when controlling for other 
cognitive and self-regulated learning (SRL)1 factors (e.g., August, Flavell & Clift, 1984; 
Borkowski, Carr, & Pressley, 1987; Bransford, Brown & Cocking, 2000; Carr, Kurtz, Schneider, 
Turner & Borkowski, 1989; Garner, 1990). Moreover, though Mc is related to intelligence 
(Borkowski et al., 1987; Sternberg, 1984, 1985) it has been shown to outweigh intelligence in 
predicting learning performance (Demetriou, Gustafsson, Efklides, & Platsidou, 1992; Elshout, 
1987; Sternberg, 1985; Veenman & Beishuizen, 2004; Veenman, & Spaans, 2005). Further, the 
predictive strength of Mc is consistent across domains (e.g., Problem-solving: Davidson & 
Sternberg, 1998; Inductive reasoning: Prins, Veenman, & Elshout, 2006; Mathematics: Desoete, 
Roeyers, & Huylebroeck, 2006, Schoenfeld, 1992; Science: Georghiades, 2004, White & 
Frederiksen, 1998; Writing: Harris, Graham, Brindle, & Sandmel, 2009; and Reading 
comprehension: Palincsar & Brown, 1984, Pressley, 2002). Findings have also indicated that Mc 
was especially important for learning tasks within students’ zones of proximal development 
(ZPD; Vygotsky, 1978); when tasks were at the boundaries of their knowledge and abilities 
(Prins et al.,  2006).  Importantly concerning the current study, Mc has more recently been shown 
                                                            
1 The positive influence of Mc is not limited to academic learning. Mc has also been shown to have important associations to 
other positive life outcomes (e.g.,  relieving depression and other disorders such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, anxiety, and 
generally to making better life choices and decisions) (e.g., Fisher, 2009; 2011; Wells, 2008) but the focus of this study is on 
examining associations between Mc and cognitive development/academic learning 
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to influence even preschool-aged children’s cognitive ability and academic achievement 
(Shamir, Mevarech, & Gida, 2009; Whitebread, Bingham, Grau, Pasternak, & Sangster, 2007; 
Whitebread et al., 2009). Moreover, there is preliminary evidence that—neurologically, as well 
as behaviorally—Mc is associated with indicators of enhanced learning (i.e., error detection and 
correction responses related to progress monitoring) in preschool and primary school-aged 
children (Marulis, Kim, Grammer, Carrasco, Morrison, & Gehring, 2013; Rueda, Pozuelos, Paz-
Alonso, Combita-Merchan, & Abundis, 2011).   
Several meta-analytic reviews found robust evidence of the unique importance of Mc to 
learning and academic achievement across domains (Dignath, Buettner, & Langfeldt, 2008; 
Donker, Boer, Kostons, Dignath van Ewijk, & Van der Werf, 2014; Hattie, Biggs, & Purdie, 
1996; Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 1990). However, these studies focused on children in primary 
school and beyond, thus there remains limited information on: what different ways of measuring 
Mc can reveal, the associations between Mc and cognitive/academic success, and ways it is best 
facilitated, in younger children. This is what the current study was designed to address. 
 Nevertheless, metacognitive processes appear to be a fruitful avenue through which to 
intervene for enhanced learning and development. Providing potentially converging indications, 
Jacob & Parkinson (in preparation) conducted a meta-analysis to examine the effectiveness of 
executive function (EF) preschool interventions. They found that, overall, there was no effect of 
these well-designed interventions. One speculation as to why these interventions did not produce 
effects despite their proper designs and implementation was that none of the interventions 
included “metacognitive bridges” that helped the children learn how and when to apply the EF 
skills and strategies they learned in the interventions to the “real life” learning situations, similar 
to Resnick and Glaser’s research discussed in Flavell, 1976. Researchers continue to describe Mc 
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as a way for learners to acquire control over their own thinking and learning and, particularly 
when they are struggling or having problem-solving or cognitive failures and difficulties they 
such as described in Resnick and Glaser’s studies, and possibly the EF interventions described 
and analyzed in Jacob and Parkinson’s (in preparation) meta-analysis (Efklides & Sideridis, 
2009). This issue of application is at the forefront of several disciplines and has been called 
many things including: learning, transfer, strategy development, metastrategic knowledge, and 
conditional metacognition. Across the various conceptualizations, most searchers and 
educational practitioners view application as the highest aspiration of learning and development. 
An analogy to Mc as a catalyst can be drawn where Mc is seen as the fuel for fire. One needs 
content knowledge (i.e., oxygen in the analogy) and strategy knowledge (i.e., heat in the 
analogy) to learn, but in order to perform well and deeply understand a leaning task, one must 
know when and how to apply/regulate knowledge/strategies; in other words, be metacognitive 
(i.e., fuel in the analogy). The fuel is essential for a robust fire2.  
Intervening in the preschool years has been shown to be both more effective (e.g., 
Heckman & Masterov, 2007) and sustaining (e.g., Camilli, Vargas, Ryan, & Barnett, 2010; Li, 
Farkas, Duncan, & Burchinal, 2011) than intervening in kindergarten or later.  Consequently, the 
current study was designed to investigate the effectiveness of a scaffolded intervention targeting 
preschool-aged children’s metacognitive knowledge about a card recall task and associations to 
cognitive development and pre-academic functioning. Importantly, the intervention in this study 
was designed as a Dynamic Assessment (DA) intervention, and as such, mechanisms of change 
would more easily be detected compared to previous studies that have primarily relied on 
                                                            
2 This is not an exhaustive analogy, rather a cartoon as there are other important “ingredients” to learning such as 
motivation and emotional regulation, but I will argue that Mc (i.e., the fuel) is always an essential ingredient. 
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correlational analyses or standardized intervention.  
  Across many cultures, children between approximately 4-7 years undergo important 
developmental changes (Rimm-Kaufman & Pianta, 2000), which has historically been referred to 
as the “5-7 shift” (White, 1965). In particular, this developmental time is a sensitive period for 
learning related skills and SRL skills such as Mc and individual differences can be seen prior to 
formal schooling (Bronson, 2000). Consequently, this developmental period is ideal for 
intervening on these processes. Furthermore, because early cognitive skills have largely been 
underestimated due to the non-developmentally appropriate ways they were measured (for a 
review of this underestimation, see Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983), which is particularly pervasive 
in metacognition; many researchers persist in maintaining the later emergence of 7-8 years for 
metacognitive processes (Flavell, 1979; Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Veenman et al., 
2006). However, recent studies have shown robust evidence of Mc in preschool-aged children  
(Marulis et al., 2013, submitted; Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2005, 2007, 2009, in 
preparation). Due to this recent and growing body of evidence regarding the earlier emergence of 
metacognitive processes, it is important to examine this age group closely for evidence of Mc, its 
malleability, and associations and predictions to cognition and pre-academic achievement. 
Understanding how students develop critical skills that allow them to deliberately use 
specific mechanisms and supportive metaskills to control direct and plan their cognition and 
behavior has several implications for improving student academic achievement, beginning with 
school adjustment (e.g., Morrison, Ponitz, & McClelland, 2010).  The transition to formal 
instruction (instruction designed to raise a child’s skill level) typically occurs in kindergarten.  It 
is at this point that children begin to experience a variety of classroom requirements that call for 
the use of specific cognitive skills.  For example, children need to recruit Mc to apply 
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appropriate strategies to various learning tasks across domains (Rimm-Kaufman, Curby, Grimm, 
Nathanson, & Brock, 2009).   
Metacognition as a Protective Factor: Socioeconomic Status (SES) Achievement Gap 
Importantly, Mc may serve as a protective, or resilience, factor for children at risk for 
learning difficulties related to their low socioeconomic status (SES). Risk has been 
conceptualized as “an elevated probability of a negative or undesirable outcome in the future”, 
Masten & Gewirtz, 2006, p. 24. Related to development and learning, this typically means poor 
developmental outcomes such as delayed speech production, and low academic achievement. 
Risk factors for learning and development typically include low- socioeconomic status (SES), 
minority status, and maternal depressive symptoms. These risk factors, especially SES, have 
consistently been associated with academic achievement and the achievement gap between low-
SES and middle-SES children. Meta-analyses (Marulis & Neuman, 2010; 2013; Sirin, 2005; 
White, 1982) have found low family SES to be the risk factor most associated with learning 
difficulties. Furthermore, the achievement gap related to SES is .5 SD (Borman & Dowling, 
2010; Perry & McConney, 2010) and these effects can be detected as early as 9 months of age 
(Halle, Forry, Hair, Perper, Wandner, Wessel, & Vick, 2009).  Children from low-SES families 
tend to have lower SRL (including metacognitive) skills (Matthews, Kizzie, Rowley, & Cortina, 
2010; National Center for Education Statistics, 2001; Sektnan, McClelland, Acock, & Morrison, 
2010).   
Encouragingly, however, there are individuals who achieve positive outcomes despite 
these risk factors and have often been termed “resilient” in the literature. Related to this, 
researchers study these individuals for the “protective factors”, or environmental and individual 
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factors that “protect, buffer, or mediate risk in an individual, and promote resilience, which in 
turn promotes positive outcomes”, Raskind, 2014, p. 1. Importantly in regards to the current 
study, higher metacognitive skills, despite risk factors such as SES, have been associated with 
greater learning and academic achievement (Matthews et al., 2010; Sektnan et al., 2010), 
indicating that these skills may serve as resilience or protective factors that could potentially 
narrow the SES achievement gap  increasing equity. Moreover, some of these findings related to 
lower achievement and metacognitive skills in children from low-SES families may be due in 
large part to fewer mediated learning experiences (MLE; Feuerstein, Rand, & Hoffman, 1979) 
that will be discussed in greater detailed below.  Feuerstein and his colleagues (1979) argued that 
cognitive development was often masked in children from low-SES families due to limited 
exposure to MLE opportunities rather than the typical arguments related to low-SES 
environments (e.g., conditions of poverty, neurological impairment, emotional disturbances).  
Thus, this study was designed to address the SES achievement gap and the possibility that 
boosting children’s metacognitive experiences and supports during the MLE may increase their 
learning potential and performance (thus Mc may act as a protective or mediating factor).  
Theoretical Grounding 
The overarching theoretical framework for the current study incorporates both the 
information-processing theory of cognitive development—within which constructs like 
metamemory, Mc, and metacognitive strategies originated (e.g., beginning with research on 
cognitive processing and memory; Miller, 1956)—and sociocultural theory (Vygotsky, 1978) 
which has a tradition of literature that focuses mostly on what is conceptualized as self-
regulatory processes (including metacognitive aspects. Similar to Whitebread and colleagues 
(2009), this study is guided by an integration of these (traditionally disparate) theoretical lines. 
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Within the information-processing perspective, development is viewed mostly through 
the lens of maturational changes in children’s minds and brains (e.g., executive functioning or 
memory components that develop in line with the developing prefrontal cortex). These changes 
(i.e., development) are influenced by the way an individual process incoming information and, as 
children mature (and their brains/mind become more mature and developed), their ability to 
cognitively process becomes more advanced. Traditionally, a model of the mind from an 
information-processing perspective is analogous to that of a computer, though the evidence 
supporting this straightforward comparison is limited. Reliance solely on this perspective and its 
tenets, along with the issues inherent in the way Mc has traditionally been measured in young 
children, may be related to the pervasive view (with ample—though not comprehensive—
supporting evidence) that Mc does not develop until middle childhood (approximately age 7-8). 
This work and theoretical grounding provides one of the frames for my series of dissertation 
studies informing my theoretical perspective, approach, and interpretation.  
Within the sociocultural framework is the idea that children’s learning and development is 
enhanced through social interaction with more developed members of their culture (e.g., adults 
and “more capable peers”). Children are thought to develop from an external to an internalized 
focus mediated through this social interaction. A concept central to this perspective is the Zone 
of Proximal Development (ZPD) or “the distance between the actual developmental level as 
determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined 
through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” 
(Vygotsky 1978, p. 86).  Thus, mediated participation (e.g., scaffolded or supportive instruction) 
and interactions with adults or more able peers is reputed to can have a large impact on children's 
cognitive development that subsequently affects their long-term academic achievement (and 
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much research including Vygotsky’s own and that of his followers and beyond has supported this 
principle). These interactions often result in qualitative changes or “revolutionary 
breakthroughs” (Vygotsky, 1984, p. 249) in learning that are crucial to higher levels of 
development. Proposed mechanisms underlying these changes include a scaffolding transition in 
which the adult (or more capable peer) takes on the bulk of the metacognitive and self-regulatory 
processing (e.g., monitoring and regulating of cognition) but makes it explicit to the child/novice 
and gradually relinquishes these processes (with support and guidance) to the child so that the 
child begins to internalize the metacognitive and self-regulatory processes and apply them to 
learning contexts and tasks (Brown 1987; Palincsar & Brown, 1984). Parents and teachers who 
provide facilitative early experiences for young children can positively affect the developmental 
trajectory of young children's self-regulatory processes (Grolnick & Farkas, 2002).  Furthermore, 
the Ecological Systems and sociocultural theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Vygotsky, 1978) as well 
as a recent meta-analysis (Karreman, van Tuijl, van Aken & Dekovic´, 2006) point to the 
importance of socialization on children's social and cognitive development; children are thought 
to develop from an external to an internalized locus of control through social interaction.  
Research suggests that both parents (e.g., Fivush, 1992) and teachers (e.g., Brophy, 2004) can 
play an important role in socializing their children in a way that will facilitate their cognitive 
development (including self-regulation and academic performance). Thus, such influential adults 
may be mechanism for increasing children's academic outcomes. 
  Another prominent researcher, Reuven Feuerstein, has developed a parallel yet 
converging theory of development with similar underlying beliefs and mechanistic explanations. 
Feuerstein’s key theory (the Structural Cognitive Modifiability with a focus on Mediated 
Learning Experience) centers on the idea that cognitive development is dependent on the 
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“quality of the mediated learning that the child experiences” (Feuerstein et al., 1979, p. 102). 
Inherent in both Vygotsky and Feuerstein’s theories and beliefs is the fundamental assumption 
that cognitive development and capabilities/competences are dynamic and malleable rather than 
static or fixed. Relatedly, both researchers emphasize the importance of qualitative (conceptual) 
changes to reaching higher levels of cognitive functioning, development and learning.  
  Feuerstein empirically supported many of Vygotsky’s arguments by showing that 
mediated instruction—or “mediated learning experiences”—provided  to young children 
(particularly those at risk for learning difficulties such as those living in poverty or children who 
had been labeled “mentally retarded”),  greatly enhanced their cognitive development and 
learning. He showed that specific adult-mediated interactions helped children develop higher 
mental functions (that, in turn, fostered higher cognitive processing and progress) (Poehner, 
2005). Feuerstein subsequently developed an educational program called the “Instrumental 
Enrichment Program” that has robust empirical support for its benefits in enhancing the 
cognitive functions requisite for academic learning and achievement.  Similar to the concept of 
the ZPD, Feuerstein’s work focuses on the idea that social interactions mediate development and 
learning and, that in order to appropriately and comprehensively assess a child’s level of 
development or cognitive functioning, both her or his independent and mediated performance 
should be examined.  In fact, an examination of the effects of the Instrumental Enrichment 
Program (i.e., proving a rich mediated learning experience for children at-risk) indicates that 
children’s learning with adult-mediated support is more predictive of their 
knowledge/understanding/achievement than assessments of their independent performances 
(Poehner, 2005). 
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Much empirical work supports the idea underpinning the sociocultural/cognitive 
modifiability theories that adult-mediated interactions and instruction—when strategic and based 
on theories of cognitive change—is robustly effective across domains not only in increasing 
metacognitive and self-regulatory processes but also transfer to the performance task and beyond 
(e.g., Brown, Pressley, Van Meter & Schuder, 1996; Fuchs, Compton, Fuchs, Bouton, & Caffrey, 
2011; Fuchs, Fuchs, Compton, Bouton, Caffrey, & Hill, 2007; Perels, Merget-Kullmann, Wende, 
Schmitz, & Buchbinder, 2009; Whitebread, Pino Pasternak, Marulis, Okkinga, & Vuillier, in 
preparation). There is also evidence that similar results occur within peer-mediated contexts 
(when peers are trained in group regulatory and explanatory dialogue) (e.g., Palincsar & Brown, 
1984; Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., in preparation).  
An integration of the information 
-processing and sociocultural/cognitive modifiability theories will guide this study 
(cumulating in a DA intervention) in the following ways. The information-processing theory 
posits that information is organized and processed in specific ways by minds/brains. 
Accordingly, the way young children processed instructional information regarding 
metacognitive processes and strategies was investigated, as well as how presenting/mediating 
this information in various ways was associated with subsequent development and learning 
(Haywood & Lidz, 2007). The sociocultural/cognitive modifiability theoretical perspective 
suggests that the types of interactive environments children encounter can have a large impact on 
their cognitive development, subsequently affecting their learning and academic achievement. 
And, furthermore, that mediated-learning experiences are not only supportive of conceptual 
change and development, but indicative of a child’s developmental capacities and understanding 
(aligned with the ZPD). 
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Importantly, for this study, an integration of these theoretical perspectives is well-suited 
to addressing the overarching aim of investigating why some children are more responsive to 
education, experience, instruction and intervention than others (or, conversely, why some 
educational contexts, pedagogical orientations, types of experiences, instruction and intervention 
enhance the responsiveness of young children) and what is particularly important to enable and 
encourage children to be successful  academically.  
Stemming from an integration of the information-processing theory and 
sociocultural/cognitive modifiability theories, this study comprised multiple methods 
culminating in DA. DA involves a pre-test—socially-mediated intervention—post-test format in 
which assessment and instruction are conducted simultaneously to examine how adult-mediated 
interaction affects learners’ capabilities and competences (Haywood & Lidz, 2007). Unlike 
traditional assessment, DA aligns with Vygotsky’s conceptualization of the ZPD and 
Feuerstein’s Cognitive Modifiability, a more comprehensive indicator of children’s cognitive 
abilities and levels of development. Specifically, DA allows researchers to see into the 
“processes that lead to the person’s development and change” (Kozulin, 2012, p. xxii), and 
“focuses on a person’s learning potential and the modifiability of his or her cognitive functions” 
(Kozulin, 2012, p. xvi). Researchers have found that DA provides information (unlike traditional 
“static” assessment) about the processes learners undergo while they are solving problems 
(Hasson & Joffe, 2007) and that (unlike traditional “static” assessment) DAs can predict 
learners’ future development and learning (Jonsson, Mattheos, Svingby and Attstrom, 2007). 
Furthermore, DA has been shown to uniquely predict young children’s learning as well. 
Researchers found that a DA uniquely predicted first grade student’s responsiveness to reading 
instruction (or Responsiveness to Intervention, RTI; Fuchs et al., 2011).  For example, Fuchs and 
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colleagues found that the use of DA (see Fuchs et al., 2007 for a detailed description and 
protocol of the DA procedure) contributed unique variance (beyond established predictors of 
reading development such as letter and sound naming, elision, oral vocabulary, listening 
comprehension, and word attack, as well as other predictive measures such as sustaining 
attention and repressing impulsive behavior) to word identification and reading comprehension 
skills at the end of first grade.  
Mediated Learning Experiences 
Mediated Learning Experiences (MLE) highlight interactions between teachers and 
learners and what learners are able to learn from these experiences that are facilitated by 
teachers. During a MLE, the facilitator draws the learners’ attention specifically to aspects of the 
learning experience that she or he deems most helpful for the learner to move her or him to the 
“next level of learning,”, or for learning new applications of a learning task (Feuerstein, Rand, 
Hoffman, & Miller, 1980). The MLEs are similar to Vygotsky’s (1978) notion of the ZPD, 
where “actualization of cognitive development depends on the individual’s experience in social 
interaction with a more competent or capable person”, Seabi, Cockcroft, & Fridjhon, 2009, p. 
164. MLEs are continually being scaffolded by the facilitator and learner; the learner provides 
feedback by responding to the instruction and the facilitator responds by adjusting the mediation 
accordingly during the assessment and so on. MLEs can be naturally occurring experiences, such 
as parental interactions with their children, as well as intentional learning experiences in school. 
MLEs are one example of a DA type of instructional assessment. The ones used in this study is 
similar to the MLE, though more structured and based in empirical work and task analyses as 
described. 
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Graduated Prompt Method (GPM) 
 Similarly, the graduated prompt method (GPM; Campione & Brown, 1987) is a method 
for assessing and instructed students that aligns with Vygotsky’s ZPD concept (1978).  However, 
the GPM is more scripted than the MLE method where there are predetermined cues and 
prompts scripted that are pre-tested in a hierarchical order, with the examiner/facilitator 
providing increasing levels of support (e.g., see Haywood & Lidz, 2007). The DA used in the 
current study is an adapted GPM. There was a predetermined structured hierarchical script that 
was used with every child and increasing levels/types of supports were used. However, the 
instructional supports were specifically developed based on a task analysis (i.e., regarding meta-
memory) of what was needed to succeed on the task (card recall) based on previous empirical 
studies. Consequently, the DA intervention in this study was a combination of a GPM DA and a 
more standard intervention based on empirically-driven principles. 
DA: Metacognitive Mediated Instruction 
The three types of mediated instructional support in the current DA were chosen based on 
a task analysis regarding conceptual change, and more specifically, cognitive requisites for the 
card recall task used in this study, which indicated that, in young children, the most likely 
candidates for enhancing metacognitive and cognitive (i.e., metamemory and memory) 
performance were: 1. Elicitation of self-explanation (e.g., Crowley & Siegler, 1999; Feuerstein et 
al., 1980; Siegler & Lin, 2009; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2004), 2. Prompts/hints (e.g., Black & 
Rollins, 1982; Feuerstein et al., 1980; Haywood & Lidz, 2007) and 3. Explicit instruction (e.g., 
Bjorklund, & Harnishfeger, 1987; Fabricius & Hagen, 1984; Grammer, Coffman, & Ornstein, 
2013; Marulis & Neuman, 2010, 2013).   
Memory-related strategies 
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Moreover, to develop the instructional supports for the DA intervention, a task analysis 
and literature review was conducted. Studies have shown that though there are naturally 
occurring developmental changes in children’s metamemory, mnemonic or memory-related 
strategies (Schneider & Pressley, 1997), social interactions with peers and adults plays an 
important role in the development of these skills (Moely et al., 1992; Coffman, Ornstein, 
McCall, & Curran, 2008; Reese, Haden, & Fivush, 1993). In particular, these studies have found 
evidence that teacher’s metacognitive and strategy-related language in the context of instruction 
(Coffman et al., 2008) was associated with children’s independent abilities to recall information 
and successfully use mnemonic strategies. Again, this aligns with Vygotsky’s work suggesting 
that cognitive processes are enhanced through social interactions.  
Around preschool, children are beginning to be more strategic and developing a greater 
ability for memory. In one study 4-year-old children were more purposeful about remembering 
objects that they were told they needed to remember compared to objects with which they were 
told to play (Baker-Ward, Ornstein, & Holden, 1984). Also, 2-year olds have used simple 
strategies when asked to remember the location of objects (DeLoache, Cassidy, & Brown, 1985). 
 There is robust evidence indicating that children can successfully be trained to learn to 
use the memory strategies of rehearsal, organizational, and elaboration, and subsequently, that 
they benefit from using these strategies. Nevertheless, young children typically do not transfer 
these strategies to other contexts (Grammer, Coffman, & Ornstein, 2013).  Thus, an intervention 
such as the one in this study that incorporated metacognitive processing that teach children how 
and when to use strategies and why they are important may have the potential to help children 
learn not only to gain skills but to generalize them. 
The Current Study  
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The main focus of the current study was to investigate the effectiveness of a DA 
intervention for facilitating metacognitive processes in preschool-aged children. Related to this 
was the focus on examining whether individual differences in executive functioning and 
expressive language skills, and family background differences (i.e., children in the tuition-based 
preschools compared to children in the Great Start Readiness Program [GSRP] need-based 
classrooms) were associated with metacognitive processing. Finally, this study was designed to 
address whether metacognitive processes were associated with and predictive of cognitive and 
pre-academic skills.  Specifically, three research questions were addressed. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
  The first research question was: How malleable are children’s metacognitive processes? 
Specifically, how effective is a DA intervention in facilitating metacognitive processes in 
preschool-aged children? And, what does DA reveal about mechanisms that facilitate 
metacognitive development in preschool-aged children? It was hypothesized that the children’s 
metacognitive processes would be malleable during this preschool period when similar SRL and 
EF skills have been shown to be flexible and modifiable through well-designed interventions 
(e.g., Barnett, Jung, Yarosz, Thomas, Hornbeck, Stechuk, & Burns, 2008; Diamond, Barnett, 
Thomas, & Munro, 2007; Perels et al., 2009).  Though there are limited studies that have 
examined Mc in preschool-aged children, recent studies have found that metacognitive processes 
are emerging at this age (Marulis et al., submitted; Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007, 
2009).  Consequently, conducting a DA—designed to facilitate these processes—during the 
preschool years was predicted to be a powerful way to intervene and explore the ways that 
mediated instruction promoted development of metacognitive processes. Though DAs typically 
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do not focus on metacognitive processes explicitly as their outcome measures, targeting instead 
specific content area such as reading development (Fuchs et al., 2011; Fuchs et al., 2007) or 
sequential pattern completion (Haywood & Lidz, 2007), metacognitive functions are the 
processes being targeted by mechanisms of the DA itself.  Accordingly, it “can be worthwhile to 
explore how well these functions can be facilitated within the context of DA”, Haywood & Lidz, 
2007, p. 91. For example, in the sequential pattern completion DA (Haywood & Lidz, 2007), 
children are supported in making patterns with shapes (i.e., yellow triangle, blue triangle, yellow 
triangle, ____). The DA focuses on patterns and what they are: “A pattern tell us when 
something happens again and again.  Patterns helps us figure out what comes next”, Haywood & 
Lidz, 2007, p. 170. Thus, the mediation targets pattern making skills. However, within this, much 
of dialogue focuses on enhancing metacognitive processes related to pattern completion skills, 
e.g., “Why did you pick that one? Why was that the best one?” Haywood & Lidz, 2007, p. 170, 
after a child chooses a correct shape. Also, one of the emphases during the pattern completion 
DA task is to teach and support the child to ask her or himself “What comes next”, which is a 
self-questioning metacognitive technique to use while problem-solving.   
One related study (Lange & Pierce, 1992) successfully trained 4-5 year olds to use using 
memory strategies. Lange and Pierce (1992) provided the children with a “brief period of 
metacognitive instruction about why the strategy is effective and how, when and where to use 
it,” Lange & Pierce, 1992, p. 460. They found that the children’s memory strategies (specifically, 
taxonomic sorting) significantly increased and maintained several days later. Given that the DA 
is a brief 5- minute metacognitive instruction training (and includes mediated support backed by 
theoretical and empirical grounding) and the children in the current study are the same age as 
those in Lange & Pierce (1992), the results were expected to be similar. 
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The second research question was whether individual differences in executive 
functioning (Head Toes Knees Shoulders; HTKS) or expressive language (Expressive 
Vocabulary Test; EVT) would predict metacognitive performance in preschoolers. Though Mc 
and executive function (EF) are conceptually related, there is limited research that integrates the 
two constructs (e.g., Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000) and none with preschool-aged 
children, which is a gap in the current literature (Marulis, Baker, Basilio, & Whitebread, in 
preparation). Nevertheless, theories of both Mc and EF propose that these constructs operate by 
modulating lower level processes (that, without a higher-order cognition or  “meta” skill 
‘executive’ would be tied to external stimuli) and adding greater flexibility to cognition. Also, 
both involve monitoring and regulating input needed for voluntary, goal-directed action; for 
example, in a school setting, asking a teacher for help when needed, which involves being 
attentive to one's thinking and aware of one's abilities in relation to the task at hand and then 
inhibiting other behaviors and thoughts in order to enact a remedial strategy. It follows that Mc 
and EF would be interdependent across development. For example, if a child is aware that a task 
is far above her or his ability (e.g., has accurate metacognitive knowledge about herself or 
himself and the task), she or he would be more likely to attend to her or his progress more 
closely and put forth more effortful inhibitory control on this challenging task. However, it is 
also clear that these could operate distinctly; this child could be fully metacognitively aware but 
unable to exert the appropriate effort/attention or inhibit classroom distractors.3 There is 
empirical evidence that Mc and EF are associated in primary-school-aged children (Roebers, 
Cimeli, Röthlisberger & Neuenschwander, 2012; Roebers & Spiess, 2013; Whitebread, 1999). 
                                                            
3 Other skills such motivation could play a strong part in this scenario as well of course. For example, the child may 
have the metacognitive knowledge and EF ability but be unwilling/uninterested to exert the needed effort or seek 
help. However, for the purposes of this study, I am focusing on Mc and EF within the SRL construct. 
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However, it is an open empirical question as to how Mc and EF are related in preschoolers and 
whether/how much they work together to influence various aspects of cognition and pre-
academic achievement. It was hypothesized that these skills would be related in the preschool-
aged children and that the EF measure would predict the metacognitive processing skills of the 
preschoolers.  
Expressive vocabulary (i.e., the size of a child’s vocabulary that he or she is able to 
articulate) has also been shown to be associated with metacognitive development (Lockl & 
Schneider, 2006; Lockl & Schneider, 2007). Expressive language tasks typically involve asking 
children to describe, label, or provide another name for a picture that is shown to them. 
Therefore, It was hypothesized that the preschoolers’ scores on the EVT would be associated 
with and predict their scores on the metacognitive tasks (i.e., the McK questions and the McK 
strategies).  
The third research questions were: How are preschoolers’ metacognitive skills related to 
cognitive development and pre-academic functioning? Do metacognitive skills serve as a 
protective factor for young children at risk for learning difficulties?  
As discussed earlier, associations between Mc and cognitive skills have been well 
established (e.g., Borkowski, Carr, & Pressley, 1987; Bransford, Brown & Cocking, 2000; 
Desoete, Roeyers, & Huylebroeck, 2006; Georghiades, 2004; Rueda et al., 2011; White & 
Frederiksen, 1998), including recent evidence from studies with preschool-aged children 
(Marulis et al., 2013, submitted; Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread, Bingham, Grau, Pasternak, & 
Sangster, 2007; Whitebread et al., 2009), and meta-reviews (Dignath et al., 2008; Wang et al., 
1990). Hence, the hypothesis for this study was that associations would be present between Mc 
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and cognition (on a card recall task) and pre-academic functioning as well. In addition, It was 
hypothesized that the children’s metacognitive skills would uniquely predict both their cognitive 
and pre-academic (language arts and mathematics) skills. 
Research indicates that children with high self-regulatory skills perform better 
cognitively and academically than children with low self-regulation regardless of the presence of 
risk factors such as minority status, low maternal education, single-parent family, English 
language learner (ELL), low income, and longer periods of high maternal depressive symptoms 
(Matthews, Kizzie, Rowley, & Cortina, 2010; Sektnan et al., 2010). Therefore, SRL skills have 
been linked with high academic achievement for children in the face of various environmental 
factors shown to typically negatively impact academic achievement, suggesting these skills may 
serve as potential protective and facilitative factors. Thus, it was hypothesized that, in this study, 
the children in the GSRP classroom who had high metacognitive functioning would also have 
high cognitive and pre-academic scores (higher than their peers who scored lower on the 
metacognitive tasks).  
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 83 children (42.74-68.60 months, Mage=53.47 months SD=4.53; 41% 
female) from seven preschool classrooms in Southeastern Michigan. Four teachers—each with a 
dedicated paraprofessional—taught the preschool classes as follows; One teacher taught a PreK 
academy for 4-5 year olds, which was an all-day program held every week day. However, not 
every child attended every week day; some children attended Mondays, Wednesdays, and 
Fridays only for example. Another teacher taught a typical half-day (tuition-based) preschool 
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class in which children attended different days/times based on age. This program included a 3 to 
young-4 year old group which attended preschool on Monday and Wednesday mornings, a 4 
year old group which attended preschool on Monday and Wednesday afternoons, and a 4.5-late 5 
year old group which attended preschool on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday morning to early 
afternoons. The other two teachers taught a Great Start Readiness Program (GSRP), which is 
federally funded program similar to the Head Start program. Eligibility for this program is 
determined by age (children must be 4 years old and would not turn 5 before November 1st of the 
year of entrance), by income, and or other difficult family situations. The GSRP classrooms were 
half-day programs that were held Mondays through Thursdays in the mornings and afternoons.  
Across the seven classrooms, there were 108 children who were eligible for my study 
based on age (between 3-5 years old). I participated in the PreK academy, preschool, and GSRP,  
parent orientations, including a presentation of what my study would entail, how I would partner 
with the school and district and the potential benefits of the research. After the presentations, I 
asked parents to fill in the consent forms (indicating whether they were or were not interested in 
having their children participate in my study). Over 90% of the parents (99/108) returned the 
consent forms indicating they were interested in having their children participate in my study. 
Prior to beginning my assessments, I spent two weeks in the children’s classrooms to build a 
rapport and get to know the children and their teachers. During this time, it became apparent that 
another 15 children would not be eligible to participate—despite their parental permission—
because they were English Language Learners (ELL) still learning basic English words. 
Furthermore, one child did not want to participate even with much encouragement from her 
teacher and me. Thus, the final sample was 83 children. There was no missing data or attrition 
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over the month of this study. The final sample was 46% White, 27% Black, 8% Asian, 6% Bi-
racial, 11% Chaldean, and 2% Hispanic.   
Assignment to Conditions  
Because the principal aim of this study was to examine whether and how the DA 
facilitated metacognitive processing, the majority of the sample was assigned to the intervention 
group. However—to address practice/test-retest effects (Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, & 
Moriarty Gerrard, 2007) in other words, to be able to make a stronger claim that any result was 
due to the intervention—a modest comparison group (25% of the sample) was included; using 
stratified randomization (across the GSRP and Tuition classrooms), 62 children were assigned to 
the intervention condition and 21 to the comparison group. 
Data Collection Procedure 
All children were individually assessed in two 15-20 minute sessions. The first session 
was the card recall DA intervention for the Experimental group/repeated exposure for the 
Comparison group (COMP). Additionally, all children were assessed using McK Questions 
related to the card recall task.  Specifically, the first session was designed as a test—mediated 
intervention or repeated exposure—re-test DA. The following steps were undertaken: 
1. Pretest: The card recall task with McK questions (see Appendix 4.A). 
2. DA/COMP: The 62 children in the intervention condition then participated in a DA 
mediated intervention with the card recall. The 21 children in the comparison condition 
participated in a repeated exposure card recall task (same as the pre-test but for 5 rather 
than 2 minutes) (using a different set of—conceptually and perceptually similar—cards4). 
Briefly, the DA (which will be described in detail below) entailed:  
                                                            
4 See Appendix 4.B for the entire set of 27 cards (3 sets of 9) 
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a. The first type of support consisted of asking children for self-explanations. For 
example asking: “What types of things could help you remember more cards?; 
“What kinds of things have helped you remember things before?” 
b. The second type provided prompts/hints. For example, saying: “Other children 
have said that sorting the cards by the type of picture helped them remember the 
cards better. Do you think that would be helpful?” 
c. The third type was explicit instruction on using strategies. For example, telling 
the children: “Try sorting the cards by the type of picture; that will help you 
remember them.”5 
3. Post-test: The original card recall task with McK questions (same as the pre-test with a 
different but conceptually and perceptually similar set of cards. 
The second session focused on executive functioning, expressive vocabulary, and pre-
academic functioning assessment measures. The executive functioning and expressive 
vocabulary measures were designed to be covariates and potential moderators in these analyses 
while the pre-academic functioning measures were designed to function as outcome measures to 
which the metacognitive measures would be used to predict. Specifically, executive functioning 
was measured using the Head, Toes, Knees, Shoulders (HTKS) task and expressive vocabulary 
using the Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT) to be described in detail below. As described 
earlier, executive function and expressive language skills are often related to metacognitive 
processes in children.  
Measures.   
                                                            
5 The specific types of instructional support were adapted from the DA protocols used by Haywood and Lidz (2007) 
with preschool-aged children and based on empirical work by studies such as Fabricius & Hagen (1984) related to 
causal attribution of a strategy. For example, I included “Try sorting the cards by the type of picture; that will help 
you remember them” in the DA as a causal attribution in the explicit instruction portion of the DA support. Often 
young children how limited implementation of learned strategies even when they have been able to state and 
demonstrate knowledge of the effectiveness of the strategy (e.g. Salatas & Flavell, 1976).  Nevertheless, when 
making explicit attributions (or connections between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills such as 
monitoring) children are more likely to continue the use of successful strategies or even successfully transfer the use 
of strategies (e.g., Fabricius & Hagen, 1984). This empirically-driven principle was incorporated into the more 
traditional (Haywood & Lidz, 2007) DA intervention.   
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Cognitive task: Card recall task. To appropriately assess Mc with young children, it is 
important to have a contextualized cognitive task about which to be metacognitive (see Marulis, 
Palincsar, Berhenke, & Whitebread, submitted for more details). An individually-administered 
memory card recall task was used for this purpose. This card recall memory task was adapted 
from Shamir et al., 2009 and Haywood & Lidz, 2007, both of whom used similar tasks with 
preschool-aged children. The card recall task was used as a pre-test, a DA or COMP (repeated 
exposure comparison task), and a post-test. In each of the three instances, a set of nine cards was 
used, each with three sets of three superordinate categories (e.g., three toys, three vehicles, and 
three pieces of clothing). Thus, there were 27 cards total. The cards were counterbalanced across 
versions A and B; see Appendix 4.A and 4.B. The superordinate categories were chosen based 
on the items used in Rosch and Mervis’ experiments (1975) and Rosch (1975) for being the most 
familiar to young children. 
Specifically, for the pre- and post-tests, each child was shown each of the nine picture 
cards in a randomized (mixed or non-grouped) order and asked what each card depicted (i.e.,: “Tell 
me what this is a picture of”). If the child did not know or named the picture incorrectly, she or 
he was told the correct name. If the child named something that was close and was correct within 
the category (e.g., labeling “peas” beans, which is still a vegetable), she or he was not corrected 
and the same term was used with the child throughout the task. After all of the named cards were 
placed on the table in front of the child, she or he was told that she or he would need to 
remember the names of the cards and that the cards would be hidden in a few minutes6. After 
two minutes (with no instructions or assistance), the cards were collected and the child was asked 
                                                            
6 See Appendix 4.C for detailed instructions 
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to recall the picture cards. She or he was given one point per card accurately remembered (0-9 
points possible; see Appendix 4.C). Specifically, the following steps were undertaken for the pre-
, comparison repeated exposure, and post-tests (the DA intervention will be described in detail in 
a subsequent section): 
1. Pre-test 
a. Card recall and McK questions: Each child will be given nine named cards (Set A7) 
and told that they will need to remember the cards by name (adapted from Shamir et 
al., 2009). The child will first be asked to name each object, then given two minutes 
(without instructions or assistance) with the cards after which time the cards will be 
collected and the child will be asked to recall the names of the pictures on the cards 
(One point will be given per card accurately recalled). Next, each child will be asked 
what they did to remember the cards and responses will be scored for metacognitive 
knowledge (similar to the McKI). Further, performances will be assessed for 
metacognitive behaviors displayed during the task. For example, cards sorted into 
three categorical piles would be considered a metacognitive strategy (i.e., strategy 
that reflects awareness of what may improve recall performance).  
i. Do: Place Set A in front of the child in a randomized (mixed or non-grouped) 
order. 
ii. Say: (adapted from Haywood & Lidz, 2007): For the intervention group: 
“Now, we are going to work together on a picture game. I am going to ask you 
to play the game all by yourself first and then I get to be teacher and we’ll 
work together on it. Then I will ask you to do it all by yourself again. Okay? 
Are you ready to play?” For the comparison group: “Now, you are going to 
work on a picture game. I am going to ask you to play the game by yourself 
three times. Okay? Are you ready to play? [Wait for child to assent; 
prompt/encourage if needed]. “Okay, let’s start. Here are some pictures. 
First, tell me the name of each picture” [Wait to see if the child knows the 
name of each picture; if not, provide it and ask the child to repeat it]. “Now, 
we’re going to play a hide and remember game. In a few minutes, I’m going 
to hide these pictures, and then you will need to remember and tell me the 
names of the pictures that were here. Okay? [Once child assents/is ready, set 
the timer for two minutes; after it beeps, collect/hide the cards and continue] 
“Okay, time is up. Now, tell me the names of the pictures”. Great! Now, 
please tell me what you did to remember the cards. [If the child says 
“nothing” or “I don’t know” prompt them to think again or tell what they did 
before I collected the cards]. Do you think that helped you remember the 
                                                            
7 See Appendix 4.B 
 233 
 
pictures? Why?” If child did a non-verbal behavior (e.g., mental rehearsal 
silently or visualizing- e.g., he or she seemed to be doing something 
cognitive/thinking but it is non-verbal and thus difficult to discern), say: “I 
noticed you were looking up [or whatever the child is doing], “what were you 
doing when you did that?” 
 
1. COMP: Repeated Exposure (Comparison group only) 
a. Card recall/ McK questions (same procedure as pre-test using Set B8) 
i. Do: Place Set B in front of the child in a randomized (mixed or non-grouped) 
order.  
[Identical to the card recall/ McK questions pre-test, each child will be given 
nine cards and told that they will need to remember the cards by name. The 
only difference between this administration and the pre- and post-test 
administration is that the children will be given 5 instead of 2 minutes to be 
comparable to the DA mediated intervention] 
ii. Say: (adapted from Haywood & Lidz, 2007): “Here are some new pictures. 
Please tell me the names of these pictures” [Wait to see if the child knows the 
name of each picture; if not, provide it and ask the child to repeat it]. Say: 
“Like before, I’ll hide these cards again and you will need to remember and 
tell me the names of the pictures that were here. This time in 5 minutes. Okay? 
iii. Provide 5 minutes to be comparable to the DA mediated discussion before 
removing/hiding the cards, then ask the child to recall the pictures and record 
her/his score. 
[Once child assents/is ready, set the timer for two minutes; after it beeps, 
collect/hide the cards and continue] “Okay, time is up. Now, tell me the names 
of the pictures”. Great! Now, please tell me what you did to remember the 
cards. [If the child says “nothing” or “I don’t know” prompt them to think 
again or tell what they did before I collected the cards]. Do you think that 
helped you remember the pictures? Why?” If child did a non-verbal behavior 
(e.g., mental rehearsal silently or visualizing- e.g., he or she seemed to be 
doing something cognitive/thinking but it is non-verbal and thus difficult to 
discern), say: “I noticed you were looking up [or whatever the child is doing], 
“what were you doing when you did that?” 
2.  Post-test 
a. Card recall/ McK questions (same procedure as pre-test using Set C9) 
i. Do: Place Set C in front of the child in a randomized (mixed or non-grouped) 
order. 
ii. Say: “Here are some new pictures. Please tell me the names of these pictures” 
(Once again helping if she/he is unable to accurately name the pictures). Then 
                                                            
8 See Appendix 4.B 
9 See Appendix 4.B 
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say: “In a few minutes, I’ll hide these again and you will need to remember and 
tell me the names of the pictures that were here. Okay? [Once child assents/is 
ready, set the timer for two minutes; after it beeps, collect/hide the cards and 
continue] “Okay, time is up. Now, tell me the names of the pictures”. Great! Now, 
please tell me what you did to remember the cards. [If the child says “nothing” or 
“I don’t know” prompt them to think again or tell what they did before I collected 
the cards]. Do you think that helped you remember the pictures? Why?” If child 
did a non-verbal behavior (e.g., mental rehearsal silently or visualizing- e.g., he or 
she seemed to be doing something cognitive/thinking but it is non-verbal and thus 
difficult to discern), say: “I noticed you were looking up [or whatever the child is 
doing], “what were you doing when you did that?”  
 
Metacognitive knowledge questions (McK Questions). Next, to assess children’s 
metacognitive knowledge about the card recall task, each child was asked what she or he did to 
recall the cards and whether what she or he did to remember the cards helped (see Appendix 4.A 
for entire protocol). These questions were adapted from Shamir and colleagues (2009) task and 
extended. Responses were be scored on a scale of 0-2—as was the Metacognitive Knowledge 
Interview (McKI; see Chapter II, Marulis et al., submitted)—based on the level of Mc present.  
  Moreover, performances were coded for metacognitive knowledge strategies displayed 
during the task (adapted from Haywood & Lidz, 2007). Children received 1 point for each type 
of metacognitive knowledge strategy they used (while indicating knowledge of the helpfulness of 
that strategy for the card recall task) without assistance. The strategies that were included were: 
separating the cards into categories, repeating the card names/rehearsing, talking about 
details/elaborating, spontaneously recalling cards by category, using visualization of location as 
a clue and other. For example, repeating the names of the cards on their own, and saying “Oh, 
that’s going to help me remember them!” An example that was coded as an “other” strategy was 
sounding out words and sorting by words that started with the same sound (rather than 
categorically) and saying: “Saying these sounds helps me think about the cards! I’m going to 
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remember all of them now!” For all strategies except for “spontaneously recalls items by 
category/family”, the child’s response was coded dichotomously. Each child was given 1 point- 
when she or he displayed strategy (no matter how many times) or no points if she or he did not 
display the strategy during the card recall task. For “spontaneously recalls items by 
category/family”, each child was given 1 point if the following conditions were met: The child 
recalled two or three pictures in the same category/family (e.g., Pets/Animals: dog, cat, rabbit) in 
the same phrase (without any pauses) or the child recalled all three pictures in the same category/ 
family with pauses in between (but no extra pictures in between) or the child named the 
category/family, e.g., “Pets” and paused in between naming the actual two or three pictures. The 
child received no points if she or he did not recall the pictures in categories/families at all (or did 
not mention that recalling them in groups helped her or him remember) or recalled two pictures 
in the same category/ family with pauses in between. For the “separated into categories” code, 
each child received 1 point if she or he separated two or three cards into a category/family away 
from other cards and said that this would help her or him remember the cards or separated three 
cards into a category/family within a full group or cards saying this would help her or him 
remember. For example, if a child sorted the dog, cat, and rabbit into one pile and said “I will 
remember more pictures if I put them together like this. They’re all animals!” These types of 
behaviors were considered displaying metacognitive strategies (i.e., strategies that reflected 
awareness of what would improve recall performance). Two researchers independently coded 
30% of the sample for the McK questions and strategies. Agreement between coders was high 
for both the questions (intraclass correlation coefficient [ICC] =.89) and strategies (ICC =.95).  
See Appendix 4.D.  
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Pre-academic performance. The Woodcock-Johnson III tests of Letter-Word 
Identification (LW) and Applied Problems (AP) (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) were 
used to assess children’s pre-academic performance (pre-academic achievement) in language arts 
and mathematics (see Appendix 4.E).  The LW tested children's identification skills through 
identification of increasingly difficult isolated letters and words while the AP test measured 
children's ability to analyze and solve practical problems in mathematics with increasing 
difficulty.  Both tests had high levels of internal consistency (α = .94-.98).   
Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders (HTKS). The HTKS assessment task (Ponitz, McClelland, 
Connor, Jewkes, Farris, & Morrison, 2008; Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews, & Morrison, 2009) is 
an established and validated behavioral self-regulation instrument that is administered to 
individual children to measures executive function skills (see Appendix 4.F).  This measure taps 
into the executive function skills that are believed to underlie self-regulation and are necessary 
for self-regulated learning. Using the HTKS task, children were asked to remember behavioral 
commands (e.g., “touch your toes”) and respond with an action that is in conflict with these 
commands (e.g., child must touch their head when they hear the command “touch your toes”). In 
this way, children needed to recruit their working memory regarding the commands and response 
inhibition in order to inhibit their dominant response to follow the command. Furthermore, as the 
task get increasingly difficult, children needed to recruit cognitive flexibility (i.e., the commands 
switch at the end so that when asked to “touch your toes”, the child must touch their shoulders 
instead of their head). Children received 2 points for correct responses (i.e., touching their head 
when asked to touch their toes); incorrect responses earn 0 points, and 1 point is given if children 
self-correct their response.  Scores range from 0 to 40 on the HTKS, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of behavioral regulation.  Recent work has established strong reliability 
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and validity on the HTKS task (McClelland et al., 2008; Ponitz et al., 2008). McClelland et al. 
(2008) reported inter-rater reliability for the Head-to-Toes short version of this measure to be 
0.95, and Ponitz et al. (2009) report 75% consistency across examiners in scoring the HTKS.  In 
addition, construct validity was established with parent ratings of attentional focusing and 
inhibitory control, two cognitive components believed to be tapped by HTKS.  Ponitz et al. 
(2009) reported that children with higher scores on the HTKS in fall of kindergarten received 
higher ratings on attentional focusing, and inhibitory control. In addition, children rated higher in 
the spring by their kindergarten teachers on the behavioral regulation scale of the Child Behavior 
Rating Scale earned higher HTKS scores in the spring. 
Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT). The EVT (Williams, 1997) is a standardized norm-
referenced (conormed with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III; PPVT-III; Dunn & Dunn, 
1997) test of expressive vocabulary for children through adults (ages 2.5-90). The EVT is 
indivivdually administered and takes approximately 5-10 minutes for preschool-aged children. 
The EVT has two sections: labeling and synonyms. Using the EVT, the experimenter asked the 
children to look at pictures (see Appendix 4.G) and provide a one-word response describing what 
was in the picture. In the next section, children were asked for synonyms. They were told a one-
word name for a picture and were asked to provide another one-word word for the same picture 
(see Appendix 4.G). 
Importantly for this study, EF and Mc skills tend to be intertwined early in development 
and are difficult to parse. Moreover, they both play important roles to cognitive development and 
academic functioning. Thus, EF variables were included in the regression models predicting 
metacognitive, cognitive, and pre-academic skills. In addition, expressive language is a strong 
predictor of metacognitive skills, particularly declarative/articulated metacognition (e.g., Lockl 
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& Schneider, 2006, 2007). Thus, it was essential to include an expressive language measure as a 
covariate in the current analyses. The EVT was chosen for this purpose as it is appropriate and 
normed for use with preschool aged children and includes both labeling and synonym segments 
providing a comprehensive depiction of young children expressive vocabulary. In addition, to 
address the last research question, the HTKS and EVT were included as potential moderators to 
examine the potential variance within children’s response to the DA. 
Dynamic Assessment Intervention during the Card Recall Task 
DA procedure. As described earlier, the general procedure for the DA intervention 
followed a card recall—mediated DA card recall post-test design with McK questions posed to 
the children after the card recall task (see the previous section on the card recall task for the pre- 
and post-test procedures that occurred before and after the DA intervention). The entire 
intervention spanned 5 minutes and involved the following specific directions: 
1. Do: Place Set B in front of the child  
2. Say: (adapted from Haywood & Lidz, 2007): “Now it’s my turn to be teacher. We’re 
going to talk about how to remember what we see. Here are some new pictures. 
Please tell me the names of these pictures” [Wait to see if the child knows the name 
of each picture; if not, provide it and ask the child to repeat it]. Say: “Like before, 
you’re going to have to remember the names of these pictures after a few minutes. 
Okay? So, we should do something to help remember the pictures. Okay?  
3. After child assents, start the first type of DA mediated-instruction: Self-explanation 
Questioning—intended to elicit self-explanations regarding strategy usage—with the 
child: I wonder what you could do that would help you remember the names of the 
pictures better. What do you think?” [Wait and respond to child’s response. If she/he 
does not offer a strategy or says “I don’t know”, prompt with: “If you want to 
remember all of these pictures, how can you do that? Then, “What kinds of things 
have helped you remember things before? How do you think that helped? I wonder 
 239 
 
what would be most helpful. What do you think?” Continue using these questions that 
elicit self-explanations until the child offers (or starts to enact) a strategy. If needed, 
use practical encouraging prompts such as: “Just give your best answer” What’s one 
thing you can think of that would help you remember the pictures?” The strategy 
offered or enacted by the child may or may not be a strategy known to be effective for 
recall (i.e., one with empirical support from memory research with young children 
such as 1. Rehearsal 2. Categorical grouping 3. Visual imagery 4. Creating 
stories/elaboration - these are in developmental order). As the child talks about/enacts 
the strategy, say: “Hmmm, I wonder if that will help you remember. Let’s try/keeping 
trying” and ask the child to demonstrate the strategy with the cards if she/he hasn’t 
already; as the child demonstrates, ask “Is that helping you to remember? Why?” If 
child discontinues the strategy, say: “Can you remind me what you are doing to help 
you remember the pictures? Do you think it is helping? If child continues with 
strategy, ask specific questions about it. For example, if they are using rehearsal say: 
“Oh, you’re saying the names of the pictures over and over again to yourself. Is that 
helping you remember?” Why?”). If child is doing a non-verbal behavior (e.g., 
mental rehearsal silently or visualizing- e.g., he or she seems to be doing something 
cognitive/thinking but it is non-verbal and thus difficult to discern), say: “I noticed 
you’re looking up [or whatever the child is doing], “what are you doing when you’re 
doing that. If the child is still struggling and not implementing a strategy, go to the 
next type of mediation.  
4. The next type of DA mediated-instruction is Prompts/hints. Say: “Other children 
your age have told me that looking at the pictures and saying the names over and 
over again to themselves has helped them remember. How would that work? How 
could you try that? If child spontaneously starts to rehearse, allow and encourage that 
strategy and use other hints. If child does not, continue to prompt that rehearsing 
helps (e.g., “Many other children just like you have said it works; it has also helped 
me before! How do you think it could work for these pictures? What about these?”). 
If child discontinues the strategy, say: Remember that other children have said that 
saying the names over and over again to themselves has helped them remember the 
pictures. They said it really helps”). Another thing that helps people remember 
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pictures is thinking about how the pictures could go together helped them remember 
the names better. “How would that work?”... How could these pictures go together?” 
If child spontaneously starts to categorically sort, allow and encourage that strategy 
and use other hints for more accurate/efficient sorting. If child does not, continue to 
prompt that sorting by categories/groups helps (e.g., “Many other children just like 
you have said it works; it has also helped me before! How do you think these two 
pictures go together?... And what about these pictures?”). If child discontinues the 
strategy, say: “Remember that other children have said that thinking about how the 
pictures go together helped them remember them. They said it really helps”).  If child 
is doing a non-verbal behavior (e.g., mental rehearsal silently or visualizing- e.g., he 
or she seems to be doing something cognitive/thinking but it is non-verbal and thus 
difficult to discern), say: “I noticed you’re looking up [or whatever the child is doing], 
“what are you doing when you’re doing that. If the child is still struggling and not 
implementing a strategy, go to the next type of mediation.  
5. The third type of DA mediated-instruction is Explicit Instruction. Say: “When I want 
to remember many pictures like this, I look at them and say their names over and over 
again to myself and say something about them like this (demonstrate: e.g., “School 
bus, school bus, school bus. Okay, that will help me remember the yellow school bus. 
Blue dress, blue dress, blue dress. Okay, I think I will remember that pretty blue dress 
with a pink bow now.) Allow time for the child to start the strategy but if she/he does 
not spontaneously, say: “Now you try it. Start with this picture. Okay, that’ll help you 
remember because you are practicing the name and helping your brain remember it! 
Now try it for these pictures.” Again allow time for the child to start the strategy but 
if she/he does not spontaneously, say: “Let’s try like this” and start to rehearse 
another set of pictures having him/her repeat afterward (e.g., “Big truck, big truck, big 
truck.” Okay, now I will remember the big red truck.). Then go back to “Now you try 
it.” If child discontinues the strategy, say: “Remember, looking at the pictures and 
saying their names over and over again will help you remember the 
pictures…because it is practicing and helping the name stay in your brain so that you 
will remember it later.” You can also make groups with pictures that are alike to help 
you remember them like this: These go together because they are alike (e.g., tools). 
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Allow time for the child to start the strategy but if she/he does not spontaneously, say: 
“We can make groups with these pictures. Let’s make groups with pictures that are 
alike/that go together. That will help you remember the pictures.” Again allow time 
for the child to start the strategy but if she/he does not spontaneously, say: “Let’s try 
like this” and start to make a categorical group, e.g., by putting the shirt and pants 
together; hand the child the dress and ask her/him to place in the correct group. 
Provide as much help as necessary for at least one full group of categorically-sorted 
pictures. For example, if the child is not accurately sorting, point to one of the groups 
(e.g., Clothing) and say: “Why did I put these in one group?... Tell me about the 
things in our groups…These are all _____”. Wait for the child to respond. If she/he 
does not give the correct answer, provide prompts (e.g., “these are things we wear”, 
then identify the group,: “this is a group of Clothing; each picture is a piece of 
clothing we wear”). Once the child has successfully sorted the cards into a categorical 
group, say: “Good, it helps when we make groups of like pictures. That way you only 
have to remember a few groups of pictures instead of 9 separate pictures!” If child 
discontinues the strategy, say: “Remember, putting the pictures into groups that are 
alike will help you remember the pictures…because there are less things to 
remember”.  
6. Provide 5 minutes to allow for mediated discussion before removing/hiding the cards. 
[Once child assents/is ready, set the timer for 5 minutes; after it beeps, collect/hide 
the cards and continue] “Okay, time is up. Now, tell me the names of the pictures”. 
Great! Now, please tell me what you did to remember the cards. [If the child says 
“nothing” or “I don’t know” prompt them to think again or tell what they did before I 
collected the cards]. Do you think that helped you remember the pictures? Why?” If 
child did a non-verbal behavior (e.g., mental rehearsal silently or visualizing- e.g., he 
or she seemed to be doing something cognitive/thinking but it is non-verbal and thus 
difficult to discern), say: “I noticed you were looking up [or whatever the child is 
doing], “what were you doing when you did that?” 
 
Analytic plan 
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The data analysis for this study will include group comparisons (repeated measures 
analysis of variances ANOVAs; (covariates: expressive language/EVT and executive 
function/HTKS) of: pre- and post-test card recall and associated Mc scores (the McK questions 
and McK strategies) to examine the malleability of children metacognitive (and cognitive) 
processes. In addition, a grounded analysis of the video records of children’s behavior during the 
DA and card recall tasks was undertaken to explore how the different types of supports were 
associated with children’s verbal and non-verbal responses. For example, note will be made of 
which type of support, if any, was associated with changes in responses or metacognitive 
behaviors for each child and then compare my notes across children for emerging patterns. This 
qualitative analysis will be integrated with the pre- and post-test and repeated measure 
comparisons to examine whether the grounded analysis aids in my interpretations of the 
quantitative results. Repeated-measures ANOVA and qualitative descriptive analyses examining 
patterns will be used to analyze this data.  
All results will be interpreted through an integration of information-processing theory 
and sociocultural cognitive modifiability theories of cognitive development, with particular 
emphasis on the ZPD, in which children’s abilities will be examined in terms of both their 
independent and mediated performances, and the ways in which children’s metacognitive 
processing is affected by mediated information. Specifically, analyses will address whether 
mediated instruction will not only be associated with enhanced performance on a cognitive (i.e., 
card recall) task and metacognitive (i.e., accurately reporting strategies used and rating 
performance and behavioral Mc such as monitoring during the card recall task) task conducted 
during the DA, but also whether basic cognitive skills such as EF and expressive vocabulary will 
affect children’s metacognitive processing. 
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Results 
Descriptive Results 
 The descriptive results for the sample split by GSRP and Tuition-based preschool 
classrooms on the Mc, EF, and cognitive (expressive vocabulary and card recall) assessment 
tools can be seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. In general, these tools have both revealed more 
metacognitive capabilities in these preschool-aged children than previous studies, particularly 
involving interviewing children (the metacognitive questions regarding the card recall task), 
would indicate, with the exception of the recent studies that have been reviewed here.  In 
addition, as can be seen in Table 4.1, not surprisingly, the children in the GSRP (low-SES) class 
obtained lower scores across all measures than the children in the Tuition-based preschool 
classes. Furthermore, as can be seen in the correlation table, Table 4.2, the executive function 
and expressive language scores were largely associated with the metacognitive processes as 
hypothesized. Though Table 4.2 presents results for the sample as a whole the correlations hold 
for both the GSRP and Tuiton-based classrooms with several exceptions. The McK questions for 
the children in the GSRP classrooms were significantly correlated with their Applied problems 
scores (r=.33, p=.03) at pre-test whereas they were not for the children in the Tuition-based 
classrooms (r=.12, p=.18). Interestingly (though not related to the research question on whether 
metacognitive processes would function as protective or mediating factors for young children at 
risk for learning difficulties), the pre-academic functioning scores (letter word identification and 
applied problems) for the children in the GSRP classrooms were not significantly related (r=.27, 
p=.09) whereas the scores for the children in the Tuition-based classrooms showed a high to 
moderate association as is common with these types of standardized academic achievement tests 
(r=.59, p<.001). Similarly, the executive functioning and expressive vocabulary scores for the 
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children in the GSRP classrooms showed no association (r=.10, p=.54) whereas the scores for 
the children in the Tuition-based classrooms showed a low but significant association (r=.31, 
p=.04). Because the children in the GSRP classroom who had higher metacognitive processing 
also had higher cognitive and pre-academic scores, it may be that these underlying skills were 
serving as resilience factors across content areas even though the children’s cognitive and pre-
academic functioning was not consistent (i.e., the children who scored high on pre-academic 
functioning in mathematics were not necessarily the same children who scored high on pre-
academic functioning in language arts in the GSRP classrooms).  
Table 4.1. 
Children’s Scores on the Measurement Tools (all children; n=83) 
Assessment GSRP 
M(SD); Range 
Tuition 
M(SD); Range 
Card Recall 
Pre:  
4.36(2.08); 0-8 
 
DA/COMP: 
6.26(2.60); 0-9 
 
Post: 
4.90(2.35); 0-9 
Pre: 
4.54(2.03); 0-7 
 
DA/COMP:  
6.20(2.72); 0-9 
 
Post: 
5.15(2.53); 0-9 
McK 
Questions 
Pre:  
1.62(1.17); 0-4 
 
DA/COMP: 
2.12(1.90); 0-7 
 
Post: 
1.81(1.47); 0-6 
Pre:  
2.02(1.66); 0-5 
 
DA/COMP: 
2.43(2.08); 0-8 
 
Post: 
2.05(1.79)0-6 
McK 
Strategies 
Pre:  
0.69(.75); 0-2 
 
DA/COMP: 
2.67(1.49); 0-6 
 
Post: 
Pre:  
0.88(0.81); 0-3 
 
DA/COMP: 
2.56(1.45); 0-5 
 
Post: 
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1.64(1.06); 0-4 1.90(1.32); 0-4 
HTKS 9.62(10.84)0-41 12.07(13.28); 0-42 
EVT 99.48(10.54); 79-130 100.02(12.76); 39-121 
LW 102.71(15.18); 72-135 114.73(17.45); 72-155 
AP 99.60(13.05); 68-125 103.39(15.16); 59-137 
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Table 4.2. 
Correlations between the children’s Mc, EF, expressive language, cognitive and pre-academic assessment scores controlling for age. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
Variable   1 2 3    4    5     6       7      8      9    10    11 12 13 
1.  McK Questions_Pre - .51***  .42*** .18 .28* .14 .40*** .32** .28* .36** .31** .22* .32**   
2.   McK Questions_DA/COMP  - .63*** .28* .47*** .28* .51** .46**** .49*** .42*** .31** .26* .36**   
3.   McK Questions _Post      -  .25*  .34** .29** .26*  .28*  .51*** .43** .27* .33** .38***   
4.  McK Strategies_Pre    -   .45*** .36** .36**  .42**  .45*** .19 .16 .05 .17   
5.  McK Strategies_ DA/COMP     - .61*** .29** .66*** .62*** .21 .36** .05 .16   
6.   McK Strategies_Post      - .38** .56*** .55*** .19 .24* .09 .16   
7.   Card Recall_Pre         - .58*** .43*** .22* .27* .13 .38**   
8.   Card Recall_ DA/COMP           - .63*** .25* .37** .13 .33**   
9.  Card Recall_Post          - .31** .46*** .20 .33**   
10. HTKS (Executive function)          - .32** .26* .45***   
11. EVT (Expressive Vocabulary)           - .38*** .42***   
12. Letter Word Identification 
 
           - .47***   
13. Applied Problems              -   
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Figure 4.1. Comparison and Intervention group scores on the metacognitive and cognitive tasks 
from at all time points (pre- to DA/COMP to post-test).  
F(1, 78)=12.14, p=.001 
F(1, 78)=12.37, p=.001 
Controls: Age, HTKS, EVT
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To address the first research question regarding the malleability of children’s 
metacognitive processes; specifically related to the effectiveness of a DA intervention in 
facilitating metacognitive processes in preschool-aged children, a series of mixed-effect model 
analysis of variances (ANOVAs) were undertaken using IBM SPSS Statistics 20.0 controlling 
for age, expressive vocabulary (i.e., the EVT) and executive function (i.e., the HTKS) where 
time was the within-subject repeated measures variable and condition was the between-subject. 
The outcome measures in these ANOVAS were 1. The metacognitive strategies used during the 
card recall task (e.g., sorting the cards into categorical groups; using rehearsal; visualizing the 
location of cards, etc., and saying that this strategy would aid in remembering the cards), 2. The 
card recall task itself (the cognitive measure) and 3. The McK questions asked about the card 
recall task immediately afterward.  Across all three outcomes, the children in the intervention  
group showed significant growth from pre- to DA to post-test (see Figure 4.1) compared to the 
comparison group (with the exceptions that the children in the intervention group did not gain 
significantly from the pre-test or DA to the post-test on the metacognitive questions related to the 
card recall task).  Moreover, there was a similar pattern of results across the three measures 
where the children improved greatly from pre-test to the DA intervention (peaking during the 
DA intervention when they were receiving mediated support) and decreasing at post-test (not 
significantly except for the metacognitive questions where they returned to only slightly higher 
than their pre-test scores).  
Regarding the second part of the first research question, what does DA reveal about 
mechanisms that facilitate metacognitive development in preschool-aged children, as can be seen 
in Table 4.3, certain McK strategies were facilitated more so than others. For example, 
categorizing increased from 3.2% of children using the metacognitive strategy (i.e., using a 
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categorizing strategy and indicating that it would be helpful to their learning, such as “I put all of 
the fruit together, now I will remember them!”) to 90.3% of children using categorization during 
the DA intervention. Some strategies maintained this increase to post-test when the children were 
not receiving support. For example, the use of the McK strategy talk/elaboration showed a large 
increase from pre-test to DA from 17.7% to 50%, and only decreased slightly to 46.8% at post-
test. This strategy involved talking and/or elaborating about the pictures on the cards, such as 
making up a story about the cards or singing a song about them. For example, saying: “I know, 
I’ll make up a story about the pictures! That will help me remember a lot of them… Okay… My 
Dad has a red truck (a picture card) and he is going to wear his jeans (a picture card) and shirt (a 
picture card), put his hammer (a picture card) in the back and bring our dog (a picture card), and 
go to work.” Also, using the McK strategy recalling in groups in which children named the 
picture cards they remembered in groups, for example saying “I remember… the Pets! The dog, 
cat…and rabbit! It helps to remember them when you think about them altogether, like in a 
group”. At pre-test, 37% of the children used this strategy. During the DA, this increased to 88%, 
and only decreased slightly at post-test to 72.6%. The use of rehearsal (i.e., repeating the name of 
the picture cards over and over) and saying that this was helpful to remembering the pictures 
showed a similar pattern as well (see Table 4.3). Thus, it appears that the DA differentially 
facilitated metacognitive strategies.  
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Table 4.3.  
Metacognitive knowledge (McK) strategies most facilitated during the DA intervention in 
percentages of children using each strategy at each time point. 
McK Strategies Pre-test DA Post-test 
Categorize 
 
(“Putting these animals 
together will help me 
remember them!”) 
3.2 90.3 32.3 
Rehearsal 24.2 71.0 54.8 
Talk/Elaborate 17.7 50.0 46.8 
Recall in groups 37.1 88.0 72.6 
Visualize 3.2 9.7 3.2 
Other 1.6 16.1 8.1 
Furthermore, the type of support during the DA seemed to be differentially associated 
with metacognitive strategy use (see Table 4.4). During the 5 minutes of the DA intervention, 
there were three different types of instructional support: Self-explanation, Prompts/hints, and 
Explicit instruction. Children used the greatest average number of total metacognitive strategies 
(M=12.50, SD=8.66) during the explicit instruction support compared to using an average of 
only 3.74 (SD=4.45) metacognitive strategies during the Prompts/hints instructional support and 
an average of 1.50 (SD=3.08) metacognitive strategies during the Explicit instruction 
instructional support. Thus, similar to two meta-analyses examining the most effective 
interventions for vocabulary acquisition (Marulis & Neuman 2010, 2013) in preschoolers, 
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explicit instruction was also the most effective method for facilitating metacognitive processes. 
However, it may be that the Self-explanation and Prompts/hints support were similarly 
facilitative but the explicit behaviors did not appear as greatly until the last Explicit support. 
Integrating a neurological technique such as EEG (Electroencephalography) to measure ERPs 
(Event-related potentials) may provide additional information to help parse this analysis.  
Table 4.4. 
Frequency of McK used during the instruction types of the DA intervention. 
Instruction 
Type 
Self-
explanation
Prompts/hints Explicit/mediated 
5 minutes What could 
you do to 
help you 
remember? 
 
Other children said 
sorting into groups of 
pictures that go 
together helped them 
remember. 
 
 
Sorting into groups of 
pictures that go 
together makes it 
easier to remember the 
cards. How would that 
work? 
M(SD) McK strategies; n=62 1.50 (3.08) 3.74 (4.45) 12.50 (8.66) 
 
The second research question concerned whether there were associations between 
executive functioning, expressive language, and Mc in this sample of preschoolers. As can be 
seen in Table 4.2, both executive functioning (i.e., the HTKS task) and expressive language (i.e., 
the EVT) were significantly related to most of the metacognitive and cognitive processes in the 
preschoolers; the correlations were low to low-medium in magnitude (rs=.22-46). Not 
surprisingly, the EVT had the most and strongest associations to the metacognitive processes (all 
correlations to metacognitive processes were significant with the exception of that to the McK 
strategies at pre-test).   
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To specifically address whether individual differences in executive functioning and 
expressive language would predict metacognitive performance, a backwards stepwise regression 
model was undertaken including the following predictors: age, gender, SES, EVT (expressive 
vocabulary), HTKS (executive function) first predicting children’s scores on the metacognitive 
knowledge questions post-test (related to the card recall task).  For both the McK questions 
related to the card recall task and the McK strategies (i.e., total metacognitive strategies used 
during the card recall task), the best fitting models were ones that included all entered variables 
(age, gender, SES, EVT, and HTKS). Because this indicates that these models contained only 
variables that uniquely contributed to predicting learning, these results suggest that the HTKS 
and EVT did not uniquely predict metacognitive development.  For the McK strategies, this 
model fit was R2=.33, p=.03; for the McK questions, the model fit was R2=.49, p<.001. 
To address the third and final research question on how preschoolers’ metacognitive 
skills related to cognitive development and pre-academic functioning and whether  
metacognitive skills served as protective, resilience, factors for young children at risk for 
learning difficulties, Pearson correlations between the metacognitive measures and cognitive and 
pre-academic measures were first conducted (controlling for age, EVT, and HTKS).  As can be 
seen in Table 4.5, the children’s metacognitive scores were significantly correlated with their 
cognitive abilities (i.e., their metamemory knowledge scores were correlated with their memory 
tasks scores at pre-, DA/COMP and post-test). Additionally, as can be seen in Table 4.2 (the 
correlational table), children’s metacognitive processes were significantly associated with their 
pre-academic achievement across language arts and mathematics.  
Table 4.5.  
Correlations between McK questions and cards remembered on the memory task.  
 253 
 
Card Recall Task 
McK  Questions Pre-test DA/COMP Post-test 
.32, p=.003 .31, p=.001 .42, p<.001 
  Regarding the predictive strength of the metacognitive processes, the metacognitive 
knowledge questions uniquely predicted both the children’s Letter Word Identification and 
Applied Problems pre-academic funcitoning beyond the other variables included in the model 
(see Table 4.6).   
Table 4.6.  
Metacognitive, cognitive, and demographic variables predicting pre-academic functioning. 
Letter Word Identification  
(Pre-academic Language Arts Skills)  
R2 = 51 F(3, 79) = 8.09*** 
 β p 
McK Questions .37 .001 
Age .24 .02 
Expressive Vocabulary .19 .07 
 
Applied Problems 
(Pre-academic Mathematics Skills) 
     R2 = .64        F(5, 77) = 10.44*** 
 β p 
McK Questions .30 .007 
Age .27 .01 
Expressive Vocabulary .25 .009 
HTKS (executive function) .28 .013 
Note: *** p < .001 
 
Lastly, to address the last part of the final research question about Mc serving as a 
protective factor for young children traditionally at risk for learning difficulties (i.e., promoting 
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their learning and greater academic achievement despite risk factors that typically are associated 
with negative learning and academic outcomes), when controlling for SES, the McK questions 
were still the best predictor for Applied Problems, but expressive vocabulary was the best 
predictor for Letter Word Identification.  Furthermore, the GSRP and Tuition-based classes had 
differential associations between the metacognitive processes and the cognitive and pre-
academic skills, providing further indication that Mc may—at least partially—serve as a 
protective factor for the children in the GSRP classes, at least specific to problem-solving 
mathematics. For example, the relation between the McK questions and the Applied Problems 
for the children in the GSRP preschool classes was .46, p=.02 whereas it was .27, p=.07 for the 
children in the Tuition-based preschool classes. In contrast, the relation between the McK 
questions and the HTKS executive function task was .53, p<.001 for the children in the Tuition-
based preschool classes, while it was .12, p=.47 for the children in the GSRP preschool classes 
suggesting that, for the children from the higher SES families, metacognitive processes are more 
strongly linked to executive functioning processes and may not be recruited as much for pre-
academic functioning. It may also be that these pre-academic assessments were not as 
challenging for the children in the Tuition-based preschool classes (as can be seen by their 
significantly higher scores, see Table 4.1) and thus they did not need to recruit metacognitive 
knowledge. 
Discussion 
The socially-mediated DA intervention conducted in this study comprised a brief—five 
minute—metacognitive instructional training support related to skills needed to succeed on a 
card recall task for 3-5 year old children.  The children who received this DA intervention 
obtained significant gains on metacognitive strategies and metacognitive knowledge questions as 
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well as the card recall task itself. To be more specific, the DA and the questions posed to the 
children afterward targeted children’s metamemory, though memory, as Flavell has described it, 
is “in good part just applied cognition” (Flavell 1971, p. 273). Thus, children were able to apply 
the metacognitive skills that were facilitated—and I would add, co-constructed—during the 
mediated DA to the cognitive task (i.e., improvement on the card recall memory task). These 
children—unlike those in the Resnick and Glaser’s studies as described by Flavell (1976)—were 
able to succeed on this problem solving task, particularly immediately after the DA 
metacognitive support, but even at post-test when they did not receive support during the card 
recall task (thus received no support or interaction around doing something to remember the 
cards), the children in the DA intervention group maintained a significant gain in cards 
remembered on the card recall task (in addition to the metacognitive knowledge strategies and 
questions). The findings from this study support Flavell’s assertion (1976) that accompanied his 
inauguration of the term “metacognition”; namely that the reason children were failing to solve 
problems (for which they knew the solutions), in studies such as those of Resnick and Glaser was 
due to limited metacognitive processing.  These limited metacognitive processes were likely due 
to the limited experiences (such as MLEs) that the children were exposed to where they were 
supported in acquiring metacognitive skills and strategies or had experiences where 
metacognitive skills and strategies were modeled. Furthermore, they may not have experienced 
situations in which metacognitive skills needed to be (or were encouraged to be) recruited. As 
seen in the current study, a brief 5 minute DA intervention was associated with considerable 
increases in children’s metacognitive skills and strategies, suggesting that these types of MLE 
opportunities were novel to and facilitative for the children.  
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 Similarly, I propose that the mechanisms underlying the children’s growth and success in 
the current study are metacognitive processes, experiences, and supports. During the DA, 
children were facilitated in understanding when, how, and where and to apply the strategies they 
were receiving mediated instruction in. For example, if the child was not accurately sorting the 
picture cards during the DA mediated card recall task, the experimenter would point to one of the groups 
she had previously made (e.g., Clothing) and say: “Why did I put these in one group? Tell me about the 
things in our groups…These are all ___”.  Then the experimenter would wait for the child to respond. If 
she or he did not provide appropriate responses, the experimenter would provide prompts (e.g., “these are 
things we wear”, then identify the group: “This is a group of Clothing; each picture is a piece of clothing 
we wear”). Once the child had successfully sorted the cards into a categorical group, say: “Good, it helps 
when we make groups of like pictures. That way you only have to remember a few groups of pictures 
instead of 9 separate pictures.”  If child discontinued the strategy, say: “Remember, putting the pictures 
into groups that are alike will help you remember the pictures…because there are less things to 
remember. When you have to remember things, you can make it easier by making groups like this.” 
The results show that the children in the DA intervention group made significant gains 
from the pre-test to the DA as well as the DA to the post-test and the traditional pre-test to post-
test. By examining both the children’s independent and mediated performance in this way, a 
more nuanced picture emerged showing that a greater gain is made between the pre-test to the 
DA than the pre-test to the post-test (i.e., indicating that the mediated support provided by the 
DA was additionally beneficial to the children’s metacognitive and cognitive processing). This 
would have been obscured if only the children’s scores on the pre- and post-tests had been 
examined as is traditionally done in intervention studies. By examining both children’s 
independent (i.e., the pre- and post-test scores) and mediated (i.e., the DA scores) performance 
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(grounded in the sociocultural theory of cognitive development, underscoring the ZPD a more 
comprehensive picture of the preschoolers’ capabilities on their own and with different types of 
support was revealed. Similar pattern of results were found across outcomes where the children’s 
scores greatly increased during the DA (i.e., mediated performances) and decreased at post-test, 
but still maintained significantly and substantial gains overall between pre- to post-test. Based on 
deep theoretical framework—the sociocultural, including the ZPD, and cognitive modifiability 
theories—and empirical research, children’s mediated performance is more predictive of their 
knowledge/understanding/achievement than assessments of their independent performances 
(Poehner, 2005). 
Also, by closely examining changes in the children’s behavior from the pre- to the 
DA/COMP to the post-test of the card recall task, the second part of the first research question 
regarding the types of mechanistic information that a DA intervention could reveal about the 
facilitation of metacognitive development in preschoolers was able to be addressed. The DA 
revealed that not all McK strategies were facilitated equally (though this may also be—at least in 
part—related to development, see Ornstein, Haden, & San Souci, 2010). Children substantially 
maintained a gain from DA to post-test on three McK strategies in particular (rehearsal, 
talking/elaborating, and recalling [picture cards in groups]). One McK strategy (categorizing) 
showed the largest gain though children’s scores also showed a considerable drop between the 
DA and post-test for this strategy. The DA targeted all McK strategies (the least focus being on 
visualization as this is a later developing skill), which is reflected in the general increase in all of 
the strategies. Furthermore, the cards themselves were selected (see Appendix 4.B) based on 
category families. While this was not explicitly made any more prominent to the children than 
the other McK strategies barring visualization, it may have been inherently salient due to the 
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familiarity of the pictures and categories (e.g., Pets/Animals: dog, cat, rabbit). However, the 
categorization McK strategy did not maintain as well as the other strategies once the children 
were performing independently at post-test. It may be that this is more of a shared (or co-
constructed) strategy.  For example, some children talked about the similarity between the card 
recall game in this study and the children’s game “Memory.” They wanted to make groups of 
cards together to play in a way that was somewhat parallel to Memory (though they were 
continually reminded of the specific procedures of this game and that—and how—it was 
different from Memory). However, some children continued to make piles of alike cards during 
the DA in which they would hand me a card that “went with” a card that was close to me and so 
on. Therefore, it may have been less of a solitary strategy from their viewpoint. In future studies, 
this could be parsed by being more explicit about categorizing on their own and/or including a 
peer condition in which the children perform the card recall task with another child to examine 
individual vs. interactive strategies.  
Furthermore, it was somewhat surprising that the Explicit DA instruction resulted in the 
greatest average number of McK strategies being employed (12.50 during the 5 minute card 
recall task). The mean McK strategies were far lower for the self-explanation and prompts/hints 
DA instruction (1.50 and 3.74 respectively). This could be because the explicit instruction was 
the last type of support and thus the children had had more experience and more mediated 
instruction at this point in the DA, but there was a much greater peak in scores between the self-
explanation and prompts/hints (from 1.50 to 3.74) than between the prompts/hints and self-
explanation (from 3.74 to 12.50), therefore, this likely was only a partial explanation. Theories 
and previous research have suggested that self-explanation (Siegler, & Lin, 2009; Wellman & 
Lagattuta, 2004) and prompts/ hints (Feuerstein et al., 1980; Haywood & Lidz, 2007) could be 
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similarly facilitative of children’s regulatory processes, though that was not borne out in the 
current study.  Some of this research (or the research review) pertained to older children, but 
some focused on preschool-aged children. Thus, these results may be specific to the facilitation 
of metacognitive processes.  These results are similar to two recent meta-analyses that examined 
the effectiveness of interventions on preschoolers’ word learning Marulis & Neuman, 2010; 
2013). In both meta-analyses (Marulis & Neuman, 2013 focused on preschoolers at risk for 
learning difficulties), explicit instruction; that is, instruction that emphasized strategies for 
directly teaching vocabulary (e.g., detailed word definitions and examples were given before, 
during, or after a storybook reading with a follow-up discussion designed to review these words) 
was found to be most effective type of instruction for preschoolers’ vocabulary learning (whether 
or not they were at risk for learning difficulties).  Similar results between a more discrete skill 
such as vocabulary learning and metacognitive processes—a seemingly more socially mediated 
(e.g., see Brinck & Liljenfors, 2013) skill—were surprising. Self-explanations and prompts/hints 
would be expected to be similarly facilitating for Mc. However, the entire DA intervention was 
socially mediated so it may simply be that self-explanations and prompts/hints were not powerful 
enough to foster the children’s metacognitive processes, particularly in such a short time for this 
young age group. The preschoolers may have needed more explicit instructions and mediation 
due, in part, to their age and limited experience with metacognitive tasks and applying McK 
strategies to cognitive tasks.  
Moreover, based on the successful work by Feuerstein et al. (1980) that used cognitively-
based mediated techniques and self-questioning, specifically a process called guided discovery 
where an adult would lead a child to discover the solution to a problem, greater McK strategies 
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resulting from the self-explanations and prompts/hints DA instruction that was similar to the 
guided discovery used by Feuerstein et al., 1980 may have been hypothesized 
However, Fabricius and Hagen (1984), found that only when young children (first and 
second grade students) verbally attributed the increase in their memory performance to a sorting 
strategy, did they subsequently continue to use that strategy (and chose not to use other 
previously-used strategies such as rehearsal). The children who did not make this causal 
attribution explicitly did not subsequently make a more efficient choice of strategies in the next 
memory task sessions. This use of an explicit verbalized causal attribution was similar to the 
explicit instruction portion of the DA intervention in this study, suggesting that memory 
strategies—and becoming metacognitive about the use of them—may require explicitness. As 
mentioned earlier, this should be investigated further with a between-subjects condition and 
possibly the addition of a neurological method. 
Although, as hypothesized, the children’s metacognitive processes were associated with 
both their executive functioning (HTKS) and expressive language (EVT) ranging from low to 
low-medium (rs=.22-46) and both were included in the final model that best predicted 
metacognitive scores, neither the HTKS nor the EVT uniquely predicted the children’s 
metacognitive performance. As discussed previously, the associations between these related 
skills have rarely been explored in preschoolers (or children in general) and thus, this is an area 
in great need of additional investigation. Theories (e.g., Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Goldberg, 
2004; Lyons & Zelazo, 2011; Zelazo & Müller, 2002) suggest that EF and Mc function similarly 
and the studies that have investigated these constructs in children indicate that they are related in 
important and interacting ways over development (Bryce, 2007; Bryce & Whitebread, 2008; 
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Whitebread, 1999). In addition, expressive language has also been shown to be related to 
metacognitive processes in young children (Lockl & Schneider, 2006; Lockl & Schneider, 2007) 
but it is unclear whether expressive language precedes metacognitive development, vice versa, or 
whether they interact in early development. Though the scores on the EVT were associated with, 
and were included in the best fitting model that predicted the children’s metacognitive scores, it 
was somewhat surprising that they did not uniquely predict any of the children’s metacognitive 
performance given the language heavy nature of the metacognitive tasks in this study.  
Accordingly, exploring how early EF, Mc and language are developing, interacting, and 
impacting learning is a crucial area to investigate in young children. Nevertheless, this remains 
an area that has been largely uncharted. This was not a main aim of the current study, and thus 
was not investigated in depth. However, I have planned future longitudinal investigations to 
comprehensively study the development of early EF, Mc, language, and associations to cognitive 
and academic functioning in preschoolers.  
The culminating research questions that this study was designed to address centered on 
whether preschoolers’ metacognitive would be associated with cognitive and pre-academic 
functioning, particularly for young children at risk for learning difficulties. As reviewed earlier, 
there is robust evidence that Mc is not only associated with cognitive and academic skills but 
uniquely predicts these skills beyond intelligence scores (e.g., Veenman, & Beishuizen, 2004; 
Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman et al., 2004). However, this evidence is primarily focused 
on children in middle primary grades and adolescents. The current study provides solid evidence 
that these associations are also present for young children, prior to beginning formal schooling 
(and thus without this “training”). In addition, these associations were only slightly—and not 
significantly—lower at pre-test than at the DA intervention or post-test. Therefore, these 
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associations do not seem to be dependent upon intervention (though would likely be 
strengthened by it). Moreover, the McK questions posed to the children directly after the card 
recall task were the best predictors of the children’s scores on both the letter word identification 
and applied problems measures of pre-academic functioning (similar to the Metacognitive 
Knowledge Interview—McKI—in Study 1; Marulis et al., submitted) when entered in a model 
with the other SRL, cognitive, and demographic variables. This was also true for the children 
from the GSRP classrooms (from low-SES families, many of whom also have other risk factors 
such as minority status, low maternal education, single-parent family, English language learner 
(ELL), and longer periods of high maternal depressive symptoms) who obtained similar 
correlations between many of the cognitive and pre-academic variables and their metacognitive 
functioning as the children from the Tuition-based classrooms. This finding indicates that, like 
previous research focused on other SRL skills (Matthews et al., 2010; Sektnan et al., 2010), Mc 
has the potential to serve as a protective factor for children at risk for learning difficulties as it is 
linked with higher cognitive and pre-academic functioning in the face of various environmental 
factors shown to typically negatively impact academic achievement. This is encouraging for 
addressing the achievement gap related to SES, however because this gap is .5 SD (Borman & 
Dowling, 2010; Perry & McConney, 2010) and begins to emerge before children reach their first 
birthday (Halle et al., 2009), children at risk for learning difficulties will need powerful 
intervention related to metacognitive processes (aligned with content knowledge and other SRL 
variables) to work toward narrowing this gap. This is an area that is in need of systematic 
research programs and intervention work. Moreover, because the DA intervention was successful 
with the preschoolers, including the children from the GSRP classrooms, targeting these 
metacognitive skills and strategies through intervention appears to be a fruitful way to boost the 
 263 
 
learning and academic achievement of young children, particularly those traditionally at risk for 
learning difficulties. As Vygotsky and Feuerstein maintained, metacognitive regulatory skills in 
the children in the current study seemed to act as supportive factors enhancing children’s 
cognitive development and learning and helping them to advance to higher levels of functioning. 
Moreover, as Feuerstein and his colleagues (1979, 1980) emphasized—and supported with 
empirical evidence—children deemed “at risk for learning difficulties”, for example, children 
from low-SES families, tend to have lower levels of learning and academic achievement due to 
fewer learning-related experiences (such as MLE opportunities) than their higher-SES peers. The 
current study was designed to investigate this line of reasoning related to examining 
metacognitive processes as possible protective, mediating, factors for children at risk for learning 
difficulties. The results are in line with the claims made by Feuerstein et al., 1979, 1980. The 
children in the GSRP classrooms’ metacognitive experiences, supports, and processes were 
boosted during the DA, which—at least partially—increased their learning performance 
indicating that Mc may act as a protective or mediating factor for children at risk for learning 
difficulties. It is, thus, an important factor on which to intervene—provide MLE—for all 
children, particularly those at risk of struggling with learning or low academic outcomes.  
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Before concluding, there are several limitations of the current study to be addressed, as 
well as recommendations for future research to be made. 
First, the metacognitive processes (McK questions and McK strategies; see Appendix 4.A 
and D) were scored using a coding scheme that was developed by the first author. Though a 
similar coding scheme for the McK questions was comprehensively assessed in a previous study 
(Marulis et al., submitted; Marulis et al., 2013), it has not yet been tested using a 
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psychometrically-robust approach. For example, a factor analysis has not yet been conducted and 
there is not yet reliability or validity information available for this coding scheme because this 
was not a longitudinal study. However, a second researcher coded 30% of the children’s 
responses and behaviors and a high level of agreement was reached. Furthermore, the questions 
and the scoring system was designed to be parallel to the McKI, which has been used in a large 
pilot study and two additional studies with consistent and reliable results (Marulis et al., 
submitted;  Marulis et al., 2013). In addition, it is unclear what the floor and ceiling effects 
would be with these types of assessments, but with this age group (3-5 year olds), the coding 
schemes were appropriate and there were few children who received minimum (0) or maximum 
scores. 
Second, the DA intervention was brief as it was intended to be an exploratory study 
rather than a full intervention. Therefore, though the intervention was designed based both on 
DA principles (e.g., Haywood & Lidz, 2007) and those of SRL intervention for preschool-aged 
children (e.g., Dignath et al., 2008; Donker et al., 2014), this was not intended to be a full scale 
intervention study. Related to this, I was unable to counterbalance the types of instructional 
support (i.e., self-explanation; prompts/hints; explicit instruction) of the DA to examine effects 
more precisely. This also meant that I was unable to parse effects of the explicit instruction in 
facilitating children’s metacognitive processes from the other types of DA supports and the 
cumulative effects of the three types of DA support. However, as discussed previously, there was 
a considerable increase in scores between the prompts/hints and explicit instruction whereas 
there was only a small increase in scores between the self-explanation and prompts/hints 
instruction. Therefore, it is likely that the explicit instruction, in part, was associated with greater 
metacognitive processing in the preschoolers. In future research, these should be disentangled 
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with a proper intervention study, and a between-subjects condition to directly compare the types 
of DA support. The addition of a neurological measure (e.g., EEG) to investigate internal 
processing during the DA support that may be taking place prior to explicit behaviors would also 
be beneficial.  
Relatedly, there was a small comparison group, and thus unequal sample sizes between 
the two groups. This was a purposeful design choice as the main aim of this study was to 
investigate the effects of a DA intervention and what it would reveal about young children’s 
metacognitive processing. Consequently, when the final sample (after the removal of children 
who were unable to understand or speak any or very limited amounts of English) was 83, 75% 
was reserved for the intervention group in order to have a large group to study in depth. This 
resulted in 62 children for the intervention group and 21 children for the comparison group 
which, while small, was still an appropriate sample size for analysis.   In the current study, 
effects were detected between the groups, but there may have been some obscuring of nuanced 
effects. Taking a simple correlational example, the card recall scores were significantly—but 
differentially—related at all time points for the intervention group. The correlation between pre- 
and post-test was .44, while the correlation between pre-test and DA was .58, and the correlation 
between DA and post-test was .67, all ps <.001.  If one were to simply consider the relation 
between pre- and post-test, the association between children’s scores at the different time points 
would appear smaller than they actually may be based on both independent and mediated 
performance. This should be investigated in future research with comparable group sizes.  
Third, though information provided by DA studies is valuable in the ways that have been 
outlined, the information is not normative and inferences for instruction are limited to the type 
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built into the DA.  Consequently, generalizability will be limited. Future studies should examine 
effects of broader instruction developed from the mechanistic information obtained in this study. 
Lastly, I was unable to obtain specific family SES data from a large portions of the 
families in the study. Therefore, for the demographic variables, class level SES was used based 
on whether the children were enrolled in the GSRP classes or the Tuition-based classes. Thus, 
even though effects were obtained in the expected direction (i.e., the children in the GSRP had 
lower metacognitive, cognitive, and pre-academic scores than the children in the Tuition-based 
classes), the variable used was not specific to each child’s family. Consequently, the effects were 
not examined precisely, which is important to pursue in future research to examine whether Mc 
would serve as a protective factor for children from families with specific risk factors. However, 
though these analyses were based on a broad class variable, this was a close proxy due to the 
specific preschool program eligibility clause (i.e., in order to be eligible to enroll in the GSRP 
program, a federally funded program, the families had to meet federal poverty income levels 
based on their household size).  
Conclusion and Implications 
The findings from this study indicate that—as hypothesized—the preschool children’s 
metacognitive processes were considerably (though variably) malleable and that using a 
systematic DA intervention to foster these processes was effective both proximally (the specific 
skills that were trained—i.e., the metacognitive strategies—were facilitated) and distally (skills 
that were not specifically trained—i.e., the card recall memory skills themselves—were 
facilitated).  As suggested by Haywood and Lidz (2007), it was a worthwhile endeavor to focus 
this DA specifically on metacognitive processes as its outcome measure.  Similar to the way DAs 
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with preschoolers targeting cognitive and pre-academic domains in preparation for preschool 
have been successful in facilitating these skills (Bensoussan, 2002; Haywood & Lidz, 2007; 
Malowitsky, 2001), this DA successfully facilitated metacognitive processes in preschoolers.  
  Explicit mediated instruction was the most effective in facilitating metacognitive 
processes in young children (at least after having experienced Self-explanation and 
Prompts/hints DA instruction) and specific McK strategies were most facilitated (rehearsal, 
recall clustering, talking/elaborating and categorizing though this was not maintained as well 
from the DA to post-test as the others). Children’s executive functioning and expressive 
vocabulary were related to their metacognitive processes but, though they were included in a best 
fitting model predicting these skills, were not unique predictors. And, lastly, children’s 
metacognitive processes were not only related to cognitive and pre-academic skills but their 
children’s responses to the McK questions were the best predictors of both the language arts and 
mathematics pre-academic skills. This was particularly true for children at risk for learning 
difficulties.  
  Accordingly, studying preschoolers’ metacognitive processes and relations to 
development and learning is particularly fruitful as this is when it is most likely to affect 
subsequent developmental, cognitive, and academic trajectories (Camilli et al., 2010; Heckman 
& Masterov, 2007), particularly for children living in poverty (Barnett, 2011). Examining 
developing metacognitive skills and ways they are best supported early in a child’s 
developmental and educational trajectory (i.e., just before or at the transition to schooling) has 
strong implications for early childhood policy, particularly related to commitments to equitable 
access to educational and social opportunities: helping all children reach their highest learning 
and academic potentials.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.A. Card Recall Task and Metacognitive Knowledge (McK) Questions. 
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Appendix 4.B. Card Recall Task_27 Cards (9 per assessment session; in categorical groups). 
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Appendix 4.C. Full Card Recall (pre- and post-test) and Mediated DA intervention or 
Comparison group (COMP) Protocol 
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Appendix 4.D. Metacognitive Knowledge (McK) Strategies displayed and coded during the 
card recall task. 
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Appendix 4.E. Woodcock-Johnson III tests of Letter-Word Identification and Applied 
Problems.
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Appendix 4.F: The Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders (HTKS) measure of Executive Function  
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Appendix 4.G: The Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT) measure of Expressive Language  
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Directions 
Through this programmatic series of dissertation studies, the emergence of metacognition 
(Mc)—knowledge, monitoring, and regulation of cognition—has been examined in preschoolers, 
a critical age for developing important cognitive and self-regulated learning (SRL) skills, when 
Mc has rarely been studied but also when it is most likely to affect subsequent developmental 
and academic trajectories. This series of studies has provided evidence that (a) metacognitive 
processes are more robust in preschoolers than previously asserted (b) early metacognitive 
declarative knowledge can be feasibly assessed with a developmentally appropriate interview (c) 
early metacognitive processes are more nuanced than previously thought and, accordingly, 
should not be grouped—conceptualized and assessed—together under an overarching construct 
(d) early metacognitive knowledge is malleable and facilitated by Dynamic Assessment (DA) 
support, particularly explicit mediated instruction (e) early metacognitive knowledge is related to 
and predictive of cognitive development, other SRL skills—such as executive function (EF)—
and pre-academic functioning and (f) early metacognitive knowledge may serve as a protective, 
resilience factor for young children at risk for learning and later academic difficulties by 
allowing them to succeed cognitively and academically despite the risks they face (e.g., living in 
poverty, having parents with low educational levels), thus “protecting” them from risks related to 
learning and academics, at least partially.  
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As discussed in the preceding chapters, associations between Mc, development, learning 
and academic achievement have been well established by extant research. However, much of this 
evidence is based on inconsistent conceptualizations, operationalizations, and assessments of 
Mc, leaving this area of research in need of further explication both theoretically and empirically. 
Moreover, previous research has predominantly focused on older children (middle primary 
school and above), adolescents and adults, thus having limited ability to address the important 
developmental period prior to formal schooling (i.e., the preschool years when learning-related 
skills are developing and considerable individual differences can be seen, e.g., Bronson, 2000).  
To this end, a main aim of this dissertation was to present a systematic analysis of the key 
elements of metacognitive development in young children related to its conceptualization and 
assessment, and to provide the foundation for programmatic research on this topic. Across three 
research papers presented in Chapters II, III, and IV, the following were discussed: the 
development of a metacognitive knowledge interview that was designed to address the limited 
measurement tools available to comprehensively assess metacognitive processes in preschool-
aged; the convergent validity between two measures of metacognitive processing to further 
elucidate the conceptualization and measurement of early metacognitive skills and processes 
through the comparison of the data revealed by two different measures of metacognition in 
preschool-aged children; and a DA intervention designed to examine the facilitation of 
metacognitive processes related to a cognitive task whether children’s metacognitive skills 
would predict their cognitive and pre-academic skills. Within each of these previous chapters 
directions for future research were discussed; this concluding chapter expands upon these 
considerations. Specifically, the most important next steps for research on early metacognitive 
development and learning will be explicated focusing in particular on: (a) the need for further 
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analysis of the conceptualization and assessment of metacognitive processing in young children 
to look for convergence divergence within aspects of metacognitive functioning; (b) the need for 
additional examination of the associations between various aspects of metacognitive functioning 
and learning/academic achievement in preschool-aged children; (c) instruction, individual 
factors, contexts, and learning environments, that have the most potential to facilitate 
metacognitive processes beginning in preschool.  
Conceptualization and Assessment of Metacognitive Processing in Young Children 
 The principal aims of this dissertation thesis were to target the conceptualization and 
assessment of metacognitive processing, particularly for preschool-aged children, largely absent 
in the literature, yet crucial for developing educational interventions designed to positively affect 
developmental and academic trajectories. Explicating the way this important construct is 
conceptualized, operationalized, assessed, and measured is among the most crucial issues facing 
SRL and cognitive development researchers and, consequently, was discussed in all three studies 
presented in Chapters II, III, and IV.  
 Furthermore, there is a long history—in the area of cognitive development and 
learning—of young children’s skills, abilities, and cognitive processes being underestimated 
(e.g., for a review of this underestimation, see Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983). Not only does this 
have implications for developmental trajectories, but also for periods that may be better for 
intervening. Related to Mc, for example, because many researchers have persisted in the notion 
that metacognitive processes do not develop until age 7-8 or beyond (e.g., Veenman, Van Hout-
Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006), conducting metacognitive interventions before that age would not 
make sense. Operating under this paradigm would lead to a loss of (at least) several years when 
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children could (based on the results of this study and other recent research, e.g., Shamir, 
Mevarech, & Gida, 2009; Whitebread, Bingham, Grau, Pino-Pasternak, & Sangster, 2007; 
Whitebread et al., 2009) benefit from such intervention. Moreover, later intervention and 
instruction could build on the earlier, thus having potentially exponential benefits.  
Though this series of linked studies provided clarity around the conceptualization and 
assessment of early metacognitive development and empirical evidence of metacognitive 
knowledge (verbal and non-verbal), behavior, skills and strategies in preschoolers that related to 
and predicated cognitive and pre-academic functioning, there is still much work to be done in 
this area.  
Accordingly, researchers should dedicate more time to examining early metacognitive 
processes and precisely differentiating them from other (some similarly) developing processes 
such as EF, theory of mind, self-regulation, co-regulation, motivation, and broadly from 
cognitive development. In parallel, researchers should be careful about how they measure these 
processes and analyze the alignment between the way they have conceptualized and assessed 
early Mc.  Clarifying this concept has been called for by prominent researchers (e.g., Brown, 
1987; Kuhn & Dean, 2004), and, as discussed in Chapter I, in a recent review of SRL research, it 
was found that researchers provided explicit definitions least often for the construct of Mc 
(Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008) with definitions being provided in only 39 out of 123 
studies reviewed (32%).  Furthermore, the SRL constructs were frequently interchanged (i.e., the 
same definition presented for Mc in one paper was presented for self-regulation in another). 
Regarding alignment between conceptualization and assessment, Dinsmore and his colleagues 
(2008) found that, for Mc, the alignment was 71%. These authors implored researchers and 
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educators to be ‘vigilant’ in their conceptualization and assessment of the interrelated (though 
distinct) constructs of SRL, and particularly Mc as they found that to be the most ‘fuzzy’/ least 
defined construct.  It has been 6 years since this plea, and the state of the Mc construct has 
improved with more attention toward its clarification and assessment (e.g., Efklides, & Misailidi, 
2010); nevertheless, it has remained a construct in need of elucidation related to its 
conceptualization and assessment (Brinck, & Liljenfors, 2013; Desoete & Ozsoy, 2009; Donker, 
Boer, Kostons, Dignath van Ewijk, & Van der Werf, 2014; Whitebread & Grau, 2012) and 
researchers should be precise in the way they conceptualize and assess this important construct 
and in the alignment between its conceptualization and assessment.  
Correspondingly, in both Chapters I and III, cautions for researchers examining 
metacognitive processes were discussed (see Figure 5.1).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Expected cautions from the measurement community regarding effectively 
examining metacognition. Adapted from Schraw, 2000, p. 304-308. 
Four cautions: (from measurement experts) when studying metacognition: 
1. Field needs a plan for comprehensive assessment of the construct 
a. Reliability and validity norms 
b. Plan for translating theory into instruments that can be 
appropriately evaluated 
2. Generate and test models 
a. Translate metacognitive theory into testable models 
3. Construct and evaluate instruments that assess specific components of 
the model 
a. Use multiple measures/using multiple methodologies 
(convergent validity) 
4. Use diverse assessment models 
a. Use multitrait, multimethod (MTMM) approach.  
See Campbell & Fiske, 1959 and Cook & Campbell, 1979. 
b. Incorporate diverse approaches including neurophysiological. 
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 In my dissertation studies, I adhered to several of these—at least preliminarily—at the 
same time as conducting one of the first program of studies to comprehensively examine Mc in 
preschoolers. However, this was just the beginning steps toward these important goals. As a 
field, it is critical that we follow these measurement-related cautions when studying Mc so that 
this area of work can be regarded as highly reputable in addition to the conceptualization, 
assessment, and resultant findings becoming more consistent across studies.  
Associations between Aspects of Metacognitive Functioning and Learning in Preschoolers 
 Closely related to this is the importance of acknowledging the need to isolate specific 
aspects of metacognition rather than consider it a ‘blanket’ construct (Brown, 1987). Recently, 
researchers have described Mc as “multifaceted” (Efklides, 2008) and “multidimensional” (Lai, 
2011) indicating the general awareness that Mc should not be conceptualized (or assessed) as an 
overarching construct. However, often, this is how it is assessed and conceptualized, which may 
also be related to some inconsistency in findings across studies. Therefore, it is crucial to not 
only discuss Mc as a “multifaceted phenomenon” (Efklides, 2008, p. 280) or a 
“multidimensional set of skills” (Lai, 2011, p. 33), rather to be precise about what this means at 
the conceptualization and measurement level. Efklides (2008) presented a model of the 
multifaceted, multilevel metacognition phenomenon (see Figure 5.2). She did not conclude with 
the model, however, but discussed theoretical, measurement, and intervention implications of her 
proposed model with its complexities and interactive cycles. This promotes the future research 
that I have described here as well as in the previous chapters that is instrumental to refining the 
Mc construct and explicating its implications for learning and development.   
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Figure 5.2. Multifaceted and multilevel model of Metacognition.  
From Efklides, 2008, p. 283. 
As an illustration of assessing specific aspects of the model, Efklides (2008) 
recommended expanding beyond the reliance on static self-report measures (that are prospective, 
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or retrospective) and integrating behavioral and physiological measures along with methods that 
are able to detect the dynamic nature of metacognitive experiences (ME) during tasks, which can 
include verbal and nonverbal behaviors, facial expressions, body movements, gazes, etc. that can 
reveal affective and informational aspects of ME. Another example, would be assessing 
metacognitive skills (MS), which Efklides (2008) recommended using systematic observations 
of behavior patterns (indicative of strategy use). She also suggested using measures that are able 
to detect implicit and explicit metacognition in longitudinal studies targeting the development 
of metacognitive knowledge (MK) to elucidate the “interaction of the facets of metacognition 
between them, as well as with cognition and affect, along with growing age, knowledge and/or 
expertise” (Efklides, 2008, p. 284). Also, she emphasized the importance of neuropsychological 
measures and neuroimaging techniques for understanding associations between brain functioning 
and conscious/nonconscious monitoring and control of cognition.  Though this is a complex, 
interacting model, and thus it is likely not possible to test the entire model in one study, it is 
important for researchers to target parts of the model and carefully consider which methods and 
measurement tools would be best to test whether this model would fit the data related to 
children’s metacognitive functioning.  
An example of this type of model testing (with a simple model) was a factor analysis with 
high school students conducted two decades ago by Allen and Armour-Thomas (1993). Using 
principle components analysis, the authors found evidence for Sternberg’s six “metacomponent” 
model of Mc (Sternberg, 1986) that he proposed would permeate most complex problem-solving 
tasks: (1) deciding upon the nature of the problem; (2) selecting components or steps needed to 
solve the problem; (3) selecting a strategy for ordering the components of problem solving; (4) 
selecting a mental representation for information; (5) allocating resources; and (6) solution 
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monitoring.  These components were found to account for 62% of the explained variance (on a 
self-report measure that asked 126 high school students to rate the extent to which they optimally 
employed metacomponents of Mc when faced with hypothetical problem-solving situations in 
diverse contexts). Moreover, these components were found to be interdependent and used by the 
students across all types of problem-solving situations. Therefore, there has been evidence that 
Mc should not be treated as a unidimensional construct and should be investigated in a nuanced 
way for many years. These authors concluded with: “The results of the current study, although 
clarifying some important issues regarding the construct of metacognition, are by no means 
definitive. We recognize that the validation of a construct, particularly one as elusive as 
metacognition, is a lengthy process; the present investigation represents only a first step in this 
direction. Other measures of metacognition are needed, such as direct observations of students 
solving real problems, teacher ratings of students’ use of metacognitive strategies, as well as 
performance measures for more comprehensive evidence of the validity of the construct” (Allen 
& Armour-Thomas, 1993, p. 209). Encouragingly, there have been a multitude of studies 
conducted since this factor analysis that have employed such measures to provide more 
comprehensive evidence. However, much of this measurement work has not been done in the 
same study with the same sample, not allowing for precise construct validity or factor analysis, 
which is what is greatly needed.  The convergent validity study presented in Chapter III begins to 
address this, and provides evidence that metacognitive processes are nuanced even in preschool-
aged children (though less so for children from low-SES families) and that there is some overlap 
between declarative metacognitive knowledge about a puzzle task and metacognitive behaviors 
during the same puzzle task, though there remains substantial unique elements left to explore. 
Nevertheless, as Allen and Armour-Thomas (1993) described, this is “by no means definitive”. 
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Additional metacognitive processes should be examined in the same study with the same 
children in a careful convergent validity study such as the one described in Chapter III.  In 
addition, factor analyses should be conducted on metacognitive processes in the preschool to 
early primary grade years the way they have been done with EF (Wiebe, Espy, & Charak, 2008; 
Wiebe, Sheffield, Nelson, Clark, Chevalier, & Espy, 2011) to examine whether Mc is more or 
less unitary across early development and which aspects of metacognitive processes are more 
closely linked over this early period of development. Furthermore, it is important to investigate 
whether these links between various aspects (or subcomponents) of Mc change over 
development or across individual differences, such as across different populations (e.g., low-SES 
vs. mid to high-SES as in Study 2 presented in Chapter III). 
Some researchers have investigated specific aspects of Mc in isolation (e.g., Zohar & 
Peled, 2008), which is another way to avoid conceptualizing and assessing Mc as a unitary 
“blanket” term. Zohar and Peled (2008) examined the effects of an intervention on a Mc 
subcomponent they referred to as “metastrategic knowledge (MSK)’’. In previously studies, they 
argued, MSK was confounded with other Mc subcomponents and thus it was impossible to 
isolate the effects of each subcomponent and discern which was (most) important for learning 
and academic achievement. The authors acknowledged that: “Although the various components 
of metacognition have ‘fuzzy borders’ and are hard to isolate, we made an effort to focus the 
intervention in the present study on MSK as a unique and differentiated component of 
metacognition. Our first aim was, therefore, to test the effects of MSK as a distinct instructional 
objective” (Zohar & Peled, 2008, p. 340). These researchers found that by explicitly teaching 
MSK to 5th graders, they were able to provide considerable and significant gains on reasoning 
scores at the strategic and metastrategic level, which were present on both near and far transfer 
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tasks immediately after instruction and 3 months later (Zohar & Peled, 2008). This study 
illustrates another useful way to isolate the aspects of Mc and its effects on children’s learning 
and academic achievement, though it would be a more robust examination to include other 
measures of metacognitive processing in a similar study to examine (a) convergent validity 
between the aspects of Mc and (b) associations to learning, transfer and immediate and delayed 
performance to examine whether different aspects of Mc provide differential associations or 
predictions to learning.  
Factors Facilitative of Metacognitive Processes in Preschoolers 
Kuhn has suggested that if one is interested in increasing meaning making in any content 
area, one should target Mc (Kuhn, 1999). She pointed to its early developmental origins but 
countered that without intervention and facilitation: “like many other intellectual skills, 
metacognitive skills typically do not develop to the level desired” (Deanna Kuhn interview, 
Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 274). However, this position indicates that metacognitive processes can 
and should be targeted for intervention and facilitation, beginning early in development.  
As described in detail in Study 3, presented in Chapter IV, a DA intervention targeting 
metacognitive knowledge strategies was successful in facilitating preschoolers’ metacognitive 
knowledge processes (strategies, declarative knowledge, and behavioral skills). This type of 
instructional intervention should be pursued in greater depth and across aspects of metacognitive 
processing to examine whether different components of Mc are differentially affected by 
intervention. As discussed in detail in Chapter IV, to examine the facilitation of metacognitive 
processing more comprehensively, broad longitudinal intervention studies should be designed 
based on the information provided in Study 3. However, beyond large interventions and 
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instructional techniques, there are facilitative learning environments and contexts, along with 
individual factors that have great potential to enhance metacognitive processes beginning in 
preschool. 
Individual factors facilitative of metacognitive processes. There are several individual 
social cognitive processes that have been shown to be facilitative foundations to Mc. Theory of 
mind (ToM) is one and Private speech (PS) is another. I will briefly summarize these constructs 
and then discuss, more specifically, the facilitation of Mc.  
Theory of mind. ToM is typically conceptualized as an understanding of mental 
representation (e.g., Flavell & Miller, 1998; Taylor, 1996; Wellman, 2002). More specifically, it 
refers to the ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge to 
oneself and others and the ability to understand that the mental states of others may differ from 
those of oneself (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  Children develop a ToM between approximately 
3 to 5 years of age, typically being assessed by the ability to pass a False Belief task wherein one 
must predict the behavior or mental states of another person who holds a mistaken belief 
(Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006).  Many researchers view ToM as an important developmental 
precursor to Mc (e.g., Kuhn, 1999; Pillow, 2008; Veenman et al., 2006) and Flavell has referred 
to Mc as “applied ToM” (Flavell, 2000) indicating that children with greater ToM will generally 
be capable of achieving greater levels of metacognitive skills (though, as discussed previously, 
these should be empirically differentiated).  ToM is typically viewed as a social-developmental 
achievement (in typically developing children), Mc—even while being viewed as a successor to 
ToM—follows a different path as it typically does not fully develop without facilitation through 
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explicit instruction, socialization, scaffolded interactions or facilitative environments and 
situations (e.g., Kuhn, 1999).  
Private speech. PS has been conceptualized as verbalizations that are lower in volume 
than typical conversations and not explicitly directed toward another person/people (thus not 
appearing to serve any interpersonal communicative functions (Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; 
Winsler, Fernyhough, McClaren, & Way, 2005).  PS has been viewed by researchers beginning 
with Vygostky (1934/1986) as a precursor to metacognitive behavior, and has been  
conceptualized as “an instrument of thought” used  to verbally mediate cognition and behavior to 
carry out solutions to problems (Vygotsky, 1986)  or as “externalized thought” (e.g., Manning, 
White, & Daugherty, 1994). This “externalized thought” was thought to become internalized 
over time and with experience, thus developing into “internalized thought” related to problem-
solving, or Mc. Indeed, Manning and her colleagues have proposed that children who seem to 
simply be talking to themselves may instead be engaging in precursors to metacognitive thinking 
by planning, monitoring, or regulating their own activities (Manning et al., 1994). Additionally, 
the association between PS and Mc has been documented empirically. For example, many 
studies have implicated PS as a metacognitive mediator (e.g., Winsler, Diaz & Montero, 1997; 
Winsler & Naglieri, 2003). Manning and her colleagues (1994) found converging evidence that 
kindergarten children who were rated by their teachers as autonomous (a construct similar to 
SRL), academically advanced, or creative employed more private speech with a ‘metacognitive 
focus’ (and less ‘lower level’ or irrelevant private speech than children not rated in any of these 
ways).   
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The development of both ToM and PS seem to be associated with the development of 
metacognitive processes in young children. Less clear is the direction of these associations or 
whether ToM or PS may function as mechanisms of change for metacognitive processes in 
young children. This should be addressed in future research.  
Contextual factors facilitative of metacognitive processes. There are several contextual 
processes and conditions that have been shown to be facilitative of Mc including peer 
interactions, metacognitive learning opportunities and environments. I will briefly discuss these 
contexts and how their potential to facilitate Mc in young children. 
Peer interactions. Another potential mechanism for change related to the facilitation of 
Mc that has rarely been investigated (and was not explored in the current series of dissertation 
studies) is peer interactions. Schraw and Moshman (1995) discussed the potential power of these 
social interactions for facilitating metacognitive processes among peers of “roughly the same 
cognitive level in relevant aspects so that none can be considered an expert with cultural 
knowledge to be passed on to the others” (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, p. 364). This 
conceptualization is similar to the study conducted by Shamir and colleagues (2009). Shamir et 
al. (2009) included a peer-assisted learning (PAL) condition so that they could compare this to an 
individual learning condition (IL) related to metacognitive knowledge in preschoolers. They 
found that the PAL was significantly more facilitative of Mc than the IL for the 3-5 year old 
children. Similarly, Whitebread et al., 2007; 2009 found that preschool-aged children displayed 
more metacognitive behaviors in collaborative group configurations. Other work has found peer 
interactions and group problem-solving to increase students’ learning and performance (e.g., Geil 
& Moshman, 1994), but Shamir et al., 2009, and  Whitebread et al., 2007; 2009 were the first 
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researchers to show that this was true for preschool-aged children as well. This should be 
investigated further including the development of collaborative interventions related to 
metacognitive processes.  
  Regarding mechanisms of change, Schraw & Moshman (1995) have suggested that 
results showing greater performance in collaborative groups compared to individual conditions 
support their proposal that peer interactions are key to facilitating Mc, which consequently, 
results in enhanced problem-solving.   
Metacognitive learning opportunities and environments. Siegler has pointed to the 
importance of studying learning as it unfolds: “the only way to find out how children learn is to 
study them closely while they are learning” (Siegler, 2006, p. 469). This type of close 
investigation typically occurs in classrooms. Researchers who do this type of work have 
identified learning environmental factors that are reliably associated with greater levels of Mc 
beginning in preschoolers including allowing children to choose their own goals and levels of 
challenge and engage in self-evaluation (e.g., Perry, 1998; Winne & Hadwin, 1998), encouraging 
students and teachers to verbalize and discuss their reasoning and problem-solving (e.g., Mercer 
& Littleton, 2007; Whitebread et al., 2007).  Additionally, classroom research has shown that 
certain types of instructional practices are most effective for facilitating Mc including explicit 
teaching and modeling of Mc strategies, explicit feedback that links increased performance with 
specific strategies employed (i.e., enhanced metacognitive awareness), and gradually decreasing 
the support (i.e., external regulation) provided by the teacher allowing students to internalize 
their learning processes (e.g., Perels, Merget-Kullmann,Wende, Schmitz, & Buchbinder, 2009; 
Hattie, Biggs, & Purdie, 1996).  Furthermore, contextualized practice of metacognitive and 
content-specific strategies (e.g., Danoff, Harris, & Graham, 1993), opportunities to collaborate 
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with peers and teachers (Whitebread & Coltman, 2007), and a supportive environment where 
risk-taking is encouraged and mistakes are considered invaluable learning opportunities (e.g., 
Perry, 1998).  
 Borkowski, Chan, & Muthukrishna (2000) suggested that metacognitive factors develop 
through “high quality, interactive strategy instruction in both home and school” (Borkowski et 
al., 2000, p. 5). This facilitative instruction focused on teaching children to use strategies 
appropriately, learning about when and how to optimally use them and when and how to recruit 
specific skills and metaskills. Borkowski and his colleagues (2000) created a model (see Figure 
5.3) to illustrate this interactive cyclical process.  
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Figure 5.3. Cognitive, motivational and self-system metacognitive components 
From Borkowski, Chan, & Muthukrishna, 2000, p. 10. 
Larkin (2000) examined first grade teachers’ metacognitive learning opportunities (or the 
way first grade teachers facilitated metacognitive processes in their first grade science students).  
She developed and assessed a coding scheme (see Figure 5.4) to investigate the metacognitive 
learning opportunities across 10 classrooms. She found a positive association between 
metacognitive learning opportunities provided by teachers and first grade children’s Mc and 
science learning.  
 
Figure 5.4. Coding scheme assessing metacognitive learning opportunities facilitative of 
metacognitive behaviors. From Larkin, 2000, p. 8. 
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   Ornstein and his colleagues have also examined associations between classroom contexts 
and metacognitive development. They (Ornstein, Grammer, Coffman, 2010) found significantly 
greater Mc, cognitive performance (on a card recall task) and strategy use in first graders who 
were in a classroom with “high mnemonic” teachers (i.e., teachers who provided a metacognitive 
framework in the classroom and explicitly prompted strategy development by offering strategies 
in particular domains and discussing why they would be effective. For example, these teachers 
used both explicit prompts and suggestions such as: “Remember when you write, you have to go 
back and read what you wrote out loud” and questions designed to elicit self-explanation and 
metacognitive awareness, such as: “How did you solve that problem?”) compared to “low 
mnemonic” teachers.  The difference between students in the classrooms with high and low 
mnemonic teachers remained three years later. Importantly, these children maintained their 
facilitated Mc across three teacher/classroom context transitions. 
Kuhn has emphasized the importance of these types of opportunities for the development 
and enhancement of Mc: “If students participate in discourse in which they are frequently asked, 
‘How do you know?’ or ‘What makes you say that?’ they become more likely to pose such 
questions to themselves. Eventually, we hope, they interiorize the structure of argument as a 
framework for much of their own individual thinking. (D. Kuhn interview: Shaughnessy, 2004, 
p. 275).  In addition, Kuhn has emphasized the importance of teachers addressing why certain 
strategies are more effective and appropriate than others in certain contexts or domains making it 
more likely that children will internalize and abstract/transfer the information and knowledge 
they have learned to new situations (Shaughnessy, 2004).  
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These metacognitive learning opportunities can ideally be made more explicit.  I propose 
that the most effective way to facilitate Mc, particularly in young children, is a combination of 
metacognitive learning opportunities scaffolded by significant adults and explicit instruction 
targeting metacognitive processes (such as that used in my DA intervention described in Study 3, 
presented in Chapter IV).  
Researchers, both at the genesis of theorizing about and empirically examining Mc (e.g., 
Vygotsky, 1978) as well as the contemporary (e.g., Efklides & Misailidi, 2010) have provided 
support for the view that Mc is best facilitated in both implicit (e.g., socialization, social 
communication, collaboration and interactions, imitation and modeling) and explicit (e.g., direct 
informal and formal instruction) ways.  In sum, metacognitive instruction, and individual factors 
(e.g., ToM and PS) along with and contextual factors (e.g., peer assisted interactions, scaffolded 
classroom environments, metacognitive learning opportunities and dialogue) may act as 
bootstrapping mechanisms for children, helping them to become more conscious and 
metacognitive in their knowledge and comprehension of their own thoughts and those of others 
(Bransford et al., 2005; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Shamir et al., 2009; Whitebread et al., 2007, 
2009).  
 Future research should examine effects of more nuanced types of mediated instruction 
and different types of contexts and learning environments on various aspects of children’s 
developing metacognitive processes. It may be that a two-tiered level of ‘intervention’ (i.e., 
receiving a targeted intervention such as a repeated DA intervention in addition to daily exposure 
to a “metacognitive savvy” teacher) will facilitate children in not only developing greater 
metacognitive processes but also learning when and how to apply these skills across situations 
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and domains affecting their long-term developmental and academic trajectories.  Therefore, 
future research should include longitudinal experiments beginning early in the preschool years 
through early elementary school years to examine cognitive change and such trajectories. 
Researchers conducting these studies should be precise about which aspects of Mc they are 
measuring and cautious about measurement as discussed earlier. These studies will be 
instrumental in further (and comprehensively, precisely) conceptualizing and assessment 
metacognitive processes in young children. The information learnt from these studies would 
additionally advance our knowledge of optimal educational intervention designs and approaches 
related to metacognitive processes, learning, cognition, and academic achievement.  
 Outlook 
Taken together, the findings, discussions, and suggestions for future research in this 
series of dissertation studies points to exciting possibilities for future research on a topic that has 
been described as being “at the very roots of the learning process” (Brown, 1987, p. 66) and 
continues to hold this central role in fields such as cognitive development, educational 
psychology, developmental psychology, and increasingly, educational practice and policy. As 
Kuhn (2000) concluded her paper on metacognitive development: “There would seem few more 
important accomplishments than people becoming aware of and reflective about their own 
thinking and able to monitor and manage the ways in which it is influenced by external sources, 
in both academic, work and personal life settings. Metacognitive development is a construct that 
helps to frame this goal”, Kuhn, 2000, p. 181 
Important steps, as outlined across the previous chapters and summarized in this chapter, 
should be undertaken in order to refine the way this critical construct is studied so that (a) the 
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construct itself can be more comprehensively and precisely conceptualized and assessed and (b) 
important information can be passed onto practitioners and policy makers regarding the 
development of nuanced metacognitive processes and precise associations and predictions to 
cognitive and academic skills.  
 Lastly, this series of studies provided encouraging evidence regarding the metacognitive 
processed and abilities of preschool-aged children. Across measures and coding schemes, there 
was consistent evidence found in this sample of preschoolers including both children in Tuition-
based classrooms and need-based Great Start Readiness Program (GSRP) classrooms. 
Furthermore, these young children were able to articulate a considerable amount of their 
metacognitive knowledge. This program of linked studies, along with previous related research 
(e.g., Marulis, Kim, Grammer, Carrasco, Morrison, & Gehring, 2013; Shamir et al., 2009; 
Whitebread et al., 2007, 2009), provides robust evidence of metacognitive processes in 3-5 year 
old children. Consequently, the notion that metacognitive processes do not emerge until age 7-8 
or beyond (e.g., Veenman et al., 2006) should be put to rest. This would open the field up to 
exciting avenues of work studying this important developmental period.  
Specifically, the results from this series of dissertation studies are intended to contribute 
in both theoretical (clarifying this important cognitive construct) and applied (aiding in the 
design and implementation of effective interventions for preschool-aged children intended to 
boost their development, learning and academic achievement, which is my ultimate goal) ways 
to the fields of cognitive development and education. Specifically, my research on this critical 
developmental period has elucidated the conceptualization and assessment of metacognitive 
processes—skills vital to learning and academic achievement—and implicate mechanisms 
underlying their development. My findings have contributed to the fields of cognitive 
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development and education in two significant ways. First, a clearer and more comprehensive 
conceptualization of metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive behaviors was revealed 
through Studies 1 and 2 (presented in Chapters II and III), which is fundamental to moving 
forward in examining its importance to academic success. Second, instructional information 
critical to the later design and enactment of effective early metacognitive intervention programs 
was revealed through Study 3 (presented in Chapter IV) with the long-term goal of informing 
early educational curriculum and policy and improving developmental, educational and life 
outcomes for all children. Additionally, because this research has contributed to understanding 
how metacognition is associated with learning and development for diverse children, including 
children at risk for learning difficulties, it has the potential to advance knowledge about its 
ability to serve as a protective, mediating, factor for children at risk of learning difficulties 
(Matthews, Kizzie, Rowley, & Cortina, 2010; National Center for Education Statistics, 2001; 
Sektnan, McClelland, Acock, & Morrison, 2010), promoting higher levels of cognitive 
development, learning, and academic achievement in these children despite their risk factors and 
limited metacognitive experiences at home. Providing metacognitive intervention and instruction 
(in a two-tiered approach ideally as described earlier) would be similar to the Mediated Learning 
Experiences (MLE) that Feuerstein and colleagues (Feuerstein, Rand, & Hoffman, 1979; 
Feuerstein, Rand, Hoffman, & Miller, 1980) emphasized (described in Chapter IV) as being what 
the children from lower SES families (and other risk factors) were missing, and thus what was 
responsible for their reduced (or what they described as “masked”) learning and academic 
achievement. Feuerstein and his colleagues (1979, 1980) argued that cognitive development and 
learning was masked for these children because of limited experiences rather than individual 
deficits. In the same way, providing all children (but particularly those at risk for learning 
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difficulties) with a two-tiered metacognitive intervention at the child and classroom level would 
give them the experiences and support they need to develop greater metacognitive processes and, 
subsequently, enhanced cognitive development, learning and academic achievement. 
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